What Risks the EU Referendum Entails for Moldova

Anton ŠVEC

The success of the 20 October referendum will not only allow PAS to create the most favorable conditions for its parliamentary campaign next year, but will pave the way for an even stronger usurpation of power already now

The other day another representative delegation from abroad arrived in the capital, this time the North Baltic G8 foreign ministers. The Scandinavian-Baltic assembly had meetings with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, even though they are both formally on leave to campaign for Maia Sandu. Moreover, Dorin Recean and especially Mihai Popsoi are indeed travelling actively around the country. The G8 foreign policy chiefs did not even hide the fact that their visit at the finish line before the vote is directly related to the referendum. The intention is to share knowledge about EU membership and close relations with EU countries, so that Moldovan citizens could “make a decision based on facts and not on fear”. The diplomats visited a number of districts, where they met with the population and expressed support for Moldova’s European vector. And while the West’s campaigning in favor of candidate Maia Sandu is understandable and is already a traditional reflection of the relations between the boss and his subordinate, the situation with the referendum is more complicated. The majority of international delegations, which were clearly in favor of the current president, had different thoughts on the plebiscite. They mainly spoke about the allocation of funding and support for the European course, as well as the fight against Russia’s “hybrid aggression”. It is virtually impossible to prove a violation of campaign rules in such circumstances, especially in the context of PAS control over the CEC and the judiciary. Moreover, Moldova traditionally doesn’t consider Western influence triggering revolutionary events and change of government or, on the contrary, consolidating any of the regimes, as interference. This is a kind of advance transfer of sovereign political powers to Brussels, and Washington behind it, under the promise of future membership in the European Union and financing of the government’s current expenses for seizing power and establishing authoritarian rule. At the same time, EU representatives, including the head of the delegation in Chisinau and the president of the European Commission, have repeatedly warned that the outcome of the referendum will not directly impact the pace of Moldova’s European integration. And, indeed, there is no direct dependence, as the referendum is not about accession - today the question is not so. The negotiations have only just begun in the form of legislative screening, and their timing and outcome are fraught with numerous legal conflicts and will depend on domestic political, geopolitical and military-strategic alignments in the region and the world. Formally, the referendum is about embedding the European vector into the constitution, which will offer a broad scope for manipulation by the PAS. Citizens will be asked whether they support a change in the basic law, specifically two amendments to the preamble and the article “integration into the European Union”, establishing the primacy of EU law over national legislation, as well as the possibility for parliament to adopt organic laws to fulfil its obligations to Brussels. This is the main danger and the root of the fears of citizens and the opposition, because an organic law is adopted in Parliament by a simple majority (now and at least until March next year, PAS has it). At the same time, such a law will be able to regulate the spheres directly provided for by the constitution. For instance, the deputies of the ruling party will be able to change the electoral system, the structure of the parliament (including the size and powers), the government, the constitutional court and other justice bodies, etc. under the cover of their commitment to the European Union. Thus, the purpose of the referendum is not limited to building an artificial link between the figure of Maia Sandu and Moldova’s European integration in order to mobilize her electorate and discredit her rivals. Although this task should not be neglected either, since from a symbolic point of view, winning the presidential elections will be a crucial step in preserving the current regime. Meanwhile, the issue of granting additional powers to the parliamentary majority in the above-mentioned areas seems to be fundamental. Such opportunities will allow the PAS not only to create the most favorable conditions for itself to conduct the parliamentary campaign next spring, but also to open access to a full-scale usurpation of power. With arbitrary reference to the requirements and norms of the European Union, it will be possible to reshape legislation in own interests, up to banning certain political parties or imposing martial law and state of emergency. This is the major risk of the referendum. In some ways, the scheme resembles the Russian experience with the ‘abolition’ of Vladimir Putin’s presidential term in Russia in 2020, also disguised as various amendments to the constitution. Similar practices have taken place in other post-Soviet states and a number of African countries. The Moldovan specifics lies in the fact that in the conditions of the parliamentary form of government it is not so much a question of terms as of the powers of the parliamentary majority, which after 20 October can become much broader and arbitrarily interpreted. The fact that various Western emissaries are actively campaigning for such transformations appears to be a disguised but quite concrete meddling in Moldova’s internal affairs in order to strengthen the PAS regime. Whether the electorate will favor this – probably yes. Since 33.3% of votes from the registered number of voters (just over a million) is enough for the referendum to be considered valid. Given the joint holding with the first round of presidential election, the turnout will inevitably exceed these values. And the question itself, if we do not go into details and particulars, for the average voter hardly suggests a negative answer. Especially in the context of the information deficit resulting from the restriction of free media and the opposition’s rights to conduct media campaigns.