The Shadow of Federalisation over Moldova

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Sergiu CEBAN
The Ukraine talks are gradually taking on a much broader geopolitical dimension, involving matters about the future security architecture of Eastern Europe. Against this backdrop, the issue of federalisation in Moldova has returned to the news agenda, with media reports suggesting that Moscow is seeking to make it part of possible international agreements
Following the latest round of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi last week, efforts to reach a settlement between Russia and Ukraine appear to have moved decisively beyond simply defining the terms of a ceasefire. The negotiations are increasingly focused on much broader and more complex issues, including the shaping of a new European security architecture. Moreover, sources say that the actual scope of the talks is considerably broader than what the parties are making public. The prospect of the diplomatic process gradually incorporating new elements and extending beyond the immediate conflict zone had been discussed before. However, this trend became apparent only after the recent meetings in the UAE, where, apparently, the first exchange of conceptual issues took place. Among other things, Moscow is using the platform to revive its ultimatums of late 2021, insisting that a settlement of the conflict in Ukraine and a new security architecture in Europe are part of the same equation. It is precisely this formula, in our view, that contains a political and legal loophole: virtually any issues unrelated directly to Ukraine but falling within the scope of the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests could be folded into this broader package. According to media reports, Russia’s list of demands is wide-ranging, with all of them aimed at strengthening and in some cases restoring Moscow’s decisive role in regional affairs, particularly across the post-Soviet space. This is an important point for Moldova. With an unresolved conflict and a foreign military presence on its territory, the country automatically becomes one of the potential weak points in Europe’s security architecture. Its status is also among the easiest to reconsider in exchange for concessions on issues of greater importance to global powers. A series of coordinated leaks to the media can be interpreted from several different angles. On the one hand, they may be linked to the so-called “pro-war camp” in the West, which is creating a toxic backdrop by publicising deliberately unacceptable Russian demands, making it possible to portray any compromise as a capitulation. On the other hand, the leaks may serve to gauge public opinion and test how European capitals respond to painful concessions that could form the basis of future agreements on a new European security system, particularly in its eastern part. Further evidence that behind-the-scenes discussions are indeed taking place within the US establishment came in the form of a recent reaction from eight former US ambassadors, who saw Washington’s attempts to explore a compromise with Moscow as a sign of Western weakness. A little earlier, in October, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul also hinted that Russia might have plans extending beyond its war against Ukraine and targeting, first and foremost, Georgia, Moldova and the Baltic states. Of particular interest to Moldova is the issue of federalisation, reports of which have made headlines across the Moldovan and Romanian media. Without exaggeration, this issue represents a deep-rooted trauma for Moldova, triggering an almost reflexive rejection among the country’s ruling elites. According to media reports, during informal consultations in Abu Dhabi, Russia proposed creating a federation comprising three entities: right-bank Moldova, Transnistria and Gagauzia. In return, Moscow reportedly expressed its readiness to withdraw its troops from the left bank of the Dniester, provided that the republic retained its non-aligned status and the regions were granted the right to hold independence referendums should Moldova join the EU. One may have different views on the nervous reaction in Chisinau and Bucharest, but it is important to understand what lies behind it. For Moldova’s political establishment, federalisation is not a form of conventional decentralisation but rather an institutional mechanism that would give an external centre of influence a permanent foothold within the country. This is precisely why even the slightest mention of the issue is perceived as an existential threat. This explains why the authorities, speaking through the government spokesperson and the speaker of parliament, categorically ruled out any discussion of federalisation from the outset. Such a position is entirely understandable and justifiable. However, the problem lies elsewhere: if Washington, or worse still, Washington together with Brussels, were to ask Chisinau to put forward a realistic counterproposal that could serve as a basis for negotiations with Moscow, would the country’s leadership be able to formulate one? Do they have any vision for such a scenario that goes beyond an outright “no”? In our view, the main vulnerability of Moldova’s current position lies precisely in the absence of a convincing alternative. The key indicator of how events will unfold from here will, of course, be the position taken by Brussels and Washington. So far, however, neither has sent any unequivocal signals that Moscow’s demands are unacceptable. Unfortunately, silence in matters of this kind is never neutral. Had our partners categorically opposed such federal arrangements, their reaction would have come the same day, in the strongest possible terms. The absence of official comments, however, suggests that the issue remains on the agenda and that its prospects will be determined in the course of further negotiations. Let us consider a relatively optimistic scenario for Moldova, in which the emergence of federalisation as an issue on the agenda is merely part of Moscow’s initial negotiating position, one that could be softened as agreements are reached on other, far more sensitive geopolitical issues for Russia. Even so, Moldova’s very presence in these negotiations indicates that, despite its sharply diminished regional influence, Moscow has not abandoned its ambitions in this part of Europe. Moldova therefore remains within the scope of Russia’s foreign policy interests. In our view, the emergence of federalisation as an issue not only in diplomatic circles but also in the media is far from coincidental. It is a clear signal that familiar approaches from the past are reintroduced. If developments continue along their current trajectory, the further advancement of this narrative could gradually alter the status quo, shifting relations with Tiraspol and Comrat away from the realm of Moldova’s internal affairs and into the international arena. Hard as it may be to admit, Moldova could, within this logic, be viewed as a diplomatic testing ground and a country occupying a geopolitically ambiguous position, towards which neither Russia nor the West has firm commitments. Consequently, it may also be the country where the prospects for reaching a compromise are greatest. Chișinău should not regard federalisation as an inevitable outcome or as a non-negotiable plan that will be presented as an ultimatum. It should prepare for something else: the moment when our Western partners ask us on what terms we are prepared to discuss the withdrawal of Russian troops, security guarantees and the status of the Transnistrian region. If we have no viable proposal of our own by then, our political elites will once again, as in 2003, have to choose between options put forward by others. The only difference is that, this time, no one will be there to talk our leadership out of it, as happened with Voronin.