Republic of Moldova - Half-Life Period

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In April 2019, Moldova will mark the 10th anniversary of the Twitter revolution. The table of events includes tent strikes, riots and another revolution. The master of Moldova already selects the name and configuration.

10 years tradition

On April 7, 2009, riots began in the Moldovan capital. The Moldovan opposition, which lost the parliamentary elections to the Communist Party of Vladimir Voronin, reacted to its defeat. The protests led to the seizure and arson of the Parliament building of Moldova, on the roof of which the protesters hoisted the Romanian flag, they used paving slabs in the fight against the carabiniers, mobile communication stopped working. The Presidential Office was looted. Pro-European forces came to power: Our Moldova Alliance, the liberal and liberal democratic parties, which together did not gain even 35% of the votes, created the Alliance for European Integration and formed the government. It is interesting that the Party of Communists of Moldova, surpassing the result of the Alliance parties by 15%, surrendered power resignedly and became a donor for the new forces: the Party of Socialists of Moldova and the Democratic Party. In such a simple way a tradition started in the Moldovan politics of the last 10 years – the government is formed and the country is governed not by the one who has won the elections, but by the one who has the desire, resources and perseverance. It has also become a tradition that the main resource for seizing power is the approval of foreign partners who are ready to support a specific political force (or coalition) or at least not to prevent its victory. 10 years later, Moldova will hold regular parliamentary elections, which, according to experts, will determine the political future of the country. Thus vote on February 24 will become only a prologue to a new war for the power in which, as we know, all means are good.

What the sociology says

Current public opinion polls show that the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova can win with a considerable advantage. Its electoral potential, taking into account voting on party lists and single-mandate constituencies, is estimated at about 40-45 seats. The success of the Socialists is threatened by possible violations in voting in single-mandate constituencies and the possible return to Moldova of Renato Usatii, whom Vlad Plahotniuc literally expelled from the country. There is no doubt that the leader of Our Party will play on the electoral field of Igor Dodon and his party, taking away the votes of pro-Russian voters. The potential of Renato Usatii, not yet assessed by experts and sociologists, may be quite high. The leader of Our Party publicly confronts with Vladimir Plahotniuc and therefore favourably differs from deliberate in his comments Igor Dodon, which the most radical critics even consider as the shadow ally of Plahotniuc. The other nominees of the people’s choice award are the ACUM movement of Sandu and Nastase and the Democratic Party of Moldova of Vladimir Plahotniuc. According to existing forecasts, the pro-European opposition is gaining several seats more than the Democrats, and their total amount is comparable to the PSRM – about 45 seats in Parliament. The remaining political forces claim 10-12 seats, mainly in single-mandate constituencies. Sociologists expect that representatives of the Shor Party, PSRM and already mentioned Our Party will be in the Parliament. Political forecasts are a thankless task, especially a month before the elections. Anything can happen during this time: the Democratic Party and its allies may pull off a provocation to retain power, some dirt will come out, or external forces will interfere – such scenarios cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, it is already clear that no political force will be able to get a parliamentary majority of 51 mandates and form a government even in a coalition with a smaller party.

Struggle for power

The Dodon’s Party of Socialists will be able to create the governing coalition either with ACUM bloc or with the Plahotniuc’s Democrats. The alliance of the Democratic Party with ACUM and the Shor Party will also get 51 mandates. Obviously, the faction of Maya Sandu and Andrei Nastase will not cooperate with Plahotniuc or Dodon. Such a maneuver directly contradicts ACUM’s pre-election promises and its protest slogans, and will also lead to a break in privileged relations with the bureaucracy of the European Union and a loss of Brussel’s favor. Collaboration between the PSRM and the PDM is unlikely under present day circumstances. The socialist faction in the Parliament after the elections will inflate almost twice and will receive the most powerful party representation in the legislative body of the country over the past 10 years. The political ambitions of the PSRM will certainly grow after this. Moscow strongly encourages the Socialists: improves Igor Dodon’s ratings and kindly sends thousands of Moldovan citizens to their homeland to vote for the “reds”. Most likely, the Socialists will not be satisfied with the current role in Moldovan politics without real powers and the ability to make decisions independently. Meanwhile, the main oligarch of the country and the leader of the PDM Vladimir Plahotniuc clearly does not intend to share with the Socialists ministerial portfolios, corruption incomes, spheres of influence and other assets. This approach contradicts not only the internal motivation of Plahotniuc himself, who is used to “taking everything”, but also the position of the United States – the main source of support for the current government. Last summer, the idea of bringing together the positions of Democrats and socialists was tested on the “moldovanism” issue (the concept of “Pro-Moldova”) and the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova under international guarantees. However, that consensus was more of an attempt by the PDM to take from Igor Dodon voices of Moldovan state-minded persons than the prototype of the future equal coalition. Ultimately, there is little chance of forming a sustainable coalition in Moldova after February 24. More or less real are two scenarios – re-elections with a new number of seats (if a referendum takes place) and an attempt to seize power by force by one of the political forces, presumably, the Democratic Party of Moldova. Both scenarios guarantee a long-term paralysis of power institutions and a power struggle on the streets of Chisinau – in tent camps, parks and at the doorstep of the Moldovan Parliament. Moreover, mass protest in the spring is much more comfortable. One way or another, there is no doubt that the Republic of Moldova will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Twitter revolution with a period of anarchy and oprichnina, another popular unrest and banal calls to calm down from all geopolitical centers playing on the Moldovan field. 10 years of degradation, endless corruption and fierce struggle for power in the poorest state in Europe, which lost half of its population during the years of independence, say that Moldova is in a half-life period right now. The finalization of this process is a matter of time, and it is not clear what kind of future awaits the country.