Sergiu CEBAN
Turkey is consistently strengthening its positions in the Black Sea region, paying great attention to Moldova: this prove intensive political contacts and the large-scale projects and investments that Ankara is implementing in the republic. Anyway, for Chisinau Turkish influence strengthening might cause unpleasant side effects.
Over the last years, Turkey has been increasingly implementing its offensive foreign policy in various regional areas be it in Libya, Syria, Northern Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Black Sea. Often, Turkish interests crowd out other influential players, which is why Ankara began to systematically conflict with such countries as Greece, France, Cyprus and Russia.
The imperial past, alike the ideas of neo-Ottomanism are quite popular within the Turkish society. This pushes the country's political elites to proceed exactly from this socio-political need and act more decisively reviving a neo-imperial project, which will cover most of the conditional “Ottoman geographic space” and will gradually expand the Ankara’s influence area, thus, strengthening Turkey's position as a powerful trans-regional leader.
To date, practical steps that the Turkish leadership takes towards reformatting the state have several important levels, out of which the most fundamental is the religious one. As a result, we are witnessing an active Turkey Islamization and a gradual rejection of secular Kemalist reforms, which were actively implanted in Turkish society in the first half of the last century. A vivid example is Recep Erdogan's decision to return the status of mosque to the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul; that was a symbolic Turkish leadership’s gesture, perceived as an attempt to turn the wheel of history backwards.
Apparently, through such a Turkish Islam revitalization the goal is to make Turkey one of Muslim world’s key centers which will be entrusted with a political and representative mission in a broad international dialogue. At the same time, there are all the necessary prerequisites to create a kind of Islamic superpower: geographical position, imperial experience, one of the most powerful armies and the closest integration into Western and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Ankara's desire to ensure, among other things, its energy independence which fits into this paradigm, explains the aggressive geological exploration of Turkish companies in the Eastern Mediterranean over the past months, with complete disregard for appeals from neighboring Greece and Cyprus. This situation has become a serious internal challenge for NATO, given Turks’ willingness to defend their interests by any means, neglecting the interests of the partners in the North Atlantic Alliance. By the way, Washington's active flirtation with the Kurds throughout the Syrian campaign did only strengthened Ankara's conviction of the need to pursue, first of all its own national interests.
Such an events development could not but affect both the atmosphere in the military bloc itself and among members of the European Union. The harshest reaction came from the French president, who called the happening "a vivid illustration of NATO's brain death" and excluded Ankara from the list of EU partners in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the lack of a coherent position on the part of Brussels has already led to an unfortunate failure at the summit of foreign ministers. Then Cyprus blocked sanctions against the Belarusian leadership approving and advocated simultaneous adoption of restrictions against Turkish companies that participated in illegal natural gas extraction drilling operations in the Cypriot economic zone.
It so happened that the Eastern Mediterranean is one of the tensest geographical areas with a complex interweaving of historical, cultural, religious and geopolitical factors, where the interests of both local and leading global players intersect. It was for these reasons that it was important for Ankara's strategic positioning to demonstrate its ambitions most clearly at this Mediterranean crossroads, declaring itself as a determining force in the region.
As known, historical territories of the Black Sea basin, and especially the Northern Black Sea region, occupy as well a special place in Turkey's foreign policy doctrine. For this reason, Ankara takes a principled position on the problem of the Crimean Peninsula, continuing to keep this issue in the top-five topical issues of bilateral dialogue with Moscow.
Moldova is no less topical for Turkey. Over past years, relations between Chisinau and Ankara have acquired a solid strategic partnership form, primarily due to strengthening the work of the Turkish side in the Moldovan sector. Moreover, it is multifaceted: strengthening political and diplomatic contacts (an important milestone in this process was Erdogan's visit to Moldova), and large-scale programs implementing, alike Turkish business and investments penetration into the republic.
At the same time, it is no secret that the Gagauz autonomy, which symbolizes ethnic and cultural kinship with the Turks, became the entry point of Turkish influence in Moldova. According to experts, the complex of projects implemented by Turkey in the Gagauz territory is a long-term foreign policy deposit aimed at creating of one of the broad regional influence centers.
Obviously, with systematic Turkish support over time, Comrat can consolidate its political position and restart the dialogue with Chisinau from slightly different positions. Evidence that Ankara considers Gagauzia a strong domestic political factor in the future was Erdogan's statements during his visit to Moldova in 2018, saying that the country's leadership needs to take specific steps aimed at strengthening the Gagauz autonomy.
Thus, in the coming years, along with Transdniestria, Chisinau risks getting another territorial entity which is being under a dominant external powerful state’s influence. Aggravation to the problem bring recently damaged relations between the center and Comrat caused by the situation with the so-called "Gagauz bills " in parliament adoption. In this regard, there’s a question arising: how ready the Moldovan authorities are to adequately respond to the emerging threat and will Chisinau have enough strength to resist Ankara's soft onslaught and keep under control the creeping Comrat’s strengthening which will further stimulate the already actively ongoing centrifugal processes in the country.