Will Trump’s Bid for a “Nobel Plan” Pay Off?

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Anton ŠVEC
The Trump administration has taken a pause in addressing the Ukrainian conflict, redirecting its diplomatic efforts toward the Middle East. The peace plan proposed by Washington for Gaza is intended not only to save Israel from isolation and strategic security risks but also to secure for the American president the coveted Nobel Peace Prize
With the active involvement of the European Union, Ukraine managed to secure a pause in Donald Trump and his team’s mediation efforts to end the war. The terms of the deal outlined by Washington and Moscow did not satisfy Bankova or the EU bureaucracy backing it. The implementation of the agreements envisioned at the presidential meeting in Anchorage has been, at the very least, frozen. Kyiv has gained the opportunity to continue military operations, along with promises of U.S. weapons supplies funded by the European Union, including authorization to use them for strikes deep inside Russia. The U.S. administration has stepped back from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, waiting for the situation at the front to swing one way or the other and for the “fog of war” to clear, which would create the conditions for negotiations to resume. Clearly, shifting approaches toward a truce or a long-term deal will take considerable time. At present, all the parties involved are convinced they have not yet exhausted their potential (military, economic, or demographic) and believe they can strengthen their positions. Kyiv hopes to draw certain NATO countries and a so-called “coalition of the willing” into the conflict to boost its chances of victory, while Washington is essentially interested in increasing Brussels’ role, costs, and responsibilities in the field of European security, further deepening the EU’s economic and technological dependence on the United States. Moldova, too, could become a testing ground for further internationalization of the conflict, should the EU deem it necessary in exchange for its massive investments in supporting the PAS regime and amid the ongoing militarization of the country. Taking advantage of the pause, the White House redirected its diplomatic efforts to the Middle East, as Israel found itself in a difficult position requiring the intervention of its “patron”. Tel Aviv had severely damaged its relations with the Gulf monarchies, especially after a missile strike on Qatar’s capital, for which Benjamin Netanyahu, under pressure from Trump, recently issued a formal apology. Moreover, Israel has faced political isolation due to widespread human rights violations and inhumane methods of warfare: a dozen European states have recognized Palestinian sovereignty, Brussels has revised several trade and military agreements, and there is talk of suspending Israel from international sporting events, similar to the cases of Russia and Belarus. The exchange of strikes with Iran has damaged both Israel’s military and civilian infrastructure. Attacks by Yemen’s Houthis remain painful for Tel Aviv and have negatively affected international shipping. Radical shifts are also taking place in the sphere of military cooperation: for instance, Saudi Arabia has signed an agreement with Pakistan, effectively placing itself under its “nuclear umbrella”, which dramatically alters the balance of power in the region. Donald Trump has undertaken the task of rescuing his client, entangled largely for domestic political reasons in a “war against all”, since Israel’s aggression is already creating problems for the Americans, who are unable to justify or align their approaches even with such an ally as the United Kingdom (which recently also recognized Palestine). On Monday, the U.S. president unveiled a comprehensive peace plan for Gaza, which envisions an immediate end to the conflict and a three-stage withdrawal of Israeli forces in exchange for the release of hostages. According to Washington, neither Israel nor Hamas will take part in governing the enclave – instead, international stabilization forces under the auspices of the U.S. and Arab states will assume control, followed later by a technocratic Palestinian committee overseen by a “Peace Council” headed by Trump himself. The plan does not provide for the forced displacement of civilians from the Gaza Strip. Members of Hamas will be granted amnesty (if they lay down their arms) and will be allowed to leave; Israel will also release 250 prisoners and 1,700 Gaza residents. A free economic zone will be established in the enclave, extensive humanitarian aid will be delivered, and reconstruction of infrastructure will be organized. Netanyahu has already endorsed his American counterpart’s initiative, warning that if Hamas refuses, Israel “will finish the job itself”. Trump’s plan does not fully align with the political objectives of the Israeli prime minister and his surrounding “hawkish Zionist coalition”, the regional security interests of Israel, or the military situation in the Gaza Strip, where the IDF effectively dominates. Nevertheless, it offers a way to lift Tel Aviv out of political and diplomatic isolation and to mitigate sharply escalating strategic security risks for the state through reconciliation with certain Arab neighbors. The plan is disadvantageous for Hamas, as it effectively envisions its dismantling and eliminates the possibility of Palestinian self-governance in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, the American initiative does not take into account the situation in the West Bank, in Judea and Samaria, nor the fundamental issue of relations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, recognized by the majority of countries. Therefore, Fatah, which also claims authority over Gaza and opposes Israeli settlements in the West Bank, is unlikely to show enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the plan has a high chance of being adopted, as it is presented by Washington and is likely to gain the support of the majority of Arab countries, which suffer catastrophic reputational damage due to the daily deaths of Palestinians and the destruction of Muslim holy sites, yet are not interested in a direct conflict with Israel. On one hand, the direct external administration recalls the colonial era, but in a sense it has a consensual character, agreed upon with the Arab world, which lends the proposal both logic and potential legitimacy. Donald Trump is rushing to settle the conflict in the Gaza Strip, as just over two months remain before the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize (presented annually on December 10 in Oslo). Normalization in the Middle East, in a configuration where the U.S. president would chair a “Peace Council”, virtually guarantees him the coveted award regardless of the success of negotiations on Ukraine, where, contrary to the statements of Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, prospects for peace by the end of the year are hardly in sight. If Trump secures the coveted prize, American diplomacy will increasingly turn into an instrument for pursuing utilitarian objectives, primarily containing China and subordinating the European Union and several other historical U.S. partners. Its funding and presence will be scaled back, including in Eastern Europe. For Chisinau, which blindly follows Brussels’ line and supports Ukraine, such a scenario would be advantageous. The ruling regime, convinced that EU membership will “solve everything”, in particular, force Tiraspol into capitulation and ensure the withdrawal of Russian troops, has no need for a “bull in a china shop” operating in terms of a favorable deal and capable, at the very least, of figuratively taking Moscow’s interests into account. Genuine and inclusive negotiations are equally unappealing, as they could trigger changes and undermine the stability of its power, which it struggled so hard to “protect” from Vladimir Putin during the parliamentary elections. On December 10, after the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to Donald Trump, someone in the President’s office will breathe a sigh of relief. From then on, even certain destabilization stemming from the thawing of the Transnistrian conflict will unfold according to Brussels’ scenario, with Romania’s backing and within the broader logic of containing Moscow. In such a configuration, the interests of Tiraspol or the Kremlin are not factored in. However, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of the situation slipping out of control and the emergence of a “peacemaker president” on the stage.