Transnistrian Settlement to “Come Alive” in 2025?

Sergiu CEBAN

Signs exist that there could be much more activity in the negotiation process next year, as hinted by personnel changes in key embassies and organizations  

So-called political representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol met in Bender last week. The outcome of this infrequent event in recent years confirms that there have been no particular shifts in relations between the banks of the Dniester and that the settlement process is, in fact, still stalled. We can once again make sure that the key to this conflict is definitely not in Moldova, but on the outer perimeter, where the confrontation between the West and Russia continues to rage. As before, both the constitutional authorities and the regional administration are pursuing only their own narrow agendas. The former seek to improve the situation of Romanian-language schools and farmers cultivating land on the left bank, to secure the release of political prisoners, and to facilitate access to Transnistria for human rights defenders, journalists and NGOs. The latter are concerned about economic and banking problems, certain sectoral issues, and, strangely enough, human rights violations, albeit by Chisinau. Interestingly, Tiraspol again proposed to sign some kind of peace declaration, despite the fact that this issue screwed up even six months ago. But it is unlikely that the second attempt would have taken place without receiving preliminary assurances. That is, we can assume that there is support on this issue from some participants (apart from Moscow) who, after all, needed some paper to restart the negotiation process. This means that next year the case of the suspended Transnistrian settlement may be interrupted, which is indicated by many signs. For example, we can pay attention to the rotation of diplomats, ambassadors and other functionaries involved in the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Thus, the other day it became known that the Western capitals had decided to replace the experienced Austrian diplomat Thomas Mayr-Harting, who had held the post of special representative of the OSCE for the past five years. We will not make far-reaching forecasts before the new appointment, but this episode is in any case a marker of revision of the OSCE policy, and more precisely of the USA, in the Transnistrian direction. It is possible that this is connected with the expected attempts to reach peace talks on the war in Ukraine, with which the future situation on the Dniester is inextricably linked. In addition, Chisinau eagerly awaits other important persons. The new U.S. ambassador has not arrived yet, and the Russian ambassador, who arrived in October, is still unable to present his credentials to Maia Sandu. At the same time, Ozerov is not sitting still and in addition to his trip to Comrat, he has already started to get acquainted with Transnistrian enterprises, although he does not make any fundamental statements on the Transnistrian issue. The reshuffle at the Ukrainian embassy has been strangely delayed. Perhaps the previously announced appointment of the odious Oleksiy Danilov has been reconsidered, as Kyiv is not prepared to further unbalance the fragile internal political situation in the neighboring country. In the meantime, the Ukrainian interests in the settlement are being arranged by the Charge d’Affaires. It is quite natural that Kyiv is most interested in the fate of the warehouses in Cobasna, which are one of the key factors of the Russian military presence in the region. Before the Bender meeting, the official representative of Brussels in the negotiation process visited Chisinau and Tiraspol. It is clear that the European Union wants to do its part and, importantly, to parallel European integration and reintegration. Nevertheless, the “European integration concept” has not yet been fully integrated into the dialogue between the parties and is hindered by objective contradictions between the right and the left banks. Well, and the key moment is the OSCE Chairpersonship, which will be taken over by Finland on 1 January. Not the largest European country, it nevertheless has a special diplomatic tradition that can, strange as it may seem, bring the long-awaited thaw closer. It is not by chance that the famous Final Act was signed in Helsinki, which became an important link in reducing international tensions and building pan-European security mechanisms. At the same time, in case of activity on the banks of the Dniester, other participants, for whom the internal political configuration of Moldova is of fundamental importance, may also join the search for a model of Transnistrian settlement. The most obvious option is Romania, where the election campaign forced many to reveal their cards on the Transnistrian problem. Naturally, Bucharest will generally adhere to the general line of the West, but no one will forbid it to try to turn some points in its favor. Of course, the West would like that a political settlement begins in the context of a weakening of the negotiating positions of Moscow and Tiraspol. This would make it possible to reach the most favorable formula to permanently oust Russian influence from the region. However, the scandal that has erupted in recent days over Energy Minister Victor Parlicov’s trip to St Petersburg can be considered evidence that our authorities are not ready to make a critical break with Russia and launch reintegration amid a severe energy crisis. Besides, the Kremlin, with its latest blows on the Ukrainian energy sector, has started to cut it off from the Moldovan energy sector, which makes us even more dependent on the will of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the government is forced to go and negotiate with Gazprom, including uninterrupted gas supplies to the left bank for electricity generation. It is no secret that agreements with the Russian gas monopoly are often linked to Russia’s (geo)political interests. Earlier in 2022, Maia Sandu stated that “she is not going to sell part of the country just so that Moldova could have cheaper gas for six months”, indirectly recognizing the Kremlin’s demands for special rights and guarantees for the Transnistrian region. If we consider the prospects of solving the Transnistrian issue from the internal political point of view, it is highly probable that no fundamental changes should be expected until the parliamentary elections next autumn and further on the formation of a new government. As practice shows, the current leadership manages to negotiate with Tiraspol without critical excesses, but it is unable to offer conceptual ideas of settlement, just as its predecessors did during all three decades. But, as I have already said, the password to the “Transnistrian safe” is, alas, not in Chisinau, so the fate of the conflict depends on the state of affairs on the external perimeter. It is highly likely that next year the situation will change rapidly as the war in Ukraine unfolds. If we put aside the propaganda anesthesia and face reality, the strategy of geopolitical suppression of Moscow has yielded minimal results. That is why Western capitals and think tanks are elaborating a new policy that includes the gradual restoration of dedicated lines of communication with the Russian Federation. A clear example is the recent telephone conversation between the leaders of Germany and Russia, which until February 2022 were the main operators of the conditional zone of contact between the Euro-Atlantic and post-Soviet spaces. Consequently, it is necessary to be fully armed when the war sooner or later ends, as a noticeable diplomatic revival is expected on the Transnistrian conflict as well.