Victory at the Cost of the Country. Moldova Definitely Goes to Europe?

RTA regular author Sergey Cheban said that to overthrow the regime of Plahotniuc was possible only at the expense of Moldova’s commitment to the Eurasian integration. The expert points out that the geopolitical rhetoric of Igor Dodon has changed greatly after the creation of a coalition with the ACUM, and the European course of Moldova is almost not questioned even in Moscow. Sergey Cheban, RTA: The events of the beginning of June 2019 in Moldova will definitely go down in the history of the country as one of the landmarks of the political system. It’s not just the bloodless overthrow of the long-term authoritarian regime of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. The question is how the approaches of the Moldovan politicians and their international allies have changed in order to ‘reset’ the situation in the country. Now this is not so important, but a couple of years ago, the leader of the Moldovan socialists Igor Dodon extensively exploited pro-Russian rhetoric and in the media and the expert community of Russia used an image of a promising partner for Moscow, which will slow down the fast-moving journey of Moldova to the West. Approximately in this role, the socialists of a powerful faction settled in Parliament in 2018, and Dodon himself took the presidency in December 2016. All these years, the Party of Socialists and right-wing pro-Europeans Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase jumped all over each other. Both wings of Moldovan politics differed greatly in geopolitical preferences and ideas about the future of Moldova. In addition, the current ACUM members have always gravitated to the ideas of ‘unirea’ with Romania, and Dodon strongly advocated a sovereign Moldovan state. Now, in 2019, irreconcilable opponents have created a coalition and coordinate their actions “every day”, as President Igor Dodon says in an interview. After the masterful ‘hip throw’ of the Plahotniuc’s regime, the seemingly indestructible crime-political empire, the current friendship of pro-Europeans with socialists doesn’t cause issues. It seems that the good purpose of ‘de-oligarchization’ justifies everything, especially since the situation in Moldova gave rise to a unique consensus of the EU, the US and Russia. However, the geopolitical preferences of the ACUM and the Party of Socialists have not disappeared, and sooner or later the issues of the development vector will return to the agenda of Moldovan politics in a completely new way. So far, the coalition in the Moldovan Parliament is firmly united by a common goal – to get rid of the criminal heritage of Plahotniuc and bring order to the country. The coalition leaders do not discuss the perennial questions of Moldovan politics like the Transdniestrian settlement, the Russian troops on the Left Bank and the country’s development in general, but will definitely start, especially when it is time to compete in local and presidential elections. It is difficult to say which approach will win, but the PSRM and Moscow itself do not seem to object to Moldova’s European path. Even before the 2019 elections, Igor Dodon seriously softened his rhetoric regarding Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU, for which the Moldovan President was criticized a lot. But then it turned out that Moscow does not plan to fight the inevitable: Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, who arrived in Moldova, confirmed that the Kremlin respects the European course of Chisinau. Therefore, already as a ‘Plahotniuc slayer’ Igor Dodon does not hide that he does not intend to revise the course of Moldova towards Europe. There is nothing unexpected in this situation, by and large: the European course of Moldova is the result of comprehensive and long-term work of Brussels on the Moldovan track. After all, today Prime Minister Sandu calls the resumption of European macro-financial assistance a fundamental task for the government, which leaves no doubt about the degree of Chisinau’s dependence on Europe. More interesting: the only chance to overthrow the sworn enemy of Moscow and the main transmitter of Moldova’s anti-Russian rhetoric was such that the Kremlin had to curtail past attempts to slow down the European integration of Moldova. The ACUM and the European Union clearly noted this point, so we should expect that sooner or later the pro-Europeans themselves will begin to place not very convenient questions before Igor Dodon: about the vector of development, the Transdniestrian settlement and Russian troops on the Dniester. The international consensus of June 2019 in this case may not be repeated – the interests of Washington, Brussels and Moscow in this region are still far from the common denominator. It is possible that this will become a new political crisis for the Moldovan authorities: even having put up with the European ‘coloring’ of Moldova, Russia still retains its interests in the region, which Igor Dodon will have to protect. In this case, it is possible that Chisinau will eventually follow the ‘third path’, which in the end will again be supported in the three capitals – even despite the current ‘rosy’ path to European integration.