Moldovan-Ukrainian Control in Kuchurgan: Slow Progress or Dysfunction?

Dorin Mocanu, RTA The idea of creating a combined control at the Kuchurgan checkpoint on the Ukrainian border with unrecognized Transdniestria belongs to the representatives of the EU Delegation to Moldova and EUBAM, its expert technical study was made back in 2012-2013. This crossing point has been the main channel for Transdniestria’s foreign trade for many years, although since 2006 only imports have passed through it. The European Union is developing a strategic initiative in the economic processes in the region, obtained after the granting of the autonomous trade preferences (APT) regime to Transdniestria in the spring of 2008 and the subsequent coordination at the end of 2015 of a special trade format with Transdniestrian economic operators in accordance with the rules of the EU-RM Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). To strengthen its regional positions on the Moldovan track, the European Union took advantage of the Ukrainian political crisis and the coming to power of new elites, which radically changed Kyiv’s approaches to the Transdniestrian settlement and to Tiraspol itself. In 2014, the EU initiated a project of joint customs and border control of Ukraine and Moldova at the Kuchurgan checkpoint in accordance with the practices and methods of integrated border management, transition to which was a commitment of both states in accordance with the signed Association Agreements with the EU. The Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) has funded creation of the related infrastructure in Kuchurgan for a total of up to 6.5 million Euros, provided methodological assistance and information support for the project. An analysis of expert assessments and official comments suggests that Brussels viewed this pilot project as an important tool that is of a combined political and economic nature and allows for additional opportunities to influence the process of settling the long-standing conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria. The linking of Transdniestrian enterprises to the EU market in combination with the strengthening of their dependence on the Moldovan customs and other regulatory authorities should create unique tools for the joint influence of Chisinau and Brussels on Tiraspol. The mission was to smoothly switch the Transdniestrian business to Moldovan administration and strengthen its position in the EU. This would allow to deepen the gap between political intentions of the Transdniestria’s leadership and practical policy with the understanding that the economic basis would sooner or later rock the political superstructure towards the European Union. European experts and high level advisers, understanding the sensitive nature of the issue, focused their Moldovan and Ukrainian colleagues on using the most attractive rhetoric and progressive methods, promises for simplified “one-stop shop” control regimes for the Transdniestrian business. It must be said that the task set by the EU was carried out well in the information sphere. Kyiv and Chisinau focused exclusively on economic benefits, including ensuring the optimal logistics of cargo exports from Transdniestria, and also demonstrating the determination to fight smuggling between two neighboring states. In Chisinau, on November 4, 2015, they signed agreements on the organization of joint control, which allowed to begin substantive work and allocate funding. However, the project’s implementation came up against the first obstacles that were not initially so problematic and that could have been avoided in the presence of concentration of efforts, and most importantly, Chisinau’s ability to use European recommendations and adjust tactics of relations with Tiraspol. Transdniestria as it was expected met the joint control initiative with heavy criticism and a political and information campaign to obstruct it. One of the main arguments of Tiraspol was that the decision to control had been made without taking into account its opinion with violation of previously signed agreements with Chisinau and outside the negotiation process in the international 5+2 format, in which the EU participates as an observer. The subject matter of criticism that was negative expectations from the control regime and the projected damage to the business of the unrecognized republic is of no fundamental significance in this case, since the figures given by Tiraspol were not subjected to an independent audit. Besides, they did not eventually become a cause of stalling in establishing the control regime in Kuchurgan. To launch such an important regional project for European interests, stakeholders had to take the minimum necessary backup measures to ensure that any possible charges were rebutted. The experts who are directly engaged in this project said that Brussels had conducted serious political and diplomatic work, primarily with Moscow, in order to avoid surprises and complications. It is also known that Moscow was sympathetic to the argument that control in Kuchurgan is a sovereign matter of Ukraine and Moldova, and attempts at its intervention will receive a response not only from Kyiv and Chisinau, but from all of Europe. Moreover, at that time Russia was busy with more important problems for itself and reacted extremely painfully to the first waves of sanctions without having an interest in additional factors of the deterioration of