Why Chisinau and Tiraspol Cannot Agree on a Peace Document

Anton ŠVEC

The so-called “declaration on peaceful settlement” proposed by Tiraspol in May has not been signed for six months. Is this evidence that peace is not the only option for resolving the conflict in the near future?

In the last few days, the main negotiators of Chisinau and Tiraspol have been engaged in a long-distance verbal altercation in the media. Earlier, both officials broadcast quite calm messages following a recent face-to-face meeting in Bender. However, in December the situation changed - Oleg Serebrian tried to blame on Moscow and Tiraspol for a possible crisis with gas and electricity supplies through the media, which provoked a counter-criticism from the left bank. In addition, another issue is also stirring up, related to the so-called “declaration on peaceful settlement of the conflict”, which has been promoted by the Transnistrian administration since May. The deputy prime minister for reintegration stated that the signing of such a document is possible only if it stipulates the territorial integrity of the country. In response, Transnistrian political representative Vitaly Ignatiev said that the text of the agreement had been practically agreed at the Bender meeting, sent to Chisinau and supported by the mediators in the negotiation process. He also criticized Serebrian for preferring a public refusal through the media to an official response - and now Tiraspol doubts the sincerity of the central leadership’s assurances about the intention to solve the conflict only by peaceful means. Obviously, the adoption of a tiny declaration (its text was published back in the summer on the website of the regional leader) will clearly not be a panacea for all woes in the Transnistrian settlement. Moreover, judging by Ignatiev’s statements, the updated draft has become even more concise and general. Nevertheless, society on both banks of the Dniester in the current tense atmosphere would definitely construe such a signal positively, especially if it were supported by other participants in the 5+2 format, including Russia and Ukraine. So why does official Chisinau refuse to take such a symbolic step, which does not impose any special obligations, for six months already? Especially since our leadership regularly reaffirms its commitment to peaceful negotiations, clearly ruling out military methods. I am talking about refusal, because the mention of territorial integrity, which Oleg Serebrian publicly insists on, in this case could be considered a deliberate excuse to disrupt the signing of the declaration. This whole situation makes us fear that the attitude of our authorities is not strictly related to the logic of the negotiation process, but also takes into account the general context of relations and the changing geopolitical reality around the region. And in this reality, apparently, no future scenarios are excluded. The cancellation of the presidential election in Romania on the extremely disreputable pretext that the security agencies and intelligence services were unable to provide the public with remotely convincing evidence of external (Russian) interference in the electoral process was yet another indication that there are no longer any rules of play. Instead, only the interests of Euro-Atlantic solidarity and the political establishment defending them in each particular country remain. Everything else is secondary and can be ignored if there is external legitimacy. Actually, the situation was similar in Moldova (just not as exaggerated) earlier, when the constitutional amendments envisaged by the referendum were introduced and Maia Sandu retained the presidential post despite the specific results of the vote and mutual accusations of fraud and vote-buying by the authorities and the opposition. The PAS regime got away with violating constitutional norms and electoral legislation, while the population and the opposition, which quickly turned its attention to preparing for the parliamentary campaign, did not even attempt to stage a convincing protest movement. The lightning-fast dismantling of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the violation of the inviolability of its borders not only by terrorist and rebel groups, but also by neighboring countries (primarily Israel and NATO member Turkey) have trampled another taboo established by international law. Moreover, guided by Euro-Atlantic solidarity, the incumbent regime is often forced to publicly support actions with a highly controversial legal nature (e.g., refusing to recognize the results of parliamentary elections in Georgia). Thus, a “Pandora’s box” has been opened, when the “rule of force” acquires much more weight than any conventions like the Western construct of “order based on rules”. In our case, these changes have an even greater effect, as the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict continues on the borders, in which Moldova is logistically, economically and propagandistically involved by the will of its ruling elites. Not to mention the regular appearance of drones in the country’s regions, whether shot down, downed or transported there by land. Signing a peace declaration does not fit into this logic. It would mean not just a voluntary renunciation of armed seizure or police operations in the separatist region and a readiness to seek solutions to mutual contradictions in the course of protracted negotiations. This would, among other things, be an acknowledgement that the armed formations of the Russian Federation in Transnistria, both those operating as part of the peacekeeping forces and in the so-called Operative Group of Russian Forces, are not a factor of destabilization and do not pose a direct threat to peace. This in turn gave rise to questions as to why then there are constant demands for their withdrawal as a precondition for a political settlement. Thus, the ruling regime leaves itself free to maneuver, including the possibility of using force or, at least, the threat of force, and strives in every possible way to increase its own combat capabilities. This is done by engaging in all kinds of military exercises and receiving military supplies from abroad (recently the head of the EU Delegation to Moldova, Janis Mazeiks, announced the transfer of anti-drone weapons to Moldova). The hidden motive of Tiraspol’s idea is to deprive Chisinau of this “trump card”, at the same time earning diplomatic points on its constructiveness and drawing everyone’s attention to the destructiveness of the central authorities. In this sense, the logic of actions of both sides is clear, and experts will argue who is right and who is wrong. But if we try to answer the question whether the tactics of official Chisinau corresponds to the long-term interests of the country’s reintegration and preservation of social stability, the answer will most likely be negative. But it seems that this has never been the goal of the pro-Western PAS government.