Opinion: Russia May Lose Moldova Next Year

Last week, Deputy Foreign Ministers of Russia and Moldova Grigoriy Karasin and Tatiana Molcean met in Moscow. According to Moldovan media, the meeting was initiated by Russia, which thus attempted to break the diplomatic silence that had prevailed between the countries for more than a year and a half. During this time, representatives of the Moldovan government defiantly did not visit the Russian capital, and this, apparently, was a reflection of the overall strategy of Chisinau in relations with the Russian Federation. According to the press releases of the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the Russian Foreign Ministry, the parties pointed out to problematic issues for each other, which if resolved could improve relations of the countries. For Chisinau these are, first of all, trade restrictions and duties on Moldovan goods, introduced by Moscow after Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU, as well as relaxed rules for Moldovan labor migrants in the Russian Federation. Russia, above all, is worried about restrictions on entry into Moldova for Russian citizens, discrimination of the Russian language and disturbance of activities of the Russian-language media. Moscow is particularly worried about speculations around the Russian military presence in Transdniestria. Chisinau raises the ‘Russian threat’ topic at all venues, including the UN General Assembly and the Parliamentary Assemblies of NATO and the OSCE, which greatly irritates the Kremlin. The diplomatic contact that took place after a long period of cold relations is remarkable, although it is not clear whether it will go further than the usual exchange of ‘concerns’. This will probably become clear after the parliamentary elections in February 2019. The other thing is that the issues that the parties brought to the negotiating table already now demonstrate interesting trends in Russian-Moldovan relations. Nothing personal Requirements of the Moldovan side at the negotiations in the Russian capital were specific and quite pragmatic. Moldova professes a business-like approach and promotes current foreign economic interests. Therefore, Chisinau brought to the fore the issues of bilateral trade and amnesty for thousands of Moldovan migrants who violated the legislation of the Russian Federation. Moldova’s trade interests in Russia are easily explained. Even despite the increase in trade between Moldova and the European Union after conclusion of the Association Agreement, Moldovan agricultural products could not fill a safe niche in European countries. On the other hand, the Russian market, with its traditionally high demand for food products, remains attractive for Moldova’s farmers. At one time, Russian trade duties and barriers were a rather severe shock for this industry, which remains a safety cushion for the Moldovan economy. Therefore, the current authorities are interested in returning preferential access to the Russian market. Moreover, the Association Agreement with the EU does not forbid Moldova to remain in the CIS free trade zone since it is still a member. As for migrants, several hundred thousand citizens of the Republic of Moldova constantly work in Russia, who regularly send money to their homeland. Amounts of these transfers are comparable to 15–20% of Moldova’s GDP. Money of labor migrants remains one of the key factors for the growth of domestic consumption and the inflow of foreign currency into the country. In addition, labor migration has become for Moldova an effective ‘extraction’ of civil discontent: it is easier for people to leave for work than to fight a corrupt government for a better life in their homeland. Naturally, in these conditions Chisinau is interested in facilitating the legal status of Moldovan guest workers in Russia. Moreover, any positive result in this direction strengthens the electoral positions of the authorities. Thus, Moldova turned out to be extremely concrete and took an offensive position in its claims against Moscow. Whereas Russia, apparently, defends itself. The main demand of the Russian side can be described as “to draw in anti-Russian horns”. At the same time, Moscow has not actually taken any response to Chisinau’s demarches over the past few years: problems at the airport for Russian citizens, for the military in Transdniestria and for the Russian TV channels in the Moldovan media space have been long lasting and have sometimes taken an impressive scale. It may get worse but Moscow is waiting for now, so Russian diplomats did not voice any new requirements at the consultations at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Russia as a market Moscow is still playing defense first with Chisinau. For this reason, the most emotional experts sometimes believe that Russia simply does not have a consistent strategy in the Moldovan direction. Anyway, the only stake of the Kremlin seems to be cooperation with conditionally ‘pro-Russian’ political forces, which cautiously but vaguely support normalization of bilateral relations. However, the Russian counterparts of these political forces are still satisfied with this mode of operation. What is interesting: the demands of the pro-Russian and pro-Western, or as they say today the pro-Moldovan forces towards Moscow almost coincide. For example, the problems voiced by the MFAEI representative in the area of facilitating the access of Moldovan goods to the Russian market and amnesty for migrant workers are trademark topics of President Igor Dodon. The only difference is that Russian politicians and Russian President Vladimir Putin personally favor Dodon and are willing to help. Indeed, Igor Dodon regularly holds meetings in Moscow, which often cannot do without generous gifts. For example, Dodon brought several new agreements at once from his latest visit to Russia: they predictably became removal of customs duties on the export of a number of goods, continuation of the amnesty for labor migrants who violated the law and even investment projects in the infrastructure of the Republic of Moldova. Experts unanimously consider these gifts as an advance for strengthening the pre-election positions of the Socialist Party before parliamentary elections, which Russia itself views as a political investment. Even despite that the payback of these investments is difficult to predict. Paradoxically, Dodon himself no longer speaks of a turn to the East or breach of the Association Agreement with the EU and a reorientation towards the Eurasian Union. In all fairness, Igor Dodon just shows proper pragmatism and basic skills of political survival in Moldova trying to smooth things. Many researchers, including in the previous RTA materials, pointed to the enormous dependence of Chisinau on European and international funding. Obviously, regardless of the results of the elections, Moldova will not be able to abandon the course towards European integration, which would deprive Chisinau of strategically important financial assistance and political support from Brussels. The conditions of the Association Agreement with Europe have been operating in one way or another since 2014 and are mostly clear for business. Therefore, none of the Moldovan politicians will not risk them for the sake of favorable conditions in relations with Russia – especially since they can be achieved now, which is clearly confirmed by the success of Igor Dodon. However, in this solitaire and double game, Russia has a role of the sales market for Moldovan farmers and stock exchange for the working-age population. This is a paradoxical situation: the more curtsies Moscow makes to the Republic of Moldova, the less Chisinau regards its interests. If this hypothesis is correct, Russia may finally lose Moldova as early as next year – although, perhaps, a partial ‘exodus’ of the Kremlin from this regional space is part of the “big deal” of the United States and Russia.