Flawed but Determined: Inside the Regime’s Pre-Election Strategy

Anton ŠVEC

The ruling party is ramping up efforts to mobilize its electoral base and attract new supporters, yet its potential for further electoral growth remains limited

PAS active election campaign does, in fact, reveal the presence of a certain strategy, tactics, and schedule, reinforced by an unlimited budgetary-administrative resource and dominance in the media sphere. The party’s political strategists are betting on the figure of Maia Sandu, while at the same time striving to hold as many pre-election events as possible to win over voters. The ruling party finds it vitally necessary to flood the public space with campaigning. Firstly, this is due to the niche nature of its political platform, which relies solely on external legitimacy, solidarity with Ukraine, and integration into the European Union. Secondly, it stems from the ongoing attempts of two opposition blocs to consolidate – the left and the centrist. Alternativa, with its four strong frontrunners, is relying on anti-war, pro-state, and pro-European narratives in an attempt to secure a position in the political center and draw wavering voters from both flanks. So far, the results have been unimpressive, but the party still holds important cards, such as a well-developed program that resonates emotionally with the public and significant PR potential in the capital. There are weak yet noticeable unifying impulses among the left-wing forces, actively promoted by Moscow, centered around themes such as Moldova’s traditional and Orthodox identity, the settlement of relations with Gagauzia and Transnistria, the defense of sovereignty, and the preservation of the country’s non-aligned status. The starting point was a rally organized by the Socialist Party outside the Parliament building, timed to coincide with Sovereignty Day. The protest scene differed little from the rather dull and ideologically one-sided “Sovereignty March” organized by PAS and Maia Sandu on the same day. However, the presence among the participants, in addition to Igor Dodon, of prominent representatives of the PCRM, as well as the leaders of the Heart of Moldova and Future of Moldova parties, Irina Vlah and Vasile Tarlev, may indicate an intention to launch an electoral alliance aimed at mobilizing voters with conventionally left-wing views and securing up to 30 seats in parliament. As a result of the rally, a declaration titled “On Moldova’s Sovereign Policy in the 21st Century” was issued, and Dodon openly acknowledged plans to form a left-wing bloc and to restore relations with the Russian Federation. The ruling party, despite certain signals from Brussels, is not currently seeking to unite other pro-Romanian and pro-European right-wing projects around itself, although such a scenario remains possible, depending on evolving sociological data. Due to its dogmatism, ideological rigidity, and the relatively narrow framework set by Western patrons, PAS is objectively limited in its appeal to broader segments of society, operating mainly within its own electoral niche, albeit a sizable one. This may explain its possessive and often dismissive attitude toward competing political projects that cater to the same social demographic. Tied by commitments to Brussels and Kyiv, PAS fundamentally refrains from offering a “fresh perspective” or breakthrough ideas that could expand its electoral base. The ruling party’s strategists rely primarily on outdated, conventional methods of securing votes. Lacking both the capacity and expertise for a genuine rebranding, programmatic revision, or the “humanization” of its slogans, PAS instead opts for largely symbolic gestures of questionable effectiveness. Its electoral methodology is reduced to a disjointed set of basic PR stunts and pressure tactics against opponents. The party has approached the formation of its electoral list with utmost diligence, including well-known public figures. The calculation is straightforward – to attract voters from various communities: the creative intellectual circles, the LGBT community, volunteers, unionists, and even from Gagauzia. The process has often been accompanied by amusing mishaps, such as PAS enlisting activists who had campaigned for George Simion during the Romanian presidential elections, or individuals who, at different times and “as part of their job”, expressed support for the political projects of Plahotniuc and Filat. Meanwhile, the political purge continues through criminal prosecution of the opposition and anti-democratic restrictions on media freedom, that have drawn criticism even from Western organizations. The ruling party is openly clashing with the Chisinau City Hall, both through media attacks and by issuing questionable government decrees and obstructing the adoption of the city budget. The disruption of the Kickboxing World Championship in Chisinau by denying athletes entry into Moldova is also part of this broader campaign aimed at undermining the municipal authorities. The ultimate goal of this effort is to discredit Ion Ceban – a key figure in the Alternativa bloc, who also enjoys a certain degree of international support. The “Moldova Can” project, essentially a brazen advertising campaign funded by the state budget and bordering on a violation of electoral legislation, is also part of PAS PR strategy. Included in this are the 1,000-lei payments to parents of schoolchildren to prepare for the school year, a measure with clear signs of voter bribery. In essence, it duplicates an initiative previously proposed by opposition parties, which PAS had rejected several years ago. However, much like the recent “Sovereignty March” that featured slogans largely at odds with the government’s actual policies, these actions have had little impact on voter preferences. At the same time, it would be premature to speak of a critical pre-election situation for the current regime. Brussels remains willing to invest heavily, both financially and politically, in its support, as evidenced by the upcoming Moldova–European Union summit scheduled for July 4, with the participation of the EU top leadership. The external environment is also favorable to Maia Sandu and her team, particularly following the approval of the new Romanian government and at least temporary stabilization of the political landscape in Bucharest. PAS is gradually recovering from the fallout of the scandals surrounding the release of prisoners and the attack on the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office, helped in considerable part by the moderate stance of Olesea Stamate and Veronica Dragalin. A promising candidate has even emerged for the position of head of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office: Marcel Dumbravan, who won the competition held by the Superior Council of Prosecutors and is now awaiting confirmation by the Prosecutor General. Under current circumstances, what ultimately matters most is not how citizens vote, but who counts the votes and how. And in this regard, the ruling party has everything under control. The diaspora voting resource remains available and can be deployed exactly as needed. Full control is maintained over the Central Electoral Commission and the police (enabling intimidation of the opposition and ordinary voters). Meanwhile, the operation to take over the Constitutional Court is nearing completion, that, if necessary, will lend legitimacy to any post-election decisions made by Maia Sandu and her associates. The regime continues to move forward – its steps are not always optimal or effective, but they are certainly persistent. The pressing question now is: what exactly can the opposition do to prevent PAS from retaining a parliamentary majority after the September elections?