Is Brussels Worth the Cost of Moldova’s Relations with Turkey?

The course announced at the end of last year toward developing the national economy and attracting investment is, from the very outset, being doomed to failure by decisions driven solely by geopolitical considerations

The initial enthusiasm surrounding the appointment of Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu was largely driven by his stated emphasis on economic development and investment attraction. The maximum depoliticization of the new cabinet’s program gave rise to public hopes that, for the first time in years, pragmatism would prevail over politics and finally deliver the long-awaited stability. The economic agenda took center stage not only in the government’s overall program, but also in the strategies of individual ministries and agencies. Even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pledged to give priority to boosting exports and attracting foreign capital. According to Mihai Popsoi, “promoting economic diplomacy to enhance citizens’ well-being” is among the key objectives for 2026. However, it is highly likely that these noble intentions will never be implemented. In practice, the decisions of the country’s leadership continue to be driven not by national interests, but by geopolitical expediency. Moldova’s growing dependence on the European Union in foreign policy matters, combined with the authorities’ desire to curry favor with Brussels officials, threatens to create new problems. This is not only about steps that rule out any prospects for normalizing relations with the Russian Federation (such as the expropriation of the assets of the Russian company Lukoil). In order to secure positive signals from the EU, the ruling regime appears ready to sacrifice even its relations with Turkey. On the eve of the Republic of Cyprus assuming the presidency of the Council of the European Union, Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to join the EU sanctions imposed on Turkey over what Brussels described as “unauthorized exploration and drilling activities” in the Eastern Mediterranean. Introduced back in 2019 at the initiative of Greece and Cyprus, these sanctions envisaged restrictive measures against the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and its senior management, as well as against other state-owned companies in the energy sector. The political subtext of this decision is clear. Maia Sandu once again found an opportunity to demonstrate solidarity with Brussels and add a high-profile photo to her portfolio. It is unlikely that our president would have been warmly received at the event in Nicosia marking the official start of Cyprus’s EU Council presidency if Mihai Popsoi had not prepared the ground for it. In mid-December, Sandu personally visited Cyprus to explore possible ways to appease the Cypriots. Following her talks with the Cypriot leader, she was even given a tour along the border with Northern Cyprus. By that point, it had already become clear what to expect in Moldova’s relations with Turkey. Undoubtedly, our authorities can count on the loyalty of the Cypriot presidency over the next six months regarding the compatibility of the EU integration agenda with the reintegration process. This includes the long-awaited opening of negotiation clusters, although such calculations must take into account the enduring close linkage between Moldova and Ukraine. On the initiative of the Cypriot Minister for European Affairs in August of last year the media began to explore the possibility of a two-stage integration of our country into the EU. At that time, Marilena Raouna told the press that resolving the Transnistrian conflict was not a prerequisite for Moldova’s EU accession and that the Cypriot mechanism could be used (allowing European legislation to extend to the northern part of the island under Turkish occupation when circumstances permit). Direct analogies were drawn with Transnistria and the presence of Russian military forces. Later, Brussels officials actively distanced themselves from this idea as a practical option, fully aware of the associated complexities. Another question is what the consequences of such purely opportunistic moves by our leaders will be, given that Turkey remains one of Moldova’s key trading partners. According to official data, there are 1,179 enterprises in our country with Turkish capital totaling around 1.1 billion lei. Turkish companies have established a number of successful operations in sectors such as textiles and food production, road construction, mobile communications, healthcare, and hospitality. Landmarks that have become the calling cards of Chisinau – MallDova, Radisson Blu Leogrand Chișinău, Courtyard by Marriott Chisinau, Medpark, Crown Plaza, Chisinau International Airport, and Arena Chisinau – were all developed by Turkish businesses. The increasingly important sphere of energy security is also closely linked to Turkey, which has become a key transit hub for hydrocarbons in Eastern Europe. All gas exports from Romania to Moldova, Ukraine, and Greece rely on supplies passing through Turkey. At present, Ankara ranks third in terms of import volume from Moldova, accounting for nearly 9%. Moreover, exports to Turkey in January-October 2025 increased 1.7 times compared to the same period in 2024. In Moldova’s import structure, Turkey also holds an important position with 7%, alongside Germany. The growth of trade between the two countries was facilitated by the free trade regime established during Vlad Plahotniuc’s tenure. A decade later, however, this agreement could come under threat. Recently, EU officials have mentioned that one potential measure against Turkey could be the suspension of the customs union. If such initiatives are implemented, the first to feel the impact will likely be the EU candidate countries, rather than the member states themselves. In recent years, Moldova has clearly experienced a growing trend of capital flight. Investment in the country has declined amid foreign policy risks and systemic economic problems. With their latest politicized decisions, the authorities are making the diversification of investment, something they themselves frequently advocate, impossible. It is evident that, in the medium term, Moldova will only increase its dependence on European funding, depriving itself of opportunities to engage with other regional centers of power.