Sandu’s Pro-Ukrainian Militarism: How Will Russia Respond?

Anton ŠVEC

The exchange of high-level visits between Kyiv and Chisinau,amid burning border crossing points, raises acute questions about the limits of Moldova’s neutrality and security

On Monday, Maia Sandu, together with the leaders of several Western countries, visited Kyiv, where she endorsed the so-called “coalition of the willing” and presented Volodymyr Zelensky with Moldova’s highest state honor, the Order of the Republic. In the Ukrainian capital, the foreign leaders put forward a number of demands directed at Russia, including a halt to hostilities along the current front line, an end to strikes on energy and transport infrastructure, and declared their readiness to deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a pause in the war. The United Kingdom announced that it would grant Kyiv the rights to produce Storm Shadow/SCALP long-range cruise missiles and called on NATO member states to support Ukraine’s air defense. The events in Kyiv were coordinated with a UN resolution condemning Russia’s attack. It likewise called for an end to hostilities along the current line of contact and to attacks on civilian infrastructure. Maia Sandu did not merely take part in the celebrations marking Ukraine’s Independence Day but actively voiced support for its actions and condemned Russia. At the same time, she invited Presidents Nicusor Dan and Volodymyr Zelensky to Chisinau, where an expensive military parade marking Moldova’s Independence Day will be held on Thursday. Clearly, the event will continue the anti-Russian and militaristic rhetoric. Especially since on Monday, our leadership, represented by Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu and Prime Minister Vasile Tofan, had already made a series of similar statements, claiming that Ukraine, by waging war, is defending Moldova’s territorial integrity, freedom, and independence. The rhetoric and actions of the PAS regime are not merely a reflection of the ideological dogmas of Sandu’s team or an attempt to follow the latest political fashion. They reflect very specific demands from a European Union undergoing militarization, as well as from a North Atlantic Alliance seeking a new strategic foothold and greater coordination of foreign and security policy. For Moldova, this is expected to be formalized not only at the doctrinal and legislative levels, but also reinforced through concrete rhetoric, participation in sanctions and migration restrictions, as well as the strengthening and training of the national armed forces. The decisions taken in Kyiv, despite the changing situation on the battlefield and Ukraine’s deteriorating infrastructure as a result of intensified Russian strikes, undermine the very prerequisites for moving toward peace negotiations. For the time being, this situation suits most stakeholders, with the possible exception of the United States, which did not even support the relevant UN statement, yet is in no hurry to send its envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, to the capitals of the parties to the conflict. If we assume that the military campaign will continue, Moldova will become increasingly drawn into the mobilization context. Recently, Romania’s defense minister complained about the consequences of the hostilities, including the regular discovery of Russian and Ukrainian drones in Romanian airspace and territorial waters, arguing that Bucharest is not a party to the conflict and should not have to bear its consequences. Chisinau cannot afford to make such statements. On the contrary, Maia Sandu systematically comments on developments in the neighboring country and condemns Russia. In practice, Moldova is prepared to assist Ukraine. The discount granted on rail transit is merely one example of the current political line. The intelligence services’ investigation into the ammunition depots in Transnistrian Cobasna is not only an element of information management aimed at suppressing public discontent, particularly amid rising gas tariffs, but also a gesture toward Kyiv, which has shown interest in the aforementioned military stockpiles for many years. Despite Chisinau’s unfriendly measures against embassy diplomats and its withdrawal from agreements within the CIS framework, Moscow has so far confined itself entirely to information and diplomatic confrontation. However, the expansion of military and other transit traffic through Moldova apparently does not sit well with Russia. Previously, it deliberately sought to destroy bridges linking Ukraine with its southwestern neighbors, as well as individual locomotives and railway trains. Now, the targets of strikes have shifted to border crossing points along the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Yesterday saw the second such attack in a single week, this time targeting Vynohradivka on Ukrainian territory, near the border with Vulcanesti. The Kremlin is making it clear that excessive attention to Cobasna, even when justified by indirect considerations, and logistical support for Kyiv constitute a “red line”. This is particularly significant given the repeated statements about transforming the peacekeeping mission on the Dniester, as well as a new round of pressure on businesses and the social environment in Transnistria through the planned imposition of excise duties and value-added tax on enterprises in the region. Russia has repeatedly, at the level of its ambassador and Foreign Ministry representatives, called on Chisinau to pursue pragmatic relations and resume negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement. However, these calls have been ignored by the ruling regime, which is systematically suppressing any elements of Russian influence, including through measures targeting Gagauzia’s autonomy. There has been no dialogue at the highest or governmental level for several years. Under these circumstances, Moscow’s further responses may take a form unexpected for Moldova’s political establishment, as diplomatic options have, in effect, long since been exhausted. PAS is deliberately pursuing a path of escalation, believing that intensifying the Russian threat will give Maia Sandu greater latitude to eliminate domestic opponents and allow her government to press more aggressively for EU membership, or even union with Romania, regardless of the pace of reforms. The likely collateral damage to the economy and the population is apparently regarded as negligible from the regime’s perspective.