relations with Brussels. However, the main problems that Tiraspol eventually took advantage of have emerged on the side of Ukraine and Moldova. Despite the EUBAM recommendations and the activities of the European high-level advisers (including the customs and the Bureau for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova), Chisinau failed preparation for the launch of joint control, which eventually resulted in the repetition of the same reassuring theses. Chisinau also ignored the recommendations to create legislative parameters for the control mechanism, which implied that there were no obstacles to the foreign economic activity of the Transdniestrian enterprises with the necessary permits and Moldovan registration, thus could remove any charges from Tiraspol. The Moldovan customs service instead of applying a careful targeted approach towards Transdniestrian economic operators, on the contrary, disoriented and intimidated entrepreneurs, eventually playing into the hands of Tiraspol that did everything to convince their companies that the project is dangerous. While Transdniestria was releasing more and more harsh statements about the “blockade”, Chisinau continued to engage in its endless electoral campaigns. Experts in this issue also drew attention to Chisinau’s unwillingness to ensure even a nominal involvement of representatives of the Transdniestrian authorities in the process of discussing joint control, its forms and advantages. On the contrary, Chisinau used a strange tactic of refusal, referring to the bilateral nature of the issue, rather than demonstrating a maximally transparent approach and smoothing the situation by agreeing to begin a discussion on the most acute contradictions. Such behavior has led to tangible image costs for the project stakeholders, including Brussels. The European Union had to interfere again. On April 10, 2017, EUBAM organized a conciliatory meeting of the parties at its headquarters, during which the Moldovan customs officers had to explain the forthcoming procedures and find common ground with Tiraspol within the framework of the developed plan and Moldova’s commitments to the EU. However, this meeting failed, and Transdniestria used the time to put forward another set of claims that demonstrated the unpreparedness of the customs services of Ukraine and Moldova to launch effective control. The unwanted way out was the decision approved by the Brussels to establish joint control in Kuchurhan gradually in several phases, but as time has shown, it has not helped to bring the situation onto a guided track. Despite the nominal presence of Moldovan customs officers and border guards in Kuchurgan within the first phase, the Transdniestrian administration continued its information and diplomatic pressure. In 2017, numerous appeals were made to the international community, including Federica Mogherini, provoking tension and additional bureaucratic processes at the intra-European level. In 2018, Chisinau finally began to adhere to a more adequate approach and agreed to a dialogue with Tiraspol, but the pace and the new opportunities that were opening up were lost. Transdniestria, for its part, found the most sensitive topic for the European community, related to possible restrictions on imports of medications through Kuchurgan, involving Moldovan representatives in complex discussions at the level of medical structures, veterinary and phytosanitary services, with completely vague prospects. The position of Kyiv, which financial injections from Brussels keep interested in the matter of joint control, is also causing some concern. Such formalist approach of Chisinau and Kyiv to their commitments to the European Union within the framework of the basic Association Agreements and to the unique opportunity to receive an additional instrument of consolidated influence on the prospects for the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict eventually turned out to be a “two-edge sword”. As a result, there is an unpleasant political “aftertaste” around the Kuchurgan issue, consisting of a stable idea that a lot of unresolved problems surround this topic, and every year more and more questions arise. Therefore, it is not surprising that this time the postponement of a new phase of control in Kuchurgan until 2019 caused a general sigh of relief for all the parties involved. Circumstances prompted the way-out in the form of “deferred” control, which, judging by the unfolding events in the region, could become the best scenario in the midterm. In view of the sudden crisis in relations between Chisinau and Brussels on the eve of the forthcoming elections to the Moldovan Parliament, completely different issues that require targeted political management come to the forefront for international development partners. In the event of an aggravation of the conflict with Transdniestria in the conditions of Moldovan internal political disunity, one cannot rule out the change in the behavior of such an influential player as Russia, which has placed a bet on one of the political forces. Such surprises in the Eastern Partnership region are clearly not something that will benefit the interests of the European Union in view of the progressive deterioration of relations with the authorities in Moldova. As one diplomat, completing his mission on the Chisinau track, expressed his opinion on Kuchurgan – “in foggy conditions the best way to get home faster is to slow down”…