In the next two years the major powers that support independent Kosovo intend to cut the knot of problems that prevent the young republic from fully integrating into the international community.

Pristina as the OSCE's focus area

In 2019, the OSCE Chairmanship passed to the Slovak Republic, a small state in Eastern Europe. In view of the complicated political situation on the European continent, nobody particularly has high expectations of the Slovak presidency. In the context of the tense situation in international relations, the choice of a relatively neutral and little ambitious Slovakia is rather a soft, compromise option. Against this background, few political experts and observers drew attention to the decision of the OSCE Ministerial Council, which gave the chairmanship to Albania in the next 2020. This fact is absolutely remarkable – for the first time this tiny Balkan country has broken into the forefront of European politics. This is, of course, an outstanding achievement of Albanian diplomacy, which, however, at first glance seems to be a complete mystery. There is an opinion that such a “diplomatic breakthrough” is directly related to the Kosovo issue and the whole topic of the Balkans, which are traditionally the scene of international battles. The situation around the partially recognized republic in recent years has not been developing along the path that was originally defined by the supporters of the Kosovo project. Obviously, there is a need for certain adjustments, and sometimes quite decisive action. So, the Albanian chairmanship can be considered one of the tactical elements of the policy of the major powers on the Balkan track, where the uncompleted case of Kosovo stands apart besides other important tasks. What is interesting is that each of the OSCE Troika – Italy, Slovakia, Albania – is one way or another connected with the Balkan context. This confirms once again the focus of international attention on this geopolitical flank. Despite some sterile approaches of Tirana during its presidency in the OSCE and attempts not to focus on the Kosovo theme, the diplomatic environment links the planned presidency to the achievement of specific goals. We only need to take a look at the statements of Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu during his visit to Albania in October last year. He noted that Turkey fully supports Albania’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2020, as well as makes efforts for greater international recognition of Kosovo and its membership in international organizations.

The first step is to solve the problem of “non-recognizers”

To date, Kosovo is recognized by 104 states (117, according to Pristina). At the same time, through the efforts of Serbian diplomacy and because of the many years of uncertainty in the Serbian-Kosovo settlement, about 10 countries have already withdrawn or suspended the recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. The stalled registration of the international legal personality of the republic, apparently, began to provoke reverse processes. They are also promoted by a number of unpleasant stories about refusals to accept Kosovo in some international organizations. All this, most likely, encourages the forces interested in further development of the project to start preparing the ground for the final outcome. One of the primary tasks on this way is to overcome the indecision of the so-called “doubtful non-recognizers”, which, as reality shows, are not a few. The motive is clear: the more states recognize Kosovo, the more likely it is for the republic to join the majority of international organizations and structures, as well as to create the necessary pressure on certain stubborn members of the UN Security Council. So far, most of the “non-recognizers” have adopted a neutral and wait-and-see attitude towards Kosovo, evading concrete steps and closely monitoring regional trends. For instance, Greece, not ready at the current stage to establish full diplomatic relations with Kosovo, has allowed the authorities of the republic to establish a Trade Bureau of Kosovo in Athens. Romania and a number of other states have opened contact offices in Pristina. In fact, by imitating the process of finding a balance in relations with Kosovo and Serbia, the hesitant countries are simply waiting for the weather vane to turn. That is, new variables that will help to properly solve the Kosovo equation and to carry out an optimal upgrade of their position in relations with Pristina. And these variables will definitely take place by 2020.

Slovak model of “accepting the inevitable”

In this context, the position of the current Slovakia’s OSCE Chairmanship, which has not yet recognized Kosovo, looks extremely interesting. In April 2012, its Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajcak, stated that Slovakia’s relations with the republic would depend on the development of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, as well as on the situation in Kosovo itself. Speaking about Kosovo at the Globsec in the same 2012, Lajcak said the following: “our position is given but it is not set in stone”. At the forum, the then Political Director of the Foreign Ministry of Slovakia, Peter Michalko, conversing with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo Petrit Selimi, expressed Slovakia’s support for Kosovo’s European prospects and called cooperation with the EU the fastest way of normalizing the situation in the Balkans. Vice-speaker of the Slovak Parliament Mikulas Dzurinda, in turn, expressed the wish that the relations between Pristina and Bratislava would be expanded to the highest level. In the summer of 2012 Slovakia began to recognize passports of Kosovo citizens, although this measure did not influence on diplomatic and official documents. Since the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence the Slovak politicians kept different degree of flexibility of positions in relation to the republic, but the overall trend is quite obvious. It shows once again that many of the non-recognizers are more or less morally mature to make a final decision, and all that is required is a little external stimulus. The most obstinate opponents of the recognition of Pristina in the coming years, for sure, will be brought through all the stages of accepting the inevitable in the form of independent Kosovo. To do this will be easier if more hesitant countries move to the opposite camp. Thus, there is every reason to believe that 2020 will be a milestone year for Kosovo. Moreover, the OSCE will celebrate the 45th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which is a very symbolic context. Since the eighth section of the document clearly speaks about the right of peoples to determine their internal and external political status in full freedom. And the chairmanship of modest and pliable Albania in the OSCE will be a key factor for the final resolution of the Kosovo issue. The developments in this scenario will actualize other territorial disputes and frozen conflicts, especially in the post-Soviet space. It is obvious that to cut the Kosovo knot without consensus at the level of the UN Security Council is hardly possible. In this regard, we can expect an interesting geopolitical bargaining and unexpected compromises on those unrecognized states, which, for example, are under the patronage of Russia.

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