Expert: PAS Will Have Little Time to Find Its Footing

Contrary to expectations, the parliamentary elections did not mark a final point, but rather opened a new phase of political turbulence. Formally, the ruling party retained its leadership, securing 55 seats in parliament. Yet, although the vote has already taken place, the elections seem far from over. Two deputies elected from the PAS list have already announced that they do not intend to join its parliamentary faction. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission, instead of calming public tension, referred the matter of six mandates of the “Democratia Acasa” party to the Constitutional Court. Whatever the court’s decision, the very existence of such disputes will further undermine trust in the electoral process and in the authorities as well. Nevertheless, most experts aiming to objectively assess the political situation in Moldova agree that PAS’ victory reflects the lack of viable alternatives more than a conscious endorsement of its policies. The very fact of the high result, which none of the sociologists had predicted, appears as an inertia of public demand oriented toward a European course. In this sense, a significant portion of voters cast their ballots not “for” PAS, but “against” the potential chaos and uncertainty associated with the opposition forces. Such an election outcome is highly perilous for the country’s internal stability, and one would hope that the key PAS officials are fully aware of this. When power is sustained not by enthusiasm but by fear of alternatives, its legitimacy becomes fragile. In a state of tension, society quickly grows weary of leadership that fails to meet expectations. If the ruling group does not change its previous approaches, it risks rapidly sliding into a deep crisis. Having secured absolute power in 2021: control over the parliament, government, and presidency, PAS had a unique opportunity for large-scale transformation. Instead, it became trapped in its inherited traumas: isolation, lack of professionalism, and rhetoric unbacked by action. The promised judicial reform has turned into an endless cycle of commissions and resignations. The judicial system remains corrupt, its rulings politicized, and reforms in education and healthcare have amounted to cosmetic changes. Essentially, the paradox is that the party, which came to power on a platform of renewal, is reproducing the old post-Soviet practices where loyalty is valued above competence. The economic situation is no better due to years of stagnation and an unstable investment climate. While international partners continue to support Chisinau with substantial loans and grants, they do so more out of geopolitical considerations than genuine confidence in PAS’ effectiveness. This dependence on external support only underscores the economy’s vulnerability and the party’s lack of its own long-term development strategy, yet the current reality will inevitably change sooner or later. PAS’ major mistake lies in its political insularity, verging on arrogance, when power holders stop listening to the very people whose support legitimizes them. The party has turned into a “monologue party”, dominated by a cult of control and obedience, where any criticism is perceived as a personal attack. As a result, PAS is increasingly alienated from society, transforming into a closed structure where decisions are made behind the scenes, primarily to maintain a balance between intra-party clans. The ruling party’s personnel policy has become one of its weakest points. Over the past four years, we have clearly witnessed its inability to form a reliable elite of professionals. Key positions are often granted to individuals lacking experience but possessing the right party ties. As a result, this has led to imbalances and inefficiencies in public administration. Such a situation not only frustrates society but also demoralizes the administrative system as a whole. In a country where the slogan of a European future is “on everybody’s lips,” public administration remains at the level of the CPSU Central Committee. Experts and representatives of civil society have repeatedly proposed various platforms for discussing the most pressing issues – from judicial matters to regional concerns. However, the ruling party has systematically ignored such initiatives, preferring decisions made by a narrow circle of loyalists. The result is obvious: the entire state system remains hostage to someone’s political interests, reforms stall, and certain sectors exhibit signs of chronic underfunding and poor management. All of this stems from the fact that experienced specialists outside PAS’ loyal circle are left out, inevitably lowering the quality of decisions. Alas, behind the lofty words about the European path lies a harsh reality, in which the country’s socio-economic situation continues to deteriorate. Prices are rising faster than wages, poverty is becoming chronic, and regions are dying out both economically and demographically. Back in 2021, PAS promised a European standard of living but failed to offer a strategy to achieve it, focusing instead on foreign policy while neglecting domestic issues. As a result, seeing no prospects for meaningful improvement, people lose faith not only in PAS but in the country itself, leaving it permanently. Paradoxically, the weakness of the opposition is not a success of PAS, but a symptom of the broader problems within the country’s political system, which lacks the necessary checks and pressures to compel the government to act more rationally. Given the results of the Patriotic Bloc, pro-Russian parties and their rhetoric remain appealing to a segment of society, primarily because PAS has failed to offer a compelling domestic narrative and often does not provide people with answers to basic questions. Consequently, the opposition fills this vacuum with its own interpretation of events. In this way, PAS itself creates the conditions for a comeback of opposition forces and the strengthening of Russian influence. At the same time, Moscow does not necessarily need its loyal forces to achieve a decisive victory; it is sufficient for Moldova to remain in a state of uncertainty and disorientation. Therefore, the outcome of the elections is not a triumph but rather a warning signal for PAS – the political formation has been given a final opportunity to prove that it can be more than just a party of slogans and become a party of governance. If the course remains the same, closed and inflexible, it risks repeating the fate of its predecessors, who once climbed to the highest peaks of the “political Olympus” only to end their journey in political oblivion, having lost public trust and become a symbol of unfulfilled expectations. In fact, the Party of Action and Solidarity has a very limited timeframe, as voters are unlikely to grant it the same leeway, they did back in 2021. It should be understood that by the time the new government bodies are formed, the year 2026 will already have arrived – the only year before the start of another prolonged electoral cycle. Beginning in 2027, with the launch of the campaign ahead of local elections, the country will once again enter its characteristic mode, where steady governance traditionally gives way to political PR. This means that PAS has less than two years to deliver tangible results. The recent history of Moldova serves as a reminder that power is a temporary phenomenon. Having received a second chance, PAS now risks losing it just as quickly. If the party fails to restore public trust, the next political wave will sweep it away just as it did Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party, whose position once seemed unshakable. The party establishment must realize that public patience is running out and that governing a country is not a continuation of an election campaign. Voters expect real change, not slogans accompanied by endless trips to Brussels.