This coming autumn, Moldova will once again face a choice – to return the country to the path of democratic reforms or to legitimize the existing authoritarian model of governance
Segiu Ceban, RTA:
June 8, 2019, marked a milestone in the country’s recent history, signifying the fall of Vladimir Plahotniuc’s oligarchic regime. This event was not accompanied by mass street protests like those that shook the country in April 2009, but its consequences were no less significant. The power, concentrated in the hands of one man, collapsed under the pressure of an unexpected political alliance, international pressure, and growing public discontent. At the time, it seemed we were entering a new era of political cleansing, democratization, and movement toward European standards. However, six years later, it has become clear that some corrupt practices from the past have not disappeared but were simply taken over by a new generation of domestic politicians.
After the February 2019 elections, Moldova found itself in a deadlock. None of the parties were able to form a parliamentary majority. Negotiations repeatedly reached an impasse, the president was accused of corruption, and a new political crisis was brewing in the country. In this situation, on June 8, what was considered impossible happened: the ruling coalition was formed by absolute antagonists – the pro-Russian Socialist Party and the pro-European ACUM bloc. The main goal of this quasi-alliance was to remove the Democratic Party, controlled by Plahotniuc, from power.
To prevent the formation of a new government without the participation of the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM), the shadow politicians of that time employed a variety of resources and tools, which eventually led to a situation of dual power in the country. A two-week struggle for legitimacy, during which the country teetered on the brink of governmental paralysis, ended with the Democrats forced to capitulate under pressure from the EU, the US, Russia, and civil society. On June 14, Plahotniuc fled the country citing threats to his safety, and the Sandu government assumed legitimate authority.
Since then, June 8 has become a symbol of the fall of dictatorship and hopes for a new era, including a ‘better’ one, as proclaimed by the main slogan of the Party of Action and Solidarity. Maia Sandu, who was later elected president, repeatedly emphasized the significance of this date as the beginning of the fight for a European Moldova. In her speeches, she spoke about the victory over the oligarchic system that had seized the state, as well as the cleansing of government institutions and the restoration of citizens’ sense of freedom and dignity.
Indeed, many saw that June as a reboot of the state. Maia Sandu inspired trust as a figure with an anti-corruption reputation, international experience, and a genuine desire to reform the country. Her party PAS’s victory in the 2021 parliamentary elections further strengthened hopes for the modernization of the republic.
However, over time, the initial euphoria gave way to concern, as the promised reforms turned out to be wrapped in an authoritarian package. In recent years, an increasing number of experts and ordinary citizens have begun to draw troubling parallels, as Sandu’s rule has come to increasingly resemble the concentration of power in a single pair of hands – much like what was seen during the Plahotniuc era. The only difference now is that it is happening under seemingly noble pro-European slogans.
After PAS’s victory in 2021, Moldova effectively became a one-party state. The presidency, parliament, and government all came under the full control of a single political force. Like Plahotniuc before her, Sandu took control of the prosecutor’s office, the judiciary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Security and Intelligence Service. Also like the fugitive oligarch, she uses administrative resources and laws under the guise of anti-corruption to apply electoral pressure. A rapid replacement of key figures in state institutions with loyalists began. This personnel purge affected both the judiciary and the security sector. The justice reform, presented as a means of cleansing the system of corrupt elements, in practice became a tool for eliminating dissenters. Arrests and criminal cases against opposition figures have become commonplace – something unimaginable just 7–8 years ago.
An equally alarming situation has developed in the media sphere, as since 2022 the authorities have begun a large-scale purge of opposition TV channels and media outlets that offer society an alternative point of view. Under the pretext of combating pro-Russian propaganda, dozens of television channels and news platforms have been shut down or had their broadcasting restricted – including our own news and analysis portal. In essence, the current government, now hiding not behind national interests but behind the European choice, is acting in a manner similar to Plahotniuc, who controlled the country’s largest TV stations and denied airtime to his opponents.
In 2023, a de-oligarchization law was adopted, intended to serve as a tool to counter the shadow influence of powerful business groups. However, in practice, it was applied selectively against specific opposition figures, while influential businessmen close to the government remained untouched by the law and continued to lobby for questionable political decisions. As a result, the entire anti-corruption campaign launched by the authorities has come to resemble not so much a cleansing of the system, but rather a restructuring of it to suit the needs of the ruling regime – which, much like Plahotniuc’s, continues to draw resources from smuggling and grey schemes.
Ultimately, six years after the June 2019 events, Moldova once again finds itself in a situation where power is concentrated in a single set of hands, while public debates rage over the state of real democracy in the country. Although the ruling regime speaks of fighting corruption and advancing reforms, in practice we are witnessing the consolidation of vertical power, the weakening of checks and balances, and the marginalization of any viable political alternatives.
Maia Sandu came to power riding a wave of hope and disillusionment, promising a new quality of politics. But with each passing year, it becomes increasingly clear that behind the “new facade” lie the old, all-too-familiar contours of a political model marked by a personalized style of governance, selective justice, and media control. That is why the current state of the political system can be summed up with a rephrased slogan: the dictatorship is dead – long live the dictatorship.
The events of June 2019 proved that, unlike in 2009, a peaceful transfer of power is indeed possible in Moldova – even under conditions of complete state capture. This was made possible through external pressure, a political compromise between irreconcilable rivals, and, more importantly, the active stance not only of civil society, but of the broader public, which had come to recognize the power of its own voice. This coming autumn, Moldova will once again face a choice: to return the country to the path of democratic transformation, or to legitimize the existing authoritarian model of governance hiding behind a polished pro-European facade.
The main challenge in the coming months is not just the parliamentary elections or the supposed geopolitical dilemma that offers only a binary choice between “good” and “evil.” As September approaches, it will become clear whether those in power are ready for fair competition – and whether society is prepared to make firm electoral demands.
Some might say that our country lives in ten-year cycles and that the next wave of revolutionary change won’t come until the end of the decade. Nevertheless, June 8 is not only a reason to recall the events of 2019, but also a moment to reflect on what awaits us after the elections. The key question is how the ruling monopoly party will behave – and whether it will find the strength, under the pressure of a strong public and political demand, to step back and peacefully hand over power.