Could Ukraine See Peace Before the New Year?

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The recently surfaced “Trump plan” – a 28-point proposal for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – is being presented as another potential chance for long-awaited peace
Vladimir ROTARI, RTA: Known for its abrupt twists, the conflict in Ukraine has once again delivered an impressive plot turn. Only recently it seemed that the negotiation process had been put on hold, with both sides moving toward a new round of military escalation. This impression was reinforced by their mutual official statements, the intensifying long-range strikes, and the advance of Russian forces along multiple sections of the frontline. However, this week saw an unexpected surge in discussions about establishing peace, triggered by the emergence of the so-called 28-point “Trump Plan”. In the first days, the Western press was flooded with various leaks about possible provisions of the document, and yesterday Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Goncharenko, as well as the influential outlet Axios, published it in full. Judging by the leaks to the media, the new peace plan was drafted by U.S. Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff and Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund. Although it is formally claimed that Ukrainian representatives also took part in its development, it appears they were able to make only minor adjustments at this stage. The reaction of the warring sides to the emergence of yet another peace proposal has also been telling. While Moscow has commented on the matter with considerable caution and, moreover, refrains from any criticism, indirectly confirming its positive view of the plan, Kyiv perceives it almost as an act of capitulation. In fact, the plan is structured in a way that, as far as possible, seeks to sufficiently accommodate the interests of both parties to the conflict by offering each certain incentives. Russia, for instance, would receive the security-architecture changes it has demanded since 2021, NATO’s refusal to admit Ukraine, the lifting of sanctions and reintegration into the global economy, prospects for economic cooperation with the United States, and an invitation back into the G8. Certain shifts would also have to take place in Ukraine’s domestic politics, including a ban on Nazi ideology and the resolution of language and religious issues. In addition, Russia would retain and receive de facto recognition of its territorial acquisitions along with the “L/DNR” within their administrative boundaries. As for Kyiv, it is promised sovereignty, the possibility of joining the EU, and security guarantees both in the form of a mechanism analogous to Article 5 of the NATO Charter and through Russia’s legally binding renunciation of any future attack. The plan also outlines a “recovery” assistance package of at least $200 billion, to be provided in equal measure by Russia and the European Union. It is evident that the plan is somewhat more favorable to Moscow than to Kyiv. Yet in reality, this is likely the maximum either side could hope to obtain given the current battlefield situation and their respective political and socioeconomic conditions. At the same time, the concessions both parties would be compelled to make do not appear critical. For Ukraine, the most psychologically difficult demand is probably to relinquish the remaining territory of Donbas still under its control. Although the plan states this area would become a demilitarized zone leased out under specific terms, with Russian forces prohibited from entering it. The planned reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is largely symbolic: 600,000 personnel is still far greater than the size of the pre-war Ukrainian army and exceeds what the country could realistically afford to maintain. As for recognizing the rights of the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, this can only be viewed positively, as it would contribute to stabilizing and easing tensions within Ukrainian society, which has long been strained by linguistic and religious conflicts. Trump’s peace plan appears “capitulatory” only to Ukraine’s current leadership, which has repeatedly defined as its “red lines” any agreement that would impose limits on the Ukrainian Armed Forces, restrict the country’s right to join NATO, or involve external interference in domestic affairs. It is therefore unsurprising that the Zelensky administration, while avoiding an immediate refusal to the U.S. president, has already begun quietly undermining the project, just as he did with all previous peace initiatives put forward by Trump. The pattern is always the same: Russia and the United States draft a plan, Ukraine, backed by the EU, presses to introduce amendments unacceptable to the Kremlin, the initiative collapses, and the war enters a new cycle of escalation. At the same time, Zelensky’s administration is now in its most vulnerable position since the start of the war. The front is marked by continuous setbacks: Russian forces are steadily advancing in Donbas, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces face dangerous operational crises in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts that could escalate into strategic ones. The search for funds to continue financing both civilian and military needs remains unresolved. A major corruption scandal involving the president’s entourage is raging inside the country. Against this backdrop, the opposition has become more active, and the ruling coalition is beginning to fracture. According to rumors, a faction of lawmakers from the Servant of the People party is demanding the resignation of Ukraine’s “grey cardinal”, Presidential Office head Andriy Yermak, threatening to leave the faction and collapse the fragile single-party majority if he remains in power. All of this weakens Zelensky’s ability to resist the Russian-American plan as firmly as before, especially given that, according to available information, he has been allotted only a week to provide his response. Moreover, the current wave of attacks linked to the corruption case may in fact have been inspired by Washington itself in order to increase the Ukrainian leader’s pliability, since the country’s entire anticorruption framework was created under the supervision of the Americans, albeit under the Democratic administration. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that official Kyiv has been left with no room for maneuver at all. First, it can lean on the EU, which has already spoken negatively about Trump’s proposal and is now preparing its own. However, in that case, the Europeans must be ready to provide Ukraine with an unprecedented level of support so that their backing is not merely symbolic. Second, the situation itself may, in a surprising way, help Zelensky strengthen his domestic political position. Ukrainian society dislikes external pressure being applied to the country, and it is likely to rally around the president, even amid the corruption scandal. This already happened earlier this year after the well-known Oval Office confrontation. Finally, third, Kyiv may verbally agree with the plan while once again attempting to change its key provisions. However, in that case Russia is unlikely to accept it, and the war will enter yet another cycle. Therefore, everything once again comes down to one key question: how willing is Donald Trump to put pressure on the parties to the conflict in order to compel them to reach a deal? In his previous attempts, the answer was clearly negative. He has only recently imposed his first restrictions on Russia, targeting its major oil companies, but has not yet dared to introduce truly painful secondary sanctions. As for Ukraine, apart from a brief halt in military aid and the provision of intelligence without any serious punitive measures, it has faced no real pressure under Trump. It now depends on the American president whether the hostilities in Ukraine will cease before the New Year. There is a sense that, for the first time in four years, our regional space is genuinely close to peace. On the other hand, it is far too early to indulge in excessive optimism – just a single week could be enough to derail this latest peace initiative and leave the conflict in an active phase for yet another extended period, until a new peace attempt is made.