Should Moldova Expect a New Minority Government?

Sergiu CHEBAN The Constitutional Court of Moldova set out a clear vector for political processes in the country, enabling the opposition to mobilize their efforts for a decisive battle with the current government Yesterday, on July 7, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova determined that to dissolve the legislative body six months before the presidential election and hold early parliamentary elections simultaneously with the presidential is unlawful. Furthermore, the court ruled out the possibility for early parliamentary elections if president resigns, since his functions in such circumstances, as provided for by the current legislation, will be executed by the chairman of the parliament or the prime minister. Despite the unequivocal expert opinion that the court is unlikely to interpret the current legislation speculatively, the majority political stakeholders represented by PSRM and PAS, as well as personally Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu, expected ad-hoc decision of the Constitutional Court allowing for the parliamentary elections to  take place this year. By the way, yesterday’s court explanation was given to the identical requests submitted almost simultaneously by the socialist Vasile Bolea and PAS deputy Sergiu Litvinenco. The fact is that, unlike other political parties, PSRM and PAS have good electoral indicators. The soonest holding of elections to the country’s legislative body is more than favorably for them, since further functioning of the current parliament is fraught with significant costs. However, the leaders of both parties seem to be quite discontent about the completely predictable Constitutional Court’s decision and voiced political statements of utter hopelessness. The Sandu team was reckoning on at least positive conclusion from the court regarding the early presidential resignation, which allegedly predetermined the parliament dissolution. Based on this idea, the PAS have built over the past two months its tactical line and calls on the head of state to resign in order to enable an early election campaign. Most experts share the view that prolonging the life of the current parliament suits the minority factions. The risk of this year’s early parliamentary campaign which existed up to that point prevented motley opposition groups from any sudden moves towards a new government formation. Now that the early parliamentary appeal is postponed at least until the spring of 2021, the parliamentary opposition’s has a broader room for maneuver - for example, to try to take power into their own hands and regroup the state system, including to ensure a guaranteed victory for the pro-Western candidate in the upcoming presidential elections in November. It seems that in the near future the Moldovan domestic policy might be somehow changed, and the political confrontation may take on a completely different character and form. One way or another, the new circumstances will force the main party and parliamentary groups to reconsider their positions and strategic plans, as well as to start working on the parameters of the country’s existence during the next six months. The DA Platform and Pro-Moldova leaders have already addressed all pro-Western forces with a call for a constructive discussion and compromise, offering to bury the ax of war and vote for the resignation of the current Cabinet and the new pro-European government as soon as possible. Electoral positions of most pro-Western parties, to put it mildly, are not ok. This can be improved through administrative resources and involvement in the new government. However, right now, only the DA Platform team openly expresses its ambitions and readiness to take responsibility for the new cabinet. Despite the considerable fragmentation of the opposition field, it is theoretically possible that all opposition deputies (even without taking into account the extra-toxic SHOR Party), including Maia Sandu’s PAS and the Democratic Party, can vote for an anti-crisis minority government with an evident pro-European profile. At the same time, in order to maintain political “innocence”, the forced situational allies can technically do without an officially formulated parliamentary majority. In the current political reality, Maia Sandu is facing a dilemma: to prolong the life of the current government or to get involved in the not-quite-controlled reformatting process of the domestic political field. The first option implies further being in opposition under constant pressure from the ACUM bloc colleagues, whose presidential ambitions could be neutralized by government posts. The second option, in turn, is fraught with risks of dealing with not quite “handshakable” partners, but with significantly increased chances to win in the upcoming presidential race.