Will Moldova Be on the Periphery of a ‘New Yalta’?

Sergiu CEBAN

The prospect of a major diplomatic realignment puts Moldova’s foreign policy of recent years in a new light. As major powers seek ways to resolve the conflict in Ukraine and discuss the future of European security, Chișinău enters this phase having strained relations with Russia, limited dialogue with the United States, and largely untapped potential for cooperation with China

Over the past week, two significant developments have converged on the international stage, which can potentially shape a new geopolitical framework. The first concerns the idea of a trilateral summit involving the United States, China and Russia; the second, Moscow’s agreement to resume trilateral talks involving Ukraine and the United States. For Moldova, found in dangerous proximity to the epicentre of events, the emerging contours of a broader diplomatic game are of considerable importance, as the country’s security environment could change faster than its leadership can grasp what’s unfolding. Despite the high-level summit, the interests of the three key players are unlikely to be reconciled after just one round of talks. According to analysts, Washington is seeking to draw “red lines” for Beijing over Taiwan in exchange for concessions in Europe. China is positioning itself as the leading peacemaker and guarantor of economic stability across Eurasia, struggling to balance its relations with Moscow and Brussels. Russia, meanwhile, is seeking to legitimise its territorial claims and restore its status as one of the key centres of power, linking an end to the war to restrictions on Western military activity in Eastern Europe. If the “trilateral” summit lays the groundwork, direct talks between Moscow and Kyiv will likely give it concrete substance. For now, however, the Kremlin is prepared to engage only in a trilateral format, excluding European intermediaries. This is significant in itself, as the EU and the UK could find themselves “shut out” when discussions turn to the future of European security. As is well known, Moscow’s central strategic demand is for NATO’s military infrastructure to be rolled back to the alliance’s 1997 borders. According to diplomatic sources, this demand could be put forward at the next round of Russian-Ukrainian talks in November. In practical terms, this would mean the withdrawal of NATO forces from Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland and other countries, in other words dismantling the deterrence architecture that has taken shape over the past quarter-century. Thus, the alliance’s Eastern European defence network is becoming a central issue on the agenda of potential European security talks. All the countries listed above are, in one way or another, protected by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Romania, however, is in a different position: despite being a NATO member, its eastern flank borders directly on Moldova and Ukraine, both of which are unstable in terms of security and military risks. As a country outside NATO, Moldova has only its partnership with the EU and defence cooperation with Romania as institutional safeguards. This means that Russia’s demands for NATO to roll back its military presence to the 1997 configuration carry the greatest potential impact for Moldova. In Chișinău, the authorities are either turning a blind eye to what is unfolding or preparing for the impending diplomatic activity in a rather unusual way, including by building up military-technical cooperation with Ukraine. Yesterday, as is known, a new agreement was signed in Kyiv providing for the transfer of drone-production technologies and the possibility of assembling unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Moldovan territory. However, the deeper Moldova becomes involved in defence ties with a country at war, the more important it is to understand what guarantees it receives and what risks it takes on. The authorities readily speak of army modernisation, technology and assistance from partners, but it is much harder to figure out how these initiatives fit into a long-term diplomatic strategy. For Moldova, the substance of any potential grand deal will be shaped by three sets of issues: the country’s military status and foreign presence; external defence cooperation; and the political and economic terms of the Transnistrian settlement. Moscow will clearly seek to prevent the emergence in Moldova of any infrastructure it perceives as a threat. This calls into question Chișinău’s entire strategy of “a backdoor exit from neutrality”, an approach it has pursued in recent years. One of the most likely negotiating packages concerning Moldova could involve discussions on Russia’s military presence on the left bank of the Dniester alongside international guarantees of the country’s neutral status. These issues are directly linked to the structure of a future reunified state and the powers vested in the Transnistrian region. In this context, virtually any external agreement could have implications for Moldova’s domestic political architecture. For PAS, this means the risk of facing a settlement framework incompatible with its vision of maintaining full control over the reintegration process. Odesa Oblast and southern Ukraine as a whole will also be of critical importance. The security of Ukrainian ports and land routes, the north-western Black Sea region, and supply routes will all shape the extent to which developments affect both banks of the Dniester and their future coexistence. At the same time, Kyiv will continue to view the Transnistrian vector as part of its efforts to protect southern Ukraine for the foreseeable future. Consequently, Ukraine will assess the final settlement formula in terms of its implications for the wider Odesa region. These circumstances make Ukrainian support particularly important for Moldova, but its scope and limits will be determined primarily by Kyiv’s own interests. Moldova’s authorities tend to emphasize the two countries’ shared European path, but when it comes to the post-war settlement, their positions may align only partially. Ukraine needs predictability on its south-western flank and the absence of additional threats. It is therefore far from certain that Kyiv would be willing to accept even a reunification plan that fully meets Moldova’s expectations. Our country arguably finds itself at one of the most vulnerable points in its modern history. Successful high-level negotiations could create an opportunity for Moldova to make progress on the Transnistrian issue, but they also carry the risk of the country being confronted with external conditions that will likely be shaped without Chisinau’s participation. The most dangerous scenario for Moldova would be to become a convenient bargaining chip, serving as a prelude to more complex agreements. For the major powers, restrictions on Moldova’s defence cooperation and the country’s reunification on the basis of an externally imposed model might seem like an acceptable formula for cooperation. For Moldova itself, however, such an arrangement could shape its development trajectory for years to come. Under the circumstances, Moldovan society needs answers to concrete questions now. Who is conveying Moldova’s position to Washington and European capitals? Which terms are considered unacceptable? How are defence projects linked to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Transnistrian conflict? The lack of clarity cannot be indefinitely excused by the complexity of the international situation, hybrid attacks, alleged Kremlin machinations and the like. If the stars align and global politics begins to take on new forms and substance, PAS’s foreign policy will face a particularly uncomfortable test. What diplomatic leverage does Moldova actually have in its relations with the key players? Its political dialogue with the United States is cool, while expectations of the strategic partnership are inflated. With China, Moldova has untapped potential for cooperation while constantly heeding Brussels which is imposing restrictive mechanisms designed to curb trade with the Middle Kingdom. Relations with Moscow, meanwhile, are marked by outright confrontation. Chișinău has placed its main bet on European partners, whose own ability to influence the terms of any potential grand deal is, to put it mildly, limited. If anyone in Chișinău still believes that Moldova’s position will automatically be taken seriously under these circumstances, that is profoundly naive. At some point, PAS leaders or those close to Maia Sandu may come to realise that putting all their eggs in Brussels’ basket was a strategic miscalculation. By then, however, Moldova may be left to negotiate an already assembled diplomatic package that sets the country’s future course with little room for manoeuvre. Ultimately, it is the entire country and future generations that will pay the price for years of placing geopolitical loyalty to the European Union above a sovereign foreign policy.