What Will Igor Dodon’s 2016-2020 Presidency Be Remembered for?

Semion ALBU The main Igor Dodon's four-year period result, if compared to his predecessor, is the significantly increased role of the institute of the president that again became an influential player in the Moldovan political field. Igor Dodon was elected President of Moldova in 2016, replacing Nicolae Timofti in this position. The latter, as well known was far from a public person, rather on the contrary, a quite boring and quiet functionary, that’s actually why he received from Moldovan experts and journalists the impartial nickname Dumb Duck. Timofti got himself remembered only for the unexpectedly bold opposition to Vlad Plahotniuc when trying to take the prime minister's chair. And even then, his heroic halo got significantly neutralized when Timofti’s subsequent apology to the all-mighty oligarch. Against this background, the Socialists leader looked very advantageous, since being energetic and fresh when stepping in with a program understandable to the population and clear slogans. In addition, the fact that he was the first popularly elected President of Moldova since 1996 added political weight to Dodon. This means that a priori, he had much more legitimacy than many other components of the Moldovan political system. Starting with ritual steps, such as removing the European Union flag from the presidency building and replacing Romanian with Moldovan on his official website, Dodon soon began implementing his campaign promises. In the first half of 2017 already, he initiated a consultative referendum on four issues: repealing the law on the stolen billion; expanding president powers; reducing the number of deputies and returning the school subject "History of Moldova". However, the finger-tipped Plahotniuc’s Constitutional Court recognized the plebiscite holding being inconsistent with the basic law of the Republic of Moldova and the powers of the head of state. Further on, the limited presidential status more than once prevented Dodon from implementing his program’s points. Recall, the head of state in Moldova has a very meager set of power levers. So, he has the status of commander-in-chief (however, during the Plahotniuc reign, Moldovan military went to joint exercises with NATO, even despite president's decision), the right to initiate legislation, appoint judges, dissolve parliament under certain conditions, appoint a prime minister. The Moldovan leader must sign the adopted laws as well and Dodon actively used this tool, regularly rejecting projects that he did not like. Anyway, this was soon followed by a counterattack by means of shameful and unconstitutional practice when temporary blacking the president out. In addition, the Socialist Party, which served as an ally to the head of state in parliament, was in opposition until June 2019, while the ruling majority was completely disloyal to Dodon. Therefore, the first part of Dodon's presidential term was mainly devoted to foreign policy, country's reintegration and a number of successes were achieved in these areas. First of all, Dodon managed to significantly intensify contacts with the Russian Federation (which was to some extent the "highlight" of his election program) and to establish a regular personal dialogue with Vladimir Putin - the latter met with Dodon more times during this period than with any other world leader. This yielded fruits that resulted in practical agreements with benefits for Moldova: Moscow provided Chisinau with a discount on gas, canceled duties on certain categories of goods from Moldova and made concessions for Moldovan labor migrants on its territory. In addition, Russia agreed to provide a 200 million loan, which, however, was blocked by the Constitutional Court. However, the opportunity to get it still remains, since it is expected that a new agreement will be signed on the eve of the second November elections’ round. Thanks to Dodon, Moldova received as well the status of an observer state in the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, it was not all roses within neighbors’ relations - the president was hampered by his reputation of a Pro-Russian Politician and of a Kremlin Agent, and when talking of Ukraine by his long-standing statements about the Russian Crimea. As a result, in four years, Dodon only once managed to meet with the leader of Romania, Klaus Johannes on the sidelines of the UN New York summit; at the same time, communication with the Ukrainian leaders was completely absent. Igor Dodon did not integrate in the West, although he had periodic contacts with European and American officials. The president's diplomatic isolation has intensified especially after the PSRM-ACUM coalition collapse late last year. The Pridnestrovian settlement saw a surge of activity in 2017-2018, which was also facilitated by Dodon’s regular meetings with the left-bank head Vadim Krasnoselsky – as of today, there are already eight of them. One cannot say their relations were completely idyll (it sometimes came to the indirect verbal exchanges), however, in general, no Moldovan president had such close communication with the head of the Transdniestrian administration. Today, relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol have deteriorated again, but this is an overall standard story for the pre-electoral Moldova, further aggravated by the pandemic crisis. After Vlad Plahotniuc’s reign was over, Igor Dodon took advantage of the new circumstances to finally become a truly number-one man in the state (which he succeeded, especially following the newly-created PSRM-PDM coalition). Constant meetings with the speaker and the prime minister and vigorous media activity have largely covered up the obviously lacking presidential powers, whereas the presence of a loyal ruling coalition has made it possible from now on to directly influence the country’s domestic policy. In early 2020, Igor Dodon gives a program interview in which he outlines eight major priorities until the end of his term. It is obvious that the pandemic has significantly amended these plans, which were implemented not in full and with a clearly minor media stunt. So, for example, the “grand construction”, conceived by the president, has ended up in mere renewal of some road sections. In addition, Dodon still managed to fulfill (partially) some of the program provisions – in particular, despite the IMF’s resistance, he succeeded in adopting a law on reducing the debt under the law on the stolen billion, and biannual pension indexation was also introduced. Curiously, during his presidency, Igor Dodon has gradually adjusted some of his key theses, abandoning the most radical ideas. Thus, his public rhetoric gradually lost calls to abolish the Association Agreement with the European Union, sharp attacks towards Euro-Atlantic integration and the need to promptly close NATO institutions in Chisinau. The idea of the foreign policy vector referendum gave way to the “balanced foreign policy” and neutral status concept, which the president has tried to implement during the past year, but to no avail so far. Over the past four years, Dodon couldn’t fulfill a number of other 2016 program promises. Moreover, some of them “migrated” to the 2020 document almost unaltered, such as the unionism ban (which, in truth, the president was fighting more in words than in deeds), consolidating the Moldovan language status and the subject “History of Moldova”, the Comfortable Village program. It is obvious that Igor Dodon was feeling extremely tight within the limited presidential powers. In this sense, the referendum on amendments to the Constitution he has initiated to expand the role of the head of state in running the nation is understandable. One way or the other, there is reason to believe that the second term will provide Dodon with more chances to realize his vision. His current program is devoid of revolutionary elements and is designed to ensure the country’s progressive development, which should meet less resistance from the Moldovan politicians than, say, the idea of abandoning the European integration. In addition, judging by the parliament-related activities, the work is already underway to put together a new ruling coalition, which should become the basis for the reforms that the president needs so much. Whether Dodon will receive a popular mandate to carry out these reforms, we will find out after mid-November.