Moldova in the EU Accession Race: Ukraine’s Forced Ally or Rival?

Behind the facade of solidarity and overtly friendly relations between Moldova and Ukraine, deep contradictions are emerging, stemming from the different scale of the challenges they face and the uneven pace at which they can move toward the EU

In recent months, debates about the prospects of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s European integration have noticeably intensified in both European and regional media. There are recurring suggestions that Brussels is ready to treat the two neighboring states not as a “single package”, but as candidates moving at different speeds. And although official statements still deny this, the very framing of the question reflects growing tension both between Kyiv and Chisinau and within Europe itself. Undoubtedly, Moldova appears to be a much more “convenient” candidate for fast-tracked negotiations, given its more compact territory, lighter economic burdens, and the fact that it is not involved in an active military conflict. On the other hand, Ukraine remains a key geopolitical factor for the European Union, with its membership prospects directly tied to the outcome of the war and the scale of future post-war reconstruction. Recently, Maia Sandu has barely concealed that separating Moldova’s application from Ukraine’s aligns with interests of Chisinau. In the president’s speeches, the notion that the EU accession process should be merit-based has been appearing more frequently. Therefore, according to Sandu, there is no reason to assume that the two countries should move toward the EU at the same pace if their levels of compliance with European criteria differ. It stands to reason that what particularly irritates us is the risk of becoming dependent on a set of factors that, in essence, have nothing to do with Moldova itself. For example, Hungary’s increasingly “hardened” veto on Ukraine’s European aspirations with every strike on the Druzhba oil pipeline. Given the current parallel review of the Moldovan and Ukrainian dossiers by the European Council, this directly affects Chisinau’s position. That is why our politicians are understandably afraid that we might become hostages to the complicated Ukrainian-Hungarian relationship or other foreign policy circumstances. Moreover, this anxiety is tied to the ruling PAS rapidly losing popularity inside the country. To hold on to its electoral strongholds, as well as to keep the idea of European integration in the mainstream, another strong positive signal from the EU is needed. An additional success in negotiations with Brussels, the ruling party believes, could be exactly the argument that would ultimately sway voters to choose in its favor. However, Kyiv evidently has no intention of allowing a scenario in which Moldova pulls ahead, breaking away from the unified framework. For Ukraine, the prospect of falling “behind” its neighbor in the EU integration process would constitute a serious blow to the government’s image and its international positioning. For this reason, following the first hints of a possible separation of the “EU integration package”, Ukrainian diplomacy actively engaged in the matter and managed to secure the support of several European capitals. According to some estimates, Kyiv ultimately succeeded in achieving a stable majority among EU member states opposed to decoupling Moldova, making it impossible for Chisinau to advance independently without coordination with Kyiv. Most likely for this reason, the other day the European Commission was forced to confirm that both countries have fulfilled all the conditions for opening the first cluster of negotiations. At the same time, the final decision must be made by the EU Council, where unanimity remains the guiding principle. Thus, Brussels has carefully defused the intensity of the issue, yet the very fact that a public discussion about placing Moldova in a “separate track” has emerged serves as a warning signal for Kyiv. As the old saying goes, “where there’s smoke there’s fire”. Therefore, if the topic of a possible split between Chisinau and Kyiv in the integration process is surfacing in leading European media and political circles in Brussels, it means there is a demand for it, and consequently, there are forces interested in such a scenario. For the EU, this could be an attempt to accelerate the process with at least one country, showcasing the successes of its eastern enlargement policy along with the corresponding geopolitical effects. However, it seems that Europe does not yet possess a unified determination to make such a “bold” decision. This is primarily due to the current situation, in which the United States is exerting significant pressure on Ukraine regarding conflict resolution, making Brussels disinclined to deal Kyiv an additional blow by slowing down its European integration. Despite the underlying rivalry, the two countries still share numerous areas where their interests are increasingly intertwined. First, starting in 2026, Moldova and Ukraine will join the European roaming zone together. Second, energy interdependence is becoming increasingly apparent. It is known that Kyiv and Chisinau are discussing the creation of so-called “vertical corridors” for gas supply and electricity procurement, which would allow them to enhance resilience against external energy shocks. However, the available scope for cooperation is limited. As the crisis surrounding Ukraine deepens and Europeans aim to put Moldova on an accelerated track, tensions with the neighboring state will inevitably rise, along with the desire of certain Ukrainian actors to “ground” Moldovan politicians and their plans to fast-track their own EU path. Attention should be drawn to a recent border incident, in which a citizen attempted to transport a significant number of explosives. Officially, the case was presented as a criminal matter, but some experts interpreted it as a coded “signal” from Ukrainian partners: “Remember who granted you candidate status, so don’t move too far ahead.” For now, let us not interpret such episodes as a deliberate policy by Kyiv, which possesses extensive experience in covert operations. However, it should be understood that relations with our Ukrainian neighbors are gradually entering a zone of heightened sensitivity, where any incident can take on different dimensions and be interpreted, among other things, as part of political rivalry. At the official level, both countries continue to display solidarity and synchronization. This is reflected in their statements, joint projects, and similar perceptions of global developments. Yet behind this facade, deep contradictions are emerging, tied to the differing scale of challenges faced by Chisinau and Kyiv, and the varying pace at which they can advance toward the EU. Moldova’s stake is clear: to seize the window of opportunity before the war in Ukraine closes off all paths for accelerated progress. Ukraine’s task is to prevent any perception of a “freeze” in its EU integration and to maintain its status as the leading candidate among post-Soviet states. Given today’s trends, Brussels is unlikely to decide on splitting the Moldova-Ukraine tandem soon. The political cost and potential repercussions make such a move too risky. However, the issue has entered public discourse and will resurface repeatedly, ultimately prompting a reassessment of the current approach if new circumstances allow it to be done with minimal cost. In the long term, much will depend on the outcome of the war and the overall political situation within both countries. If, after the elections, Moldova retains a relatively similar political regime that continues its pro-European course, its chances of outpacing Ukraine will gradually increase. For now, however, Moldova remains a forced ally – too closely tied to Ukraine to diverge, yet too different to move in the same European integration track.