Council in the Kremlin: What New Things Did Dmitry Kozak and Igor Dodon Discuss

Sergiu CHEBAN The recent blitz visit of the Moldovan President to the Russian capital has given rise to a new wave of conspiracy theories, although the answer is lying on the surface. Moscow will support the Moldovan politician at the important pre-election stage and will do everything in its power and even more. The main question is whether Igor Dodon will be able to effectively manage the external support and the available political resources Recently, Moldovan Telegram channels have been posting information that Igor Dodon has left for an urgent visit to Moscow. Allegedly, to discuss with Russian colleagues several delicate issues that do not need additional public coverage. However, the day before yesterday, the head of state's press service broke the silence: the purpose of the short-term visit is “to intensify and deepen Moldovan-Russian cooperation in all areas,” including discussing traditional issues of Moldova's export to Russia, the € 200 million loan and the support for the Moldovan diaspora. It is no secret that Igor Dodon was formed as a political project in the context of constant and diverse assistance from Moscow. Without this factor, it is difficult to imagine positive prospects for the main PSRM ideologist and leader of the Moldovan nation. In fairness, it should be noted that numerous oppositional political projects receive similar diverse support but already from Western development partners, so there is a certain parity here. Of course, the Kremlin meeting touched upon the upcoming presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova, including practical components that will help Igor Dodon to win in the difficult battle with the opposition candidate, Maia Sandu. Who, by the way, promises to increase the confrontation degree with the authorities to the extreme point in the next few months in order to deprive the president of chances to be re-elected for the second term. Moscow has to solve many issues in this regard, for example the Russian loan, which due to the rivals of the Moldovan president’s efforts managed to gain notoriety in Moldova and at the same time, risks again making another “history”. In addition, despite the special Kremlin’s press service message that there was no time in the schedule of the Russian president for meeting his Moldovan counterpart, one way or another, it was important for Igor Dodon to show Moscow the need to arrange a visualized “strong handshake” on the eve of the elections, if not with Vladimir Putin, then at least with one of the authoritative Russian politicians. Already at the beginning of autumn, the high-level Russian representative visit to Moldova is possible (earlier it was about the Prime Minister to come, then it changed for the Federation Council Representative). It is curious that although the Transdniestrian leader’s administration did not announce any visits to Moscow, unofficial Moldovan sources report that Vadim Krasnoselsky also visited the Russian capital. It seems that the deputy head of the Kremlin administration Dmitry Kozak decided to seriously immerse himself in the "Moldovan dossier" before going to vacation. It can also be assumed that the results of the July 28 meeting of the two leaders were planned to be consolidated in Moscow and to bring down specific agreements to the corresponding working levels. Over the last period of time, the left bank of the Dniester has been increasingly featured in discussions around the presidential elections. The issue of involving the residents of the region in the voting process is especially acute. Rumor has it that the Igor Dodon’s election headquarters expect several important percentages from the Transdniestrian electorate to win the second round. In addition, there are statements among opposition politicians that the head of state, in the case of an unfavorable epidemiological situation, considers as an option opening polling stations directly on the territory of Transdniestria which is not being controlled by constitutional authorities. According to opposition representatives, they are categorically against this original idea. Nobody knows exactly how the circumstances, including epidemiological ones, will develop by the time of elections. However, the planning horizon is not so distant and that means the main candidates need to prepare for scenario options in the coming after elections period. Therefore, it should not be ruled out that Moscow discussed (and maybe previously agreed upon) the action procedure for the end of this and the beginning of next year. It so happened that presidential elections in Moldova provoked a rather emotional struggle exacerbation between the West and the East for a very symbolic trophy. With all the pathos, this position is actually devoid of serious potential. No, by The parliament and government. will continue to determine the country's political agenda no matter who wins the elections If the current president wins then radical changes in the country's internal political life can hardly be expected. According to experts, in the coming years, the routine of the situation will remain in any post-election scenario, since the Moldovan authorities will have to concentrate mainly on overcoming consequences of the pandemic and solving viscous chronic problems in the life of the country. Returning to the recent Kremlin meeting, it can be assumed that considerable attention was paid to alternative situation development scenarios in the country. No doubt that over decades being present in the unpredictable Moldovan "theater" of political action, Russia has been forced to draw important conclusions, one of which is long-term planning and contingency plans elaboration in case of "rainy day". One believes that the head of state's entourage, at Moscow's insistence, is working out options to retain power in Igor Dodon and the Socialist Party’s hands in if an unfavorable outcome of the presidential election occurs. This crisis scenario is directly related to the topic of early parliamentary elections, towards which the main focus of political attention will be shifted immediately after November. Thus, it is quite possible that quite recently a new page in the puffy "Moldovan dossier" is to appear under the working title "Government of National Accord 2021", headed by Prime Minister Igor Dodon.