Plans for joint control at the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border began to actively appear in the media back in 2014 at the height of hostilities in the east of Ukraine. At the same time, there is still no clear understanding in the expert and journalistic environment what exactly has changed during these 5 years and how Kyiv and Chisinau strengthened their borders. Attempts to figure this out, frankly, have not been successful. Moreover, the joint control of Ukraine and Moldova is rather stalled than actually benefiting the governments of both countries.
When the stars aligned
Kyiv, which in 2014 faced separatism, had to involuntarily and very quickly reconsider many things in its domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with Moldova. Chisinau, in its turn, without hesitation, supported Ukraine in its struggle against the rebels in the Donbas, and thus ensured full favor and support from the neighboring state. The first and main goal for the two capitals struggling with the pro-Russian forces was predictably Transdniestria, where Kyiv finally saw the risks of its national security.
Let me remind you that Ukraine had pandered to the region for decades, ensuring its autonomy, as well as access to international sites. First of all, it concerned the trade sphere: in fact, Ukraine supported the life of the Transdniestrian project for three decades, not really hindering trade across its borders.
However, Ukraine changed its views after outbreak of the war in the Donbas. Not being able to control its eastern borders, Kyiv fully felt the “pain” of Moldovan neighbors and willingly supported the deployment of Moldovan security officials on the border of rebellious Transdniestria. It is completely obvious that neither Tiraspol nor Moscow liked the plans for a total barrier for the Transdniestrian region from the territory of Ukraine. Both capitals articulated new old slogans about “blockade”, “pressure”, “humanitarian catastrophe”, etc. But Kyiv and Chisinau, as they say, were inexorable, moreover, such a reaction only facilitated the project and accelerated its appearance.
Already in the process of preparing the first joint posts, it became clear that there is no necessary legislation for the complete customs and border control at checkpoints on the territory of Ukraine. So, every 6 months the parties signed new protocols and agreements, ratified them, passed laws and reported on plans to open 13 joint points on the Transdniestrian segment of the border. The public waited for results all this time.
On July 17, 2017, that is, after about three years, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip ceremonially launched the first joint control point Kuchurgan-Pervomaisk. In all fairness, the choice of this particular checkpoint is correct, since it is actually the main commodity-transport artery for Transdniestria through which 75% of all goods come to the region.
Phase shifts
Statements about control over the Eastern borders, the flow of goods and people, as well as cheerful speeches about the spread of Moldovan legislation on the Transdniestrian section of the border, in fact, turned out to be somewhat rushed. As it turned out, implementation of the agreements and the project as a whole is divided into not quite clear phases, which cause a lot of questions from experts and specialists involved.
It became known that since July 2017, representatives of the constitutional bodies of Moldova at the Kuchurgan-Pervomaisk checkpoint appear to carry out only some monitoring functions, and simply put perform absolutely nothing, only signifying the Moldovan state on its Eastern borders. It is difficult to say whether the impasse in joint control is connected with international pressure or other considerations. One thing is clear: conspiracy hypotheses about some possibilities of Tiraspol are not credible in Brussels and Washington. This means that the project has real pitfalls – but what?
In 2018, the expert community watched the periodic debates of Chisinau and Tiraspol on “blocking” of imports, public access to medicines, etc. It seemed that Transdniestrian officials had reasons to be worried, and a new stage of joint control is approaching, when Moldova will take control of the Transdniestrian border and begin to outline the contours of its state.
As a result, there was only another extension of the moratorium on full control until July 1, 2019.
It is obvious that such results of joint control for 5 years seem to be quite non-optimistic. Apparently, at the local and international level, it was decided to freeze the project at the current starting level in order to avoid aggravation around the Transdniestrian settlement. Apparently, Brussels influenced this decision since the escalation in the region is disadvantageous to the European Union, which is already about to fail the “European Moldova” project. In addition, the EU’s position only confirms the desire to gently reformat the current regime in Chisinau, without giving it a chance in the form of provocations and intensified struggle with the “Russian threat”.
Moldova again becomes a hostage of geopolitics, albeit not in the usual manner. The interests of the country, as we see, are secondary. The expert community every day loses enthusiasm and, rather, generate acceptance of the idea that far-reaching plans to protect national interests, even supported by pro-Russian President Dodon, are sacrificed on the altar of some political expediency. 
