Judicial Takeover as the Opening Move in PAS Power Game

The Constitutional Court has been fully cleared of the Sandu–Dodon coalition's legacy and prepared to make political decisions if the September elections don’t go as planned

Just recently, Parliament, the Government, and the reformed Superior Council of Magistracy appointed and reappointed Constitutional Court judges. Given the role this body plays in the power hierarchy, and its past involvement in state capture under Plahotniuc, this is undoubtedly a significant development. Officially, the changes were explained by the expiration of most judges’ terms, but the real motives behind the reshuffle were, of course, entirely different. The first and most important outcome is that the ruling PAS is entering the parliamentary race with the comfort of a secured rear. Having a court under control that holds the power of the “final word” is a matter of both prestige and insurance for any authoritarian regime. What matters here is not just predictability, but strict adherence to a scenario crafted in the enlightened minds of the country’s political leadership. Every state institution must, like an orchestra, play its part precisely and on cue, so that everything appears flawless. And in the event of force majeure, it is the Constitutional Court that, following Romania’s example, must pull the emergency brake: declare anything that deviates from the plan “unconstitutional” and restart the process, electoral or otherwise. Another typical feature of many long-entrenched leaders is the cultivation of a personality cult. This goes beyond merely encouraging praise, it involves building an entourage whose sole purpose is to serve the leader’s interests. In essence, extended time in power breeds a reluctance to consider whether future officials possess actual professional training or competence. Trust, obedience, and controllability become the only criteria for appointments. Liuba Sova, Nicolae Rosca, and even Domnica Manole managed to earn such trust, though not without bargaining, by demonstrating their loyalty. That’s why they were reappointed. To facilitate this, a new law on the Constitutional Court was adopted in April, which, among other things, eliminated the requirement for a public competition and allowed judges to serve two consecutive terms. But before reappointments, there was a “test assignment”. The judges were expected to satisfy the request of Prosecutor General Ion Munteanu to declare unconstitutional the provision granting the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia the right to nominate a candidate for the regional prosecutor’s office. In parallel, the ruling party had to work hard to meet the material demands of the Constitutional Court’s members. The greed of Domnica Manole, in particular, has already become a byword in political circles. Thanks to this, the long-sidelined Sergiu Litvinenco will also join the composition of the Court. Obedience and patience have allowed the former personnel manager of the ruling party to return to the public sphere, even after high-profile failures. It was Litvinenco, after all, who once went to great lengths, first to prevent the respected jurist Dumitru Pulbere from joining the Constitutional Court, and then to remove the prominent PSRM figure and native of the Left Bank, Vladimir Turcan, from the position of Court chair. Notably, the official justification for demanding Turcan’s removal was his dissenting opinion regarding the Court’s decision to block the social and economic support measures proposed by the Socialist-Democratic government, including the acceptance of a Russian loan. It is nearly impossible to imagine a similar situation today. And yet, in reality, the underlying circumstances remain unchanged: Cabinet, with parliamentary backing, continues to adopt populist decisions on various payouts to the population while regularly taking out loans to cover budget shortfalls. The only real difference lies in the identity of the presidents. In the spring of 2020, the formal pretext for blocking an attempt to establish cooperation with Moscow was Igor Dodon’s excessive talkativeness. Today, however, even Maia Sandu’s public statements about who should receive European funds and how elicit no reaction at all. Another important detail, stemming from the personality traits of a long-standing ruler, is the desire to sever all ties with former partners. If you will, even to rewrite history, so that nothing reminds the public of past moments of weakness, concessions made, or forced compromises. In this regard, the composition of the Constitutional Court was the last remaining attribute of the coalition formed six years ago between Maia Sandu and Igor Dodon. Of course, the current authorities began their campaign against former “partners” within the Constitutional Court without delay as early as 2019. First, they replaced the leadership. Then, they effectively hounded Judge Vladimir Turcan. A former ally of Igor Dodon, Turcan had long ceased any active resistance and only occasionally made remarks that irritated the government, such as questioning the legitimacy of last year’s referendum. Nevertheless, the regime continued to view him as an unbearable relic of the former alliance with the Socialists. Now that chapter has finally been closed. In place of seasoned figures like Turcan, the key court will now be occupied by younger individuals who have already proven their loyalty to PAS, such as Ion Malanciuc. Coming from a prominent legal family, Malanciuc contributed to the judicial reform by helping form new compositions of the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. He also blocked appeals by fellow judges who had failed the Pre-Vetting process. Notably, the very process of Malanciuc’s appointment serves as a vivid illustration of the complete dependence of the so-called “reformed” self-governance bodies in the justice system on the ruling party. It is difficult not to view with irony a situation where the candidate being evaluated openly admits he does not meet the criteria for appointment, and instead of disqualification, the examiner expresses confidence that the very act of appointment will serve as motivation for him to “rise” to the required standards. All in all, what has occurred can be described as a repeat, bloodless takeover of an institution that is supposed to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution and uphold the principle of separation of powers. The predictability of the ruling party’s scenarios being successfully carried out has increased dramatically. Meanwhile, the opposition’s chances of defending its legitimate rights on its own in our would-be constitutional state have been reduced virtually to zero.