EU Bides Its Time While PAS Faces “Desperation”

The parliamentary election campaign is unfolding unfavorably for the ruling party, which is losing its leading position. Against this backdrop, Brussels has apparently decided to delay granting Moldova another round of generous funding, choosing to await the outcome of the September 28 vote

Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: The day before yesterday, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning Russia’s hybrid operations and its attempts to interfere in the upcoming parliamentary elections in Moldova. In light of Moscow’s actions aimed at destabilizing the country and undermining its democratic course, MEPs called on our authorities, civil society, and EU structures to “strengthen strategic communications” in order to more effectively counter “disinformation and false narratives”. At first glance, this statement could be seen as yet another confirmation of Europe’s commitment to Moldova’s chosen course. However, behind the seemingly reassuring rhetoric lies a much more restrained and cautious stance from Brussels. In essence, PAS is receiving neither additional benefits nor clear political messages from the EU that could strengthen its position at the height of the election campaign. To somewhat smooth over the unfavorable backdrop, Maia Sandu was quickly given the opportunity to address the European Parliament, where she once again stressed that Moldova’s security is directly linked to the security of Ukraine and the entire European Union. Perhaps some had hoped that in this way the president might secure other forms of support that could be presented to voters as yet another step on the road toward EU membership. However, it appears that the European capitals have already reached a general agreement not to rush events and to hold off on officially opening negotiations between Moldova and the European Union. Until the vote is over, Brussels will likely limit itself to words, avoiding revealing its main cards or granting PAS yet another significant dose of political capital that, in the ruling party’s view, could substantially influence the outcome of the campaign. This refusal to extend the usual generosity signals that Moldova has reached a certain limit. In recent years, the country has received significant EU preferences, ranging from substantial procedural concessions during the course of European integration to considerable macro-financial assistance. Essentially, much of this was an advance, extended in the hope that the ruling regime in Chisinau would be able to consolidate the country’s current trajectory and secure broad public support. There are multiple reasons behind the EU’s cautious stance. It is quite possible that European institutions already possess analyses indicating that the situation in Moldova is unlikely to be straightforward or linear after the elections. In other words, even under the most favorable circumstances, if PAS manages to maintain its leadership, the composition of the future parliament could prove unstable, and the political process highly unpredictable. Under these circumstances, the Europeans apparently prefer not to stake too much in advance, so as to avoid finding themselves in an awkward position should the electoral outcome prove unfavorable for pro-European forces. In the event of a PAS defeat or the need to form a fragile coalition, the EU risks losing face. Opening accession negotiations under such conditions would appear as “integration on a tightrope”, making it more rational, for now, to put the process on hold due to insufficient public support. Thus, the European caution is driven less by a waning interest in Moldova than by an awareness of risks and potential threats. The main partner prefers to wait, observing how the situation unfolds, and to take further steps only after the electorate has spoken. For PAS, this situation serves as a painful signal, as the core of its election strategy was built around demonstrating to citizens a constant shoulder of support from the EU. The lack of tangible achievements within the previously loudly announced framework of opening negotiations provides additional leverage to the ruling party’s opponents. The opposition is likely to seize upon this “awkward pause” between Chisinau and Brussels, persuading voters that even on the crucial issue of European integration, the ruling party, together with Maia Sandu, has committed a strategic misstep. A successful deployment of this narrative could significantly undermine PAS’s rating, especially against the backdrop of public fatigue from endless media campaigns about the European idea amid insurmountable socio-economic challenges. The current situation marks a significant turning point in Moldova’s relationship with the European Union. Brussels has made it clear: support will be provided, but it is neither limitless nor unconditional. Much now depends on how the elections unfold and what the political landscape of the country looks like after September 28. If PAS manages to maintain its leadership and form a stable majority, it could pave the way for a new phase of rapprochement with Europe. However, if the election results lead to instability or a strengthening of pro-Russian forces, the EU will likely reassess its stance toward Moldova, and the process of European integration, if not halted entirely, will be drastically slowed. Semyon ALBU, RTA: This week, representatives of the “yellow nest” unleashed a batch of scary stories about the upcoming elections, targeting both external audiences and, especially, the domestic public. First, Maia Sandu told frightening tales in the European Parliament about Russian interference “like a virus”. To impress European deputies with the scale of the so-called “hybrid war”, she claimed that Russia allegedly spent, just last year, an amount equivalent to 1% of Moldova’s GDP to influence the elections and, in addition, organized massive vote-buying schemes involving almost hundreds of thousands of voters. One wonders whether the president genuinely believes that the only reason someone might not vote for her is money. According to Sandu, this year the situation is even worse. Through Telegram, of course, no one doubted this messenger would be mentioned in such a context, protests are allegedly being coordinated. Deepfakes, forged letters from state institutions, fake news websites spreading lies, and cyberattacks are reportedly everywhere. To add extra drama, she claimed that Moscow is turning almost everything in Moldova into a weapon against PAS – religion, PR, Gagauzia, Transnistria. In the latter case, calls to open more polling stations for residents of the Left Bank were labeled as a “tactic to falsify turnout far beyond the real level”. Naturally, the president did not bother to explain how turnout could possibly be fabricated at polling stations located on territory controlled by the official authorities in Chisinau. Sandu was not the only one delivering warnings – other top officials, Dorin Recean and Igor Grosu, joined in as well. Recean sternly warned citizens “not to sell their votes”, claiming that otherwise the country would have neither a future nor “any chance of escaping poverty”. One can hardly miss the irony of the prime minister saying this, given that under PAS rule poverty levels have reached record highs. Grosu, for his part, sought to frighten the public by suggesting that if the “yellows” lose, the new authorities would allegedly bring Russians directly into Moldova’s governing institutions, and that Moldovan men and youth would become “cannon fodder in Putin’s bloody wars”. Such blatantly primitive scare tactics, seemingly aimed at the least discerning segment of the public, appear to reflect the rather unfavorable course of the campaign for what is still the ruling party. According to the latest polls, PAS has for the first time ceded the top spot in voter preferences to the Patriotic Bloc. Internal opinion surveys, commissioned for the party’s own use, are likely painting an equally bleak picture. As we can see, the topic of European integration has failed to deliver the expected boost in the form of the opening of the first negotiation cluster with the EU, leaving PAS with little to boast about.  Plahotniuc’s extradition is still on the table, which they are clearly trying to use as a trump card. But that seems not enough in the face of the other scandals, failures, and controversial statements coming from representatives of the ruling regime. It is therefore hard to disagree with the opposition, which describes PAS’s current behavior as nothing short of hysteria. This hysteria manifests itself not only verbally, but also in concrete actions – for example, in the constant pressure exerted on its electoral opponents through almost daily searches and raids, as well as the initiation of hundreds of criminal cases on charges of “illegal party financing” and “vote buying”. The punitive apparatus is being deployed to its fullest extent, targeting the Patriotic Bloc and the Alternativa Bloc as PAS’s main competitors. With 16 days left before the elections, we can expect even more desperate attempts by the regime to intimidate the population while simultaneously mobilizing its own supporters to the maximum, frightening them with the prospect of a complete halt to European integration. One can only hope that, in their desperation, the “yellows” will at least refrain from taking practical steps, including in relations with Russia, that could inflict long-term damage on Moldova’s interests.