Worldwide Conflict Escalation: Has Moldova Reasons to Fear?

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Sergiu CEBAN
Moldova’s location at the crossroads of interests of at least three major players and the unresolved territorial conflict make the situation around the country quite vulnerable
On the night of June 22, the US Air Force launched a massive airstrike on Iranian territory. Nuclear facilities in Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz were targeted. The primary focus of the strike was Fordow, which is believed to house the Islamic Republic’s underground nuclear capabilities. Extremely heavy GBU-57A bombs, specifically designed to destroy deeply buried targets, were used. Whether the US succeeded in destroying Iran’s nuclear program remains an open question. If the airstrike did not inflict critical damage, then Tehran can only be stopped through a large-scale ground operation or the use of nuclear weapons. Given the current international situation, both options seem highly unlikely. But the issue is not just about this specific strike. It has become merely one symptom of a much larger and more alarming process, namely, a chain escalation of conflicts around the world. Ukraine, Karabakh, the India-Pakistan border, Israel versus Hamas, Hezbollah, and now Iran. And this list continues to grow. Whereas such conflicts were previously seen as localized flare-ups, they now fit into a broader picture of global restructuring. Why is the density of hot spots around the world increasing so rapidly today? History shows that the international order is established as a result of major wars. The Westphalian system emerged after the Thirty Years’ War, the Versailles system after World War I, and the Yalta-Potsdam system after World War II. Even the end of the Cold War in 1991, when the world transitioned to a unipolar order dominated unconditionally by the United States, was a kind of outcome of prolonged confrontation, albeit mostly nonviolent. However, this model also proved to be temporary. By the early 2020s, it became clear that the idea of Pax Americana had exhausted itself. New powers emerged onto the stage, such as China, the regional powers of the Middle East, the globalizing India, and Russia, which is asserting its ambitions. A struggle for the redistribution of influence began. Unlike in the past, when the world experienced “great wars”, the key actors now, possessing nuclear weapons, avoid direct confrontations, afraid of mutual destruction. Therefore, the frontiers of the new world order do not lie directly between the superpowers themselves, but in the “grey zones”, that is, at the intersections of their spheres of influence. Ukraine, Taiwan, the South Caucasus, and the broader post-Soviet space are zones of geopolitical tension where the interests of the United States, Russia, China, the EU, and regional players collide. Today, more than ever before, it is the long-frozen conflicts that are intensifying. Why? Because in this transitional period, when the old rules no longer apply and the new ones are yet to be established, every player seeks to maximize their gains. This applies not only to great powers but also to second-tier states. Those who previously waited or hoped for diplomatic solutions now prefer to act by force, seeking to cement the status quo before the arrival of a new system. The example of Nagorno-Karabakh is particularly illustrative: Azerbaijan, seeing changes in the international and regional balance, decided on a swift and decisive operation. Israel, perceiving that American support remains steadfast, is escalating military actions in the Middle Eastern arena. India and Pakistan also came dangerously close to large-scale armed conflict. And all this happens against the backdrop of tension around Taiwan, instability on the Korean Peninsula, and dangerous trends in the Balkans. In this troubling international landscape, Moldova also finds itself in a zone of risk. Despite the seemingly geographical distance from the Russian-Ukrainian front line, our country is situated at the crossroads of at least three powers: the EU, Russia, and Romania. The presence of an unresolved territorial conflict further increases the vulnerability of the situation around us. At first glance, the Transnistrian issue appears to be frozen and manageable, but given the global instability, even it can be “unfrozen” within a matter of days. Actors who have previously shown restraint may attempt to change the status quo by force, especially if the external globalist forces behind the political regimes in Chisinau and Bucharest sense that another blow against Moscow is necessary to strengthen their positions. On the one hand, there are those who believe that the current international environment creates a basis for more resolute action regarding the Transnistrian region. However, it seems that the prevailing view remains that, no matter how tempting it may be to resolve the issue by force, the combined risks and consequences could outweigh any potential gains. First of all, military intervention in the Transnistrian situation is virtually unfeasible without Ukraine’s involvement. Moldova’s national army lacks the necessary resources and motivation to carry out such an operation. This raises the question: is it in Kyiv’s interest, already engaged in a full-scale war, to open yet another front? Moreover, one must take into account that a possible asymmetric response from Russia missile strikes or other actions, including against Moldova, could seriously complicate the situation in the region and cast significant doubt on the prospects of European integration. Secondly, any move toward a forceful resolution of the issue would have political repercussions on the international stage. Even during Joe Biden’s presidency, no one dared to sharply escalate the conflict in Transnistria. Under current conditions, actions by Kyiv and Chisinau to inflame the situation could be perceived by the new US administration as a deliberate provocation aimed at weakening the United States’ strategic position as the dominant power and global stabilizing force. Thirdly, it’s still difficult to see what exactly the potential initiators of the conflict would gain. A forceful seizure of the left bank of the Dniester does not offer a decisive advantage but entails enormous political, economic, and military-security risks, primarily for Moldova. Such a venture that carries the risk of losing control over the entire country is perhaps the main safeguard against a small war with far-reaching consequences. Thus, 33 years after the tragic events in Bender (Tighina), it can now be said that the Transnistrian region, despite its vulnerability, remains in a state of conflict deterrence. The relative stability is ensured not so much by military balance as by the absence of a clear post-conflict scenario that would be acceptable to the key players, particularly the Kremlin, for which this region remains a zone of strategic interest. As long as there is no shared understanding of such an outcome, the likelihood of bloodshed remains low. Nevertheless, in the long term, much will depend on how the global order takes shape, that is likely to take considerable time. Until then, hotspots of instability will continue to multiply. And the longer this period of international uncertainty lasts, the more often both major and minor states will be tempted to use force. That is why countries like Moldova, located in zones of heightened geopolitical pressure, must exercise maximum rationality and caution in order not to become an arena for others’ conflicts or a tool in the pursuit of foreign geopolitical agendas.