Moldova and Cyprus: Twin Cases on the Road to the European Union

The further Chisinau advances toward full membership in the European Union, the more sharply the question of a possible “Cyprus-style” scenario for Moldova will arise

The issues of territorial and political divisions in Europe remain one of the most serious challenges to the continent’s security system. Cyprus and Moldova are two countries with their own unique features and histories, yet they are united by one key problem: the presence of unrecognized entities that have become not only stumbling blocks on the path to European integration, but also arenas for subtle diplomatic maneuvering. Recent developments in Northern Cyprus, where opposition politician Tufan Erhürman has come to power, as well as the forthcoming appointment of experienced diplomat Valeriu Chiveri to oversee the Transnistrian settlement, provide grounds for drawing parallels between these two cases, especially considering that our authorities have already referred to the Cypriot precedent in the context of EU integration more than once. The “presidential elections” held on October 19 in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) came as a surprise to many observers. The victory of Erhürman, representing the opposition Republican Turkish Party, was perceived as a sign of the society’s drift toward resolving the conflict with the rest of the island. Many analysts openly described the election results as “the most serious political defeat for Recep Erdoğan outside of Turkey”. However, a closer look reveals that the structural dependence of Northern Cyprus on Ankara remains unchanged. Therefore, despite all his “pro-European” signals, the new leader will still be forced to maintain a course of close cooperation with Turkey. Northern Cyprus is, in essence, a Turkish protectorate, sustained by Turkish subsidies and relying on Ankara’s support in areas such as healthcare and education. Turkey serves as the main guarantor of TRNC’s security, maintaining control over the size and structure of the local armed forces. Moreover, the Turkish military presence itself is a key factor ensuring the stability of the regime. The political cycles in the northern part of the island have long taken on a pendulum-like nature: with each election, power alternates between supporters of a “federal solution” and proponents of the “two-state” concept. In practice, however, this does not change the essence of the situation, since Northern Cyprus is unable to form a fully independent negotiating position. Thus, even Erhürman, despite his declared readiness for dialogue with Nicosia, emphasized that “no foreign policy decisions can be made without consultations with Ankara”. The “parliament” of the TRNC, which adopted a resolution in support of a “two-state solution” on the eve of the elections, has in fact tied the hands of the new leader of the unrecognized entity. In doing so, Ankara preserved the strategic framework in which any rapprochement with the Greek side must remain largely declarative, while in practice Turkey will continue to firmly hold its “own” part of the island. For the European Union, this issue has long since become a paradox: a member state of the EU, the Republic of Cyprus, de facto has part of its territory under the control of another state. Moreover, EU membership has not turned into an instrument for forcing the opposing side to compromise. On the contrary, Turkey uses the existing status ambiguity as a lever of pressure. The current balance between Ankara and Brussels, largely due to the EU’s dependence on Turkey’s role in migration policy and regional security, leads European capitals to perceive the Cyprus issue as a “frozen conflict with a controlled temperature”. At first glance, Moldova today appears to be moving in a direction diametrically opposed to Cyprus. The country has officially submitted its application for EU membership and is actively preparing to launch negotiations with the European Commission. However, the Transnistrian region remains precisely that obstacle which makes European integration conditional and incomplete. The key similarity between our country and Cyprus is obvious: just as Northern Cyprus has Turkey, Transnistria has Russia. Moscow, like Ankara, uses “frozen conflicts” as a tool of influence both on individual states and on the regional landscape as a whole. The mechanics of patronage in both cases are similar. Both Turkey and Russia establish special models of “controlled autonomy” in the dependent territories, supplying them with resources and ensuring their security through military presence. At the same time, they position themselves as guarantors of the local population’s safety, contrasting their role with what they characterize as the “unjust policies” of international institutions and former metropolitan centers. For Turkey, the TRNC is a symbol of geopolitical resilience, a bargaining tool in negotiations with the EU and NATO, a factor of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and an element of Turkic identity. For Russia, the Transnistrian region serves as a foothold of influence in Eastern Europe, a means of exerting pressure on Moldova and Ukraine, and also a symbol of protecting the Russian-speaking population. The appearance of an experienced diplomat, Valeriu Civeri, in the sphere of reintegration, instead of an ordinary figure from the PAS parliamentary circle (Roman Rosca), may be perceived as a signal that our authorities do intend to revitalize the negotiation process. Chiveri, who has extensive experience in relations with Russia, Ukraine, and CIS structures, may become a figure capable of formulating a concept that could reconcile European integration with reintegration. If the new approaches show any “Cyprus-like elements”, then most likely the discussion will concern the search for a stable architecture for the coexistence of the two banks of the Dniester, with a high degree of manageability of this unresolved conflict. The possible implementation of a “Cyprus scenario” in Moldova has been circulating in expert community for several years. Such a scenario implies the de facto preservation of territorial division under a framework of legal unity, and the simultaneous accession to the European Union within internationally recognized borders. However, the example of Cyprus clearly demonstrates that EU membership does not resolve the problem of a divided state and, moreover, institutionalizes this status quo. If our leadership chooses this path, then European integration will most likely take place without the reunification of the country. Brussels may well overlook the frozen status of the conflict, especially if Chisinau demonstrates continuity in reforms and an irreversible loyalty to European policy. As experience shows, Turkey and Russia today are increasingly acting not as competitors but as situational partners, including with regard to the aforementioned “unrecognized zones”. Both countries have learned to use low-intensity conflicts as a (geo)political lever in dialogue with the West. Having lost its political influence in Moldova, Moscow is likely watching the Cyprus process very closely, seeing in it a possible model for how the EU may behave toward territories with an indeterminate status. The Kremlin’s logic here is clear: if Brussels has managed to maintain relations with Nicosia despite the island’s de facto division, what would prevent it from doing the same with Chisinau? For Brussels, both cases serve as a test of its ability to pursue a policy of “deferred integration” under rapidly changing conditions. Thus, the Cyprus settlement and the inclusion of our country into the European Union become not so much issues of reintegration for either state as they do a litmus test of how far the EU is prepared to follow its own principles when confronted with real geopolitics. At the same time, Cyprus and Moldova, seeing themselves as part of a unified European bloc, will continue to bear the burden of an “unresolved territorial question”, which makes their membership incomplete. At the same time, it should be understood that while Cyprus is already a historically established case, Moldova is only now entering a period in which it will have to choose between the speed of integration and the completeness of its sovereignty. Therefore, in the very near future, our authorities will face the extremely difficult task of determining how to advance toward the EU without relinquishing part of the country’s own sovereign territory. The Cypriot example can, to a certain extent, serve as a reference model, but also as a warning: integration is possible, but it carries a certain price in the form of a geopolitical compromise.