Presidential Race: Veiled Threats for Sandu

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Sergiu CEBAN
Many people think that the ruling regime keeps the presidential election under full control and everything is going exactly according to the plan of Maia Sandu’s electoral headquarters. But that is not entirely correct - it appears that not only the entourage of the incumbent head of state, but also neighboring Romania is bracing for a very tough electoral battle
The presidential election and the referendum are four weeks away. One might think that the campaign is tense. But instead, it is relatively calm: none of the candidates is making any sudden maneuvers, acting within the framework of a pre-selected strategy. Everyone realizes that one wrong move can lead to irreparable consequences, and there is almost no time to rectify the rating. Alas, despite all the prudence, there is still a risk of getting into trouble. A striking example is the U.S. elections, where one of the candidates have been the target of several assassination attempts. It is rather possible that some of our politicians also have something similar in store, which in a sense will swing the pendulum of public sentiment. However, of all the factors that cannot be predicted so far, only the recent prolonged rainfalls resulting in serious ramifications for Chisinau and some districts can be mentioned. At the same time, the president’s office and the media resources close to her successfully shifted the problem into the area of responsibility of the government and the capital’s mayor, shielding Maia Sandu from awkward questions. This suggests that Sandu’s electoral headquarters fears the vicissitudes of fate, especially since there are plenty of reasons for that. The attempts to spin the protest flywheel by involving veterans of the war on the Dniester, transport workers and farmers are worth mentioning. There is little doubt that the opposition representatives are behind this. But they are not ready to invest much in these actions, and the current level of discontent is enough to spoil the electoral image of the head of state. It is unlikely that this plot will evolve into the large protest – most likely, this whole story hides the irresistible desire of some activists to start the parliamentary campaign in advance, building on the failures of the president and the government. This in fact coincides quite well with the tactical goals of the opposition. While the latter is engaged in “petty crime”, Sandu’s entourage is drawing the electoral map. Judging by the rate of registering the participants, the main objective is to put as many spoilers as possible on one of the favorites, Alexandr Stoianoglo, who will draw votes from his electoral niche. At the same time, efforts are underway to neutralize candidates who can win over Sandu’s voters in the first round. Even if they manage to pass the CEC filters and obtain a registration certificate, it cannot be ruled out that they will be withdrawn on the eve of the vote. Many experts have noted that the current regime resorts to the practices of their predecessors, which they once fought so zealously against. The combination of signs suggests that the plan to win the first round, even if someone continues to consider it unrealistic, is still “on the table” at the president’s headquarters. The next option is to pull the most convenient sparring partner into the second round, and Renato Usatii obviously fits this role. Recently, the Our Party leader has started to resemble Igor Dodon, as he is ready to lose in the second round, while significantly boosting his chances of entering parliament in 2025. According to some analysts relying on sociology, Usatii’s entry into the second round is almost the only possibility for Sandu to win. In a race with all other candidates, the president loses. Therefore, in recent months Usatii has been actively portrayed as the main opposition candidate, and sources from outside the government have been providing him with confidential information in order to provoke public scandals. The purpose of these actions is to redirect the flows of dissatisfied citizens to Usatii, who do not influence the outcome of the elections but are quite capable of bringing the counter-candidate needed by the authorities to the second round. It is also crucial to pay attention to the preparation for legitimization of the entire pre-election and post-election process. All flaws and scams of the authorities should be well disguised by the reports of the relevant international structures. For example, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has already sent 11 experts to Moldova and asked the participating countries to send 26 more long-term observers. They will be grouped into two-member teams throughout the country to assess the conduct of the elections in accordance with international obligations and national legislation. In addition, a further 200 short-term observers will arrive a few days before the vote. At first glance, it may seem to some that the ruling regime has taken full control of the situation and everything is going solely according to the plan of Maia Sandu’s electoral headquarters. But it is wrong to think so and, judging by the statements of the president’s representatives and advisers, they are preparing for a very tough electoral battle. Neighboring Romania also expects problems, where a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense was recently held, specifically dedicated to Moldova. The focus was on the options for strengthening strategic partnership and risks in managing the process of European integration of our country. To this end, Bucharest will be in close coordination with Chisinau and provide support if necessary. Certainly, the carefully chosen words hide clear concern of the Romanian authorities. They probably have the relevant intelligence and analytics indicating, to put it mildly, the ambiguity of the results of the Moldovan elections. After all, if everything is under control, why assemble the whole Security Council? In fact, our audience is also being prepared for various scenarios. For instance, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi says that if the European integration referendum fails, the sky will not fall on Moldova. Surely, as a result of Sandu’s loss, no natural disasters will happen as well. Yes, this will destabilize the regime very much, but power will still remain in the hands of the PAS party, which may take an even tougher approach to organizing parliamentary elections or cancel them altogether following the Ukrainian example. The main goal is to keep Moldova in the chosen geopolitical niche with a clear and irreversible pro–European course. The U.S. will certainly be upset by the defeat of the incumbent president. Recall that the Secretary of State’s visit to Chisinau at the end of May was construed by experts as a clear commitment to ensuring the victory of Maia Sandu, who is considered one of the most successful foreign policy projects of the current White House administration in the post-Soviet space. Sandu’s failure in the elections is unlikely to cause any emotional response from American citizens, but another bitter pill will force the new administration to change its approaches to Moldova and its voters.