The Decline of Moldovan Unionism

Vladimir ROTARI, RTA: A few days ago, the already fairly extensive list of participants in Moldova’s parliamentary elections was joined by yet another newcomer – the “National Unity Bloc.” It includes the National Reunification Party “Acasa” and the National Liberal Party. The main feature of this alliance is its commitment to the idea of “unire.” Following registration with the Central Election Commission, the leader of “Acasa,” Valentin Dolganiuc, announced his intention to bring a “Romanian faction” into parliament that will advocate for the “unification of the nation and entry into the Euro-Atlantic space.” The creation of the bloc was the result of the so-called “National Reunification Platform,” launched in March of this year. Its establishment was another attempt to mobilize the unionist camp in Moldova into a single, cohesive force capable of genuinely competing for parliamentary seats. Another stated motivation was the desire to prevent a comeback of pro-Russian forces amid the declining popularity of the ruling PAS, for which a unionist faction could have become a logical coalition partner. In theory, unionists can appeal to a fairly broad electorate. According to polls in recent years, the idea of “unire” enjoys consistently high support in Moldovan society, at around 35–40%. Even partial conversion of this support into votes could secure solid representation in parliament. However, in reality, none of the unionist forces have managed to achieve this since 2014. Since then, time and again, they have found themselves “left out” of the country’s main legislative body. Any unifying efforts within the camp of supporters of joining Romania regularly end in failure. For example, the “Unirea” bloc, which initially seemed relatively promising and brought together five parties, became memorable only for its constant quarrels with ideological “colleagues” from Octavian Ticu’s National Unity Party. As a result, in the 2020 presidential elections, the bloc’s candidate, Dorin Chirtoaca, and Ticu, who ran separately, together received just over 3% of the vote. In the 2021 early parliamentary elections, the unionists ran in fragmented formations and ultimately ended up with even more humiliating results, far below the threshold for parliamentary representation. The history of the “Together” bloc has also been inglorious. Its candidate in the 2024 elections – the same Ticu – failed to secure even 1% of the voters’ support. By the time of the September vote, the bloc was left with only two of its original five members: first, the Coalition for Unity and Prosperity left, followed by the League of Cities and Communes. The Dignity and Truth platform withdrew on its own after secretly arranging with PAS to include two of its members on the ruling party’s lists. It can already be stated with confidence that “purebred” unionists will once again be absent from the next parliament. The ratings of the National Unity Bloc – the main political actor of this kind in the September elections – are hovering around statistical error. The same is true for other unionist forces. Moreover, there is practically no time left to win over public support. At the same time, unionists did have a chance to secure a parliamentary faction for the first time in a decade. Over the past four years, the ruling party has significantly thinned the right flank, leaving it virtually a political wasteland. Simultaneously, it has somewhat lost support among the pro-European electorate, which could have turned to alternative forces with a similar agenda. A united unionist bloc could have played this role, provided it made certain adjustments to its rhetoric, removed the most controversial figures, abandoned internal conflicts, and so on. However, as it turns out, none of this has been done. Overall, at the present moment, none of the parties committed to the idea of “unire” show any potential to transform into a significant political force. To some extent, it can be said that the entire unionist camp has become a marginal segment of Moldovan politics, for which it can primarily blame itself. Primitive and outdated slogans, political “volatility,” ties to unscrupulous politicians and ruling regimes, the inability to unite ranks at critical moments, and the lack of charismatic leaders – all of these factors contribute to their regular electoral failures. An important factor is the overall loss of public interest in “unire” in its original sense. The remaining popular support is more pragmatic in nature, reflecting people’s desire not so much to necessarily join Romania specifically, but to improve their surrounding reality through changes in Moldova’s political direction. In this regard, the acceleration of European integration after 2022, which transformed the prospect of EU membership from something almost unattainable into a realistically achievable goal in the foreseeable future, offered an attractive alternative: to enter the European family independently, rather than through a “Romanian intermediary.” Therefore, even the 35-40% of the population sympathetic to “unire” are more likely to cast their votes for respectable political forces such as PAS or even “Alternative.” All the more so given that none of the parties genuinely vying for parliamentary seats oppose the course toward European integration. It should be acknowledged that even in Romania, the “national unification” project is not considered a priority by the ruling elites. Even figures such as George Simion, who recently called Moldova “an artificial state that cannot ensure the security and well-being of its own citizens,” were cautious in their forecasts regarding a possible “unire” ahead of the elections. Overall, the general message of statements on this topic boils down to the idea that the merger of the two Romanian states would be a positive act, but it is not something expected in the near future. At present, given serious socio-economic problems and political challenges, Romania seems to steer away from this concept in practice, focusing instead on a “soft integration” scenario, in which key Moldovan assets come under its control: the only international seaport with access to the sea, the gas transport system, electricity supply and distribution companies, and so on. In addition, Bucharest retains significant influence over the process of our country’s European integration, which is noticeable even in symbolic gestures. For example, in September, a European Parliament office will open in Chisinau, headed by a Romanian citizen. This arrangement fully suits Moldova’s current leadership, which facilitates this “soft integration” in exchange for the necessary political and financial support, as well as additional lobbying potential to advance its interests in Brussels. Therefore, a revival of Moldovan unionism in its classical form is unlikely; today, it is more a relic of the past than a relevant and viable political movement.