Are There Prospects for a “Thaw” in Moldova-U.S. Relations?

Washington, it appears, is currently not prepared to invest diplomatic, financial, or military resources in Moldova, gradually losing interest in our regional space as a whole

There remains an almost imperceptible, yet still persistent, tension between Chisinau and Washington. Officially, no one speaks of a cooling of relations, let alone a conflict. Diplomats continue to describe the relationship using terms such as “partnership” and “cooperation”. However, beneath this political rhetoric lies a troubling pause, that is particularly burdensome for Moldova. And it is no longer merely tactical in nature, but carries clear strategic implications, stemming from a deep incompatibility of expectations, priorities, and political orientations. A new chapter of this vague state began with the appointment of Alexandru Munteanu as Prime Minister, who publicly announced his intention to make his first visits to Bucharest and Brussels, as well as to “resume dialogue” with the United States, which, in his words, remains “frozen”. At the same time, he does not plan to go to Washington directly. The newly appointed prime minister became the first to say out loud what had long been evident, acknowledging the obvious reality. Moreover, his phrasing “we should also begin a dialogue with them” indicates that the United States is no longer viewed as a primary foreign policy priority. And the issue is not only that Munteanu is placing his main bet on Brussels, but also that Washington itself is not particularly interested in developing relations with our country. Even if the head of government does, as claimed, hold a U.S. passport and maintains certain connections, this no longer guarantees automatic access to high-level offices in Washington. The days when personal contacts could compensate for the absence of a coherent policy are over. Today, the United States engages not with loyal individuals, but with institutional capacity and in this regard, Moldova, to put it mildly, is not in the best shape. Therefore, the fact that our leadership is reacting to the current situation without hysteria or attempts to urgently “fix things” speaks to only one conclusion: the Moldovan political establishment has already internally come to terms with Washington’s position. Washington’s foreign policy priorities in recent years show that its primary attention will be focused on Asia, the Middle East, its own domestic political struggles, and global competition. In this picture, Eastern Europe is gradually losing its significance, and Moldova, in particular, is turning into a peripheral point on the map. To put it bluntly, the White House does not currently view us as a strategic player, but rather as an object of external influence for certain European capitals, and as a regional headache marked by vague internal reforms and chronic elite fragmentation. In parallel with the formation of the new government, Maia Sandu appointed Nicu Popescu as the President’s Special Envoy for European and Strategic Partnerships. Beyond signaling the need to strengthen the diplomatic track, this personnel decision highlights a new foreign policy formula: the European Union is priority number one, while relations with the United States are pursued only “if possible”. In essence, the presidency is placing its bet on the European project, reinforcing the political hierarchy around it, and concentrating resources specifically on the issue of integration. The latest appointments and the priorities set by the new cabinet clearly contrast with the optimistic background that Moldova’s ambassador to Washington, Vladislav Kulminski, had tried to project not long ago. In September, he asserted that in the U.S. capital there was not only respect, but genuine openness toward cooperation with Chisinau. He also spoke of a “positive momentum” and a “distinctly friendly attitude” on the part of the Americans. However, Kulminski’s statements now appear to be little more than routine diplomatic rhetoric, smoothing over tensions and concealing a much harsher reality. The U.S. has, in fact, already provided a realistic assessment of the situation in Moldova, which stands in sharp contrast to the optimism prevailing among our authorities. The annual U.S. State Department report on the investment climate states that systemic corruption remains entrenched in the country, meaningful reforms are lacking, the economy teeters on the brink of stagnation, and the judiciary remains dependent on political interests, earning minimal public trust. The document presents a stark and discouraging picture of institutional functioning and governance quality, directly highlighting failures in building the rule of law and the absence of transparency. Such a profile, outlined in official American sources, effectively captures the current level of confidence in Moldova’s authorities. A notable episode reflecting the U.S. administration’s actual stance toward our country, which is often discussed here in hushed tones, is the recent U.S. sanctions against Russian oil giants. Regardless of the rationale behind the Trump administration’s actions, the consequences for Moldova are very real, no matter how our authorities try to maintain an air of composure. One way or another, Lukoil is one of the largest players in the national fuel market. Its potential exit is not merely a “minor industry fluctuation,” but a targeted blow to economic stability, logistics, and energy security—particularly concerning fuel supplies for key facilities, such as the airport. The recent U.S. decision to reduce its military presence in Europe, primarily in Romania, is also noteworthy. This neighboring country, as a NATO member, has always been perceived as a strategic partner of the United States in the region. If Washington is withdrawing troops from a country where formal obligations still exist without hesitation, expecting greater loyalty from Moldova is simply an illusion. The likely reason behind such decisions is that, in recent months, Bucharest has engaged in actions perceived by the U.S. as disloyal, while Moldova, in this context, is seen as a country with even more fragile foreign policy discipline. The conclusion and the signal are therefore perfectly clear: the U.S. will not maintain a military shield over countries that do not demonstrate political alignment with America. The frozen dialogue with Washington, the emphasis on European integration, and the growing external challenges are shaping a new geopolitical reality for Moldova. Reliance on the United States as a strategic partner has, in practice, become impossible, which is why the country’s foreign policy course is shifting exclusively toward Brussels. Under these conditions, the role of the United States will increasingly take the form of that of a detached observer. It turns out that Moldova-American relations have stalled and are now close to a strategic rupture. Perhaps some in our political circles interpreted this as a signal to strengthen foreign-policy autonomy. However, in today’s fragile geopolitical balance, marked by periodic pendulum-like shifts in contacts between Washington and Moscow, Moldova may soon face challenges that Brussels may prove unprepared to handle, either politically or in terms of resources. In the medium term, a state of “cooled stability” between Moldova and the United States is likely to persist, without any signs of revival. Washington is currently unwilling to invest diplomatic, financial, or military resources in Moldova, and is gradually losing interest in our regional space as a whole. This approach, it appears, will remain dominant over the next two to three years, until the next U.S. presidential election cycle. The major risk is that Moldova may ultimately lose what remains of U.S. foreign policy attention precisely at the moment when it will need it most. Against the backdrop of growing military-political turbulence in the region, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and heightened uncertainty in the Black Sea area, the absence of an additional strategic safety buffer could become a decisive factor in determining the geopolitical fate of our state.