What Can Moldova Expect from the Trump-Putin Meeting?

If Washington and Moscow genuinely begin moving toward de-escalation in Ukraine, the package of agreements could also include other regional issues, including the “Moldovan file”

On August 15, Alaska as one of the most inconspicuous U.S. states will find itself at the center of global politics. Two high-level delegations, led by Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, are set to meet on the edge of North America. The summit has been prepared for a long time and with much tension, and appears to be the culmination of a protracted diplomatic game in which both sides have sought to preserve not only their initiative but also their dignity. For most observers, the upcoming event is yet another episode in the great geopolitical game, when the leaders of the United States and Russia, amid rising global tensions, will try behind closed doors to address the most pressing international issues. And despite its global scale, the meeting may also have quite tangible consequences even for smaller countries like Moldova. For Russia, Friday’s meeting has already become a tactical victory in any case. Against the backdrop of Washington’s tough sanctions threats, the very fact of a personal dialogue at the highest level will serve as a factor in partially breaking Russia’s international isolation in the West, as well as a symbolic acknowledgment of its subject status on a number of key issues. In effect, Moscow is gaining a platform for foreign policy repositioning and for demonstrating that it is spoken to “as an equal,” rather than through intermediaries and ultimatums. In addition, it is interested in keeping the U.S. engaged in negotiations in order to delay or soften new sanctions, thus gaining time for internal economic adaptation and subsequent geopolitical maneuvering. Washington, according to insiders, agreed to the meeting largely out of reluctance to enforce its own ultimatum: the introduction of 100% customs tariffs against Russia and its trading partners, primarily China and India. Such measures would inevitably have dealt a blow to U.S. diplomatic efforts, essentially forcing Trump to continue the Russian–Ukrainian war in one form or another. As a result, the arguments of the pragmatic wing of his circle prevailed, and Washington opted for political contact with Moscow. Judging by numerous insider reports and simply by basic logic, the Alaska summit is unlikely to be limited to discussing Ukraine alone. While that topic will undoubtedly take center stage – and it seems that the U.S. and Russia have already agreed on key points here, otherwise there would be no meeting at all – it is likely they are preparing some sort of “roadmap” for resolving the conflict, the essence of which would be a phased cessation of hostilities combined with outlining the framework of a peace agreement. The second major block concerns global security issues. On the horizon is 2026, when the New START treaty – which limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads and their delivery systems – expires. In addition, on August 4, Moscow announced its withdrawal from the unilateral moratorium on deploying intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, a move that paves the way for a new arms race, especially in Europe. The third block may concern U.S.-Russian cooperation directly, including the restoration of full-fledged diplomatic channels, the launch of joint economic and infrastructure projects, as well as the expansion of cultural and humanitarian exchanges. Finally, the fourth may involve a set of issues related to the architecture of European security – a topic that holds direct and decisive importance for Moldova. The Black Sea region and the post-Soviet perimeter have traditionally fallen within Russia’s sphere of interest, and since the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, they have also risen several points higher in the U.S. foreign policy strategy. At first glance, our country seems too far from Alaska to be mentioned in the U.S.–Russia talks on Friday. But the geopolitical map is structured in such a way that distances here are largely a formality. If Washington and Moscow genuinely begin moving toward de-escalation in Ukraine, the package of agreements could also include other regional issues, including the “Moldovan file.” The reason is simple: for Moscow, Moldova is part of the same strategic mosaic as Kyiv. Moreover, as long as unrecognized Pridnestrovie remains in the rear, where Russian troops and ammunition depots are stationed, the political architecture of the region will, in one way or another, be aligned with Russia’s position. Over the past decade, the Black Sea has become one of the main hotspots of tension: the militarization of Crimea, the increased activity of the North Atlantic Alliance, military exercises, and mutual aviation overflights – all of this now resembles a fragile balance on the verge of collapse. Although Moldova has no access to the sea, it is effectively part of this space. Consequently, any agreements between the U.S. and Russia concerning the “rules of the game” in the Black Sea area will directly affect us. On one hand, if Washington and Moscow agree to reduce military activity and establish “de-escalation zones,” regional tensions could decrease. But there is a downside, as major players might proceed to an informal delineation of spheres of influence. For the U.S., the Moldovan track is, in a sense, peripheral. Therefore, under certain circumstances, Washington might support a compromise that primarily benefits Moscow, in exchange, for example, for Russian concessions in other international areas more important to the U.S. For Moldova, this means only one thing: it must be prepared for any scenario, especially considering that the country is politically divided and is not viewed in the West as an existential strategic priority. Further confirmation that Moldova is on Russia’s foreign policy radar came yesterday with the publication of an extensive piece by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu. In it, he speaks quite openly about the upcoming parliamentary elections and their geopolitical consequences. This is a direct signal that the Kremlin is closely monitoring our affairs, assessing them also in terms of its contacts with the West. Moreover, given the policy of the U.S. administration, which openly ignores Kyiv’s position, there is a significant risk that Moldova’s fate – along with the Pridnestrovian issue – could, in the event of a “reset” between Moscow and Washington, be discussed as part of a broader “Black Sea regional package.” This would mean that certain parameters would already be set, within which Chisinau would have to develop its strategy and tactics for resolving the conflict on its territory. On August 15 in Alaska, two leaders whose decisions are capable of changing the destinies of countries and regions will meet. This does not necessarily mean that the outcome of the summit will be negative. A positive result is also possible, with reduced military activity, the resumption of various negotiation formats, and the revival of trade and economic ties. The outcome of this and similar future meetings may determine the international environment in which we will live in the coming years. Unfortunately, small countries often become pawns in the game of major powers. The meeting between Trump and Putin could turn into a decisive geopolitical match in which the Moldovan piece may end up either being traded away or placed under even stronger external protection. Our weak point lies in the “shifting” nature of our domestic and foreign policy, the disunity, and the lack of a shared vision among the elites and society regarding the country’s long-term development project. The combination of these and other factors makes Western capitals view us with caution and as a potential source of problems. Ultimately, this weakens our chances of ending up in the exclusive sphere of Western influence.