Constitutional Court’s Decision: Is It a Blow to the Russian Language or to the Moldovan Statehood?

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Semion ALBU Recognizing the new Law on Languages Functioning as unconstitutional will not fundamentally change the already unenviable position of the Russian language in Moldova, but will contribute to social split and to separatism on its territorystrengthening The language issue within the independent Moldova has always been very acute. Today, there’s no clarity even about the own language: whether is it Moldovan (according to the Constitution), or Romanian (according to the Declaration of Independence and the conclusion of the Constitutional Court of 2013). The second layer of the problem is the status of the Russian language.Many copies have been broken over the past decadesaround it. Back in 1989, the law “On Languages Functioning on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova” was adopted, and has since thenbeenthorn in the eye of the Moldovan unionists and other “patriots”. In 2013, Moldovan liberals prepared a bill to deprive the Russian language of its interethnic communicationstatus, so in 2018, the Constitutional Court, at their request (and in fact, with Plahotniuc’spermission, who at that time actively portrayed the fight against theRussian aggression) recognized the 1989 law being "obsolete." Despite the fact that the position of the Russian language was defined in four more legislative acts, the court decisionhas in factcreated a legal vacuum. The socialists and Igor Dodon promised to fill it in in their statutes and pre-election documents. But only in December 2020, the PSRM parliamentary majority and the For Moldova group voted for the new Law on LanguagesFunctioning. It provided for Russian to bearthe status of a language of interethnic communication, for government agencies to be obligedto answer in Russian for government agencies to be obliged to answer in Russian, translate official documents, goods and services produced in the republic, etc. if requested by citizens. However,having considered the appeal of Octavian Ticu,the main parliamentary unionist, the leader of the National Unity Party and of two deputies from the DA Platform, and as predicted by experts, the Constitutional Court declared yesterday this lawbeing unconstitutional, de jure again leaving the Russian language in Moldova in limbo. Analyzing this event, there are several important reservations at once to be made. First, the 1989 law was not at all ideal, it did not clearly correspond to the actual position of the Russian language in the then MSSR, although it consisted of many useful norms. Second, the 2020 socialists' project was developed in a clear rush and, apparently adoptedfor specific political purposes that do no way solve all the problems associated with the status of the Russian language. Moreover, the “new” law turned out to be a tracing paper from the past andof poor quality at the same time –bearing an even greater sphere of language’s use curtailment and a number of unclear provisions. It should also be noted that it was not constitutional as the old act was, but only organic and that could later be easily canceled by a simple deputies’majority (arethere any doubts this would sooner or later happen?). Finally, the third - the root of the problems with the Russian language lies far beyond the legal norms. After all, in addition to the notorious Law on the Functioning of Languages, its status is spelled out in a number of other laws, for example, the Law on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of Their Organizations. It's another matter that in practice all these documents are either applied extremely limitedly, or do not work at all. As a result, the Russian language has actually almost completely lost its nominal status in Moldova. All paperwork in the country has long been managed in the state language, without translating into Russian. The government agencies have either no or poor Russian versions of their websites. Russian schools were closed one by one, and the language itself is no longer a compulsory subject in schools where instruction is provided in the state language. Moreover, the Russian-language TV content was also limited. Supervisory authorities pay little or no due attention to how the language legislation in terms of the Russian language is observed. Meanwhile, cases of linguistic chauvinism at the everyday level are becoming more widespread. All the above shows that the Russian language in Moldova was softly killed, and such powerful newsbreak as the Constitutional Court decisions temporarily bring this process to the surface. Octavian Ticu, who co-authored the request, following which the Constitutional Court canceled the law, said that it allegedly "undermines the foundations of the Constitution." "If we use Russian for interethnic relations, we will never integrate national minorities into the Moldovan political design. This will always be influenced by the geopolitical agenda," Ticu added, while his co-thinkers outside the Court shouted slogans about Russian as "the language of occupiers and pigs". The Constitutional Court's decision has become another evidence that the bitter historical lessons of the early 1990s have not yet been learned by our state. Yes, it will not radically change the linguistic status quo, in which the Russian language is already slowly dying - yet, this is another bomb being planted under the contemporary Moldovan statehood, which, as we remember, cracked in the very first years of its existence, largely due to linguistic intolerance and shortsightedness of the then country's leadership. After all, it was the blatant aggression against the Russian language at the dawn of Moldova's formation that gave all the trump cards to the left-bank leaders for an open rebellion against Chisinau. We are still paying for that gross historical mistake in the form of a frozen conflict on our territory, with no end in sight. Yesterday's events, both within and outside the walls of the Constitutional Court certainly will not bring us closer to its solution. On the contrary, they will definitely be used by the Tiraspol administration to explain to the population in simple terms why returning to Moldova is not lucrative. In addition, Gagauz separatism will be additionally fueled. That is, instead of uniting the society, creating a platform for interethnic reconciliation and reintegrating Transdniestria, we see exactly the opposite, and the language, like geopolitics, is further used to increase the intensity of contradictions in society. In such circumstances, there is no hope for a prosperous future for Moldova (especially within its full borders). As for the Russian language, wiping it out of Moldova is possible, as evidenced in practice. But it is a big question whether the country will not lose more from this than it will gain.