Expert: Chisinau and Kyiv Still in Security Limbo

The outward shine of the Hague summit barely concealed the signs of crisis and a rethinking of NATO’s role, as the alliance enters an era of “strategic waiting” that will be felt most acutely by its peripheral partners

Last week, another NATO summit concluded in The Hague – a gathering that proved significant not so much for the number of major decisions or signed documents, but for the political, symbolic, and strategic signals it sent to the world. The unexpected brevity, muted rhetoric, minimal focus on the war in Ukraine, and a noticeably cold distancing from post-Soviet partners point more to an internal rethinking and reorientation of the alliance than to the usual display of Western unity. One of the most striking and simultaneously painful moments was the sharp cooling toward Ukraine. For the first time since the war began in 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky was not a full participant in the sessions. His presence was reduced to a minimum, and even the trademark “military jacket” didn’t help - Ukraine was pushed off the front pages. Yet for decades, and annually since 2014, Kyiv’s representatives had been regularly invited to all the key forums of the North Atlantic Alliance. But not this year. No official reasons were given, but none were needed. The political subtext was perfectly clear – Ukraine has become an irritant for several allies, especially for Washington, which is increasingly showing signs of fatigue with the war. This was particularly evident in Donald Trump’s remarks, in which he did not mention the word “Russia” even once and even questioned the automatic application of NATO’s Article 5 on collective defense. As a result, in the speeches of Western leaders, the situation in Ukraine was downgraded from an existential challenge to the status of a regional conflict. At the same time, the gathering in The Hague clearly demonstrated that for Europe’s elites, NATO remains a more vital instrument than even the European Union and this reveals a core vulnerability of the continent. The Alliance still relies on American military power and political will; without the United States, it becomes a non-functional quasi-military structure with limited capacity. The fact that the entire summit was tailored to suit Donald Trump’s mood and demands serves as the clearest evidence of this transatlantic dependency. As a result, The Hague 2025 became a stage for endless deference to the occupant of the White House, pushing aside the bold objectives that the leading EU capitals had set just a year ago. Behind closed doors, European leaders made no secret of their growing anxiety, clearly hoping for a swift change of leadership in the United States and counting on domestic American forces to stop Donald Trump, figuratively or literally. But for now, Europe has no choice but to fear Trump while continuing to adapt to his agenda. Kyiv, in turn, lives in anticipation, clinging to the hope that the American president will show mercy and continue military aid, even if only for a price. Amid the weakening focus on Ukraine, the issue of Moldova also slipped by almost unnoticed. Notably, in previous years, the alliance had increasingly articulated its position on the need to withdraw Russian troops from our territory. It was an important stance for Chisinau, which seeks to strengthen its international legal standing and bolster its negotiating leverage with the Kremlin. On the eve of the Hague summit, the Moldovan leadership likely learned that the Moldovan topic would also be absent from NATO’s agenda. Perhaps that is why Prime Minister Dorin Recean tried to reignite “interest” with a sensational statement to the Financial Times, alleging that Russia was preparing to deploy 10,000 troops to Transnistria and install a pro-Kremlin government in Chisinau. As expected, such a cheap trick didn’t work. And it would be one thing if Recean’s “warnings” had simply gone unnoticed. But instead, from a high-level platform, a NATO official stated during a closed briefing that the alliance sees no direct military threat to Moldova from Russia. This, in effect, undermined the prime minister’s attempt to draw attention to our “vulnerable” position. Nevertheless, the summit also brought some moderately positive signals for Chisinau. NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Sekerinska noted that Moldova could benefit from the increase in defense spending by NATO member states to 5% of GDP, as assistance to Moldova is seen as an investment in collective security. Meanwhile, Secretary General Mark Rutte assured that the alliance is working closely with the republic to strengthen its resilience “in the face of hybrid threats from Russia” and confirmed a high level of coordination with Maia Sandu’s government, especially in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. It is becoming increasingly clear that neither NATO nor the EU currently intends to pursue serious eastward expansion. Moreover, the European Union is compelled to take into account the position of the White House, that was already voiced earlier this month by Trump’s representative, Keith Kellogg: the United States is ready to abandon further NATO expansion toward Russia’s borders, and the accession of Ukraine and Moldova is not on the table. Maia Sandu attempted a rebuttal, reminding that the decision to join military-political blocs rests solely with Moldovan citizens. But the practical significance of such remarks, naturally, is close to zero. In the current geopolitical and regional context, Brussels, whether in the guise of NATO or the EU, is clearly not betting on Moldova’s institutional integration, but rather on propping up the ruling regime to keep the country within its sphere of influence. The eventual outcome will determine where the new dividing line in Europe is drawn and what the future configuration of European security will look like. Accordingly, the Moldovan authorities can expect all possible support to ensure a decisive victory for PAS in September. Behind the outward respectability and glamour of the Hague summit lie clear signs of internal instability, crisis, and the erosion of the Western world’s dominant position. This points to the near-inevitability of structural changes within the alliance in the future. The main conclusions and forecasts are as follows. Western military aid to Ukraine will continue but remain limited and unpredictable, while prospects for NATO membership will be postponed indefinitely. There is a clear trend toward freezing the issue in favor of dialogue with Moscow. Moldova, in particular, is not considered a candidate for membership, and any possible support will be confined to consulting, project activities, cybersecurity, and political assistance ahead of the elections, definitely without extending to military guarantees. The alliance itself is entering a period of “strategic waiting”, primarily due to its unreadiness for active geopolitical offensives. During this time of uncertainty, localized flare-ups of tension are possible, especially in border regions stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Nevertheless, in the near future, Kyiv and Chisinau will remain in a security gray zone, without clear prospects for integration. External support will not disappear, but it will focus more on stabilizing regimes than on the defense of these states.