Expert: War Between Sandu and Dragalin Exacerbates Ruling Party’s Split

Christian RUSSU

Another escalation of the conflict between the ruling regime and the head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office leads to growing contradictions within the PAS and threatens to turn into a full-fledged split on the eve of the parliamentary campaign

Our “independent” media, funded by USAID for many years, seem to have realized the universal laws of the market: without sensation and exclusivity, the public’s attention to them will inevitably decrease. Published opinion polls already show that Moldovan TV media are at the top of the anti-rating list as sources of manipulation, disinformation and propaganda. That is why hot airs revealing the lowdown of the nisi of politics became a vital necessity in the last month. We must admit that the young and ambitious Veronica Dragalin looks much better in such broadcasts than the wearied Maia Sandu or other representatives of the leadership. And the head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office has the best way of presenting the facts of the behind-the-scenes struggle to the public. A kind of all-knowing exposing oppositionist, like Renato Usatii in his early period, just much more attractive and with an impeccable biography. Dragalin went all-in early this month, accusing all of the country’s top leadership - the president, the speaker and the prime minister - of usurping power through unconstitutional interference in the judiciary. This is how she described persistent efforts to remove her from office. The motives of the ruling regime, as it is easy to guess, are banal and ambitious - to preserve the levers of control and to cover up its criminal abuses. “There are suspicions that acts of corruption within the competence of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office have been committed,” the head of the department said bluntly. In particular, the scandalous construction of the Leova-Bumbata road by Andrei Spinu has acquired new details. Thus, the contractor started the works even before the tender, the design firm was selected before the official invitation to the tender, and the wife of the head of the National Road Agency, which organized the auction, received 2 million lei from an interested party. At the same time, no one, except for Dragalin herself, seems to be interested in the investigation. For example, the National Centre of Forensic Expertise considered the inspection of the Leova-Bumbata road untimely, having scheduled it as late as 2028. All this, according to the official, is just the tip of the iceberg of large-scale corruption, with its roots tracing back to the ruling elite. Admission that many citizens are afraid to testify for fear of reprisals added to the plausibility of this version: searches by masked law enforcers have long been a common response to disobedience by the authorities. Moreover, in response to complaints about the lack of progress in high-profile cases, Dragalin tried to show practical results. On 7 February, she reported that Interpol had listened to her organisation’s arguments and decided to resume the search for Vladimir Plahotniuc. The threats to dismiss her were followed by an unambiguous hint about her readiness to get involved in politics, as the example of Alexandr Stoianoglo showed good prospects for such a transformation. The prosecutor made it clear that she is being deliberately pushed into politics, although she has no such goals, and this will be a forced measure given the impossibility to continue her prosecutorial career either in the USA or in Moldova. In response to these antics, Maia Sandu shielded herself with the visiting European Commissioner Marta Kos. The Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office was recognized as “a source of vulnerability to Moldova’s security and democracy”, jeopardizing the citizen’s voice. But Dragalin went further, accusing PAS and the president personally of seeking to influence the operation of her office, and published correspondence confirming the existence of dirt on the regime and her personal unsuccessful attempts since 2023 to force the authorities to cooperate with the investigation. And such sabotage, according to the revelations of the overseas prosecutor, concerns not only the investigation of criminal cases against representatives of the ruling party, but also the frauds of Ilan Sor promoted by PAS. According to her information, the Ministry of Justice obstructed Sor’s extradition from Israel, foiling the requests agreed upon by the prosecutors of the two countries. It is not only the preservation of the notorious practice of “telephone justice” of Plahotniuc’s time, but also a loud accusation of covering up cross-border crime with geopolitical overtones. Such a statement is nothing but a slap. The scandal seemed to be approaching its climax. On 12 February, Igor Grosu unhesitatingly announced the decision to liquidate the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office through a merger with the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime and the formation of a new body. The PAS chairman did not even try to justify this with any clear arguments, promising only that “the relevant draft law will appear tomorrow and will be instantly put to work”. The next day, the legislative initiative was indeed posted on the parliament’s website. However, as it turned out, the document was seen for the first time not only by opposition MPs and the public, but even by half of the elected members of the ruling party. At least, this follows from Olesea Stamate’s statements, as well as from the introduction of the draft into the agenda. Which suddenly did not take place because it was not supported... in the PAS faction itself. Half of them did not vote, half of them were against it, and only two supported it. Simultaneously with this vote, media close to the authorities spread news about president Maia Sandu’s sudden visit to the Prosecutor General’s Office, allegedly to discuss plans to restructure the justice system. After a while, the news was hastily removed. Clumsy refutations and attempts to hush up the issue followed, providing further evidence of the government’s pressure on prosecutors. An indirect confirmation of the failure of those who wanted to achieve a swift resolution of the “Dragalin case” as early as 13 February was the official press release of the Prosecutor General’s Office criticizing the government’s intentions to radically restructure the prosecutor’s office. It turns out that all prosecutors, even from the PAS-controlled Prosecutor General’s Office, sided with Veronica Dragalin in this confrontation. At the very least, this added political weight to the ambitious lady in case she needs to make a transfer from justice to politics. It is obvious that the PAS leadership and personally Maia Sandu do not intend to stop halfway and will eliminate the position of the head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office in the near future. The only question is whether the authorities are ready to sacrifice the fragile unity in their party for the sake of it. After all, part of the long-established group of influence in PAS considers the preservation of the status quo and its well-being to be paramount, rather than satisfying the “wishes” of the president. It would be unreasonably risky if Dragalin would continue to dump dirt on many “yellow” politicians who are already in the shadow. At the same time, as yesterday’s voting showed, Maia Sandu and Igor Grosu in their fight against Veronica Dragalin can rely not so much on their fellow party members as on the parliamentary opposition, which unanimously supported the government’s legislative initiative. For many, this was a testament to the coalition vote between PAS and their opponents, former BCS members. By the way, this is the scenario of joint governance, which is seen as the most probable in the future parliament. It is not excluded that Dragalin herself will now appear in it.