Would the International Community Benefit from a Conflict in Moldova?

The week began with yet another round of militaristic rhetoric about Moldova’s future. Chisinau, through the president and the chief of police, accused Moscow, while from the other side came forecasts of the country’s looming “occupation” by the European Union

On the eve of Sunday’s parliamentary elections, all players are once again relentlessly exploiting the geopolitical card, with an abnormal, even by Moldovan standards, emphasis on military scenarios. On Monday, Maia Sandu called to defend the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and European future, allegedly threatened by Russia, which she accused of bribing voters and attempting to use Moldova as a staging ground for an attack on the Odesa oblast. The following day, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service responded, pointing to supposed EU plans to occupy Moldova, suppress resistance and public protests during election fraud, and deploy NATO forces in Odesa to “intimidate Transnistria”. Such threats and mutual accusations during election campaigns have long become the norm, perceived by the more informed part of the audience as background noise. It is clear that Maia Sandu’s allegations carry, among other things, an electoral purpose, aimed at mobilizing and consolidating her own electorate. They can also be read as a prelude to restricting the participation of certain parties (or blocs) and citizens in the elections, including those from the left bank of the Dniester, or as justification for further PAS actions to usurp power in the event of defeat at the polls. The regime’s logic is as follows: the Kremlin is interfering regardless; if PAS retains power despite everything, then voters have effectively granted carte blanche for any repressions. If, however, there is a risk of losing the majority, then the election results must be “reconsidered” with the backing of a compliant Constitutional Court. Either way, this is about the electoral and post-electoral context. The core meaning of Moscow’s statements is largely similar. Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service attempted to debunk the myth of a “Russian threat” promoted by the Moldovan elite, instead drawing attention to the actual militarization of Moldova in the interests of the Western democratic establishment and European bureaucrats. At the same time, a signal is being sent to the pro-Russian and left-leaning segments of society that the continuation of PAS rule will inevitably drag the republic into the conflict with Russia on Ukraine’s side. This also includes the photographs of French servicemen on Moldovan territory and the “information bomb” about a Moldovan serviceman who was killed in September in Donbas. Paradoxically, this time the alarmist rhetoric from both Moscow and Chisinau may represent not only and not so much a component of the electoral struggle, aimed at shifting responsibility onto one another while mobilizing their own voters and demoralizing opponents. It may have deeper roots, tied both to the confrontation between intelligence communities and to Moscow’s reluctance to allow a sharp political escalation in Moldova and, above all, any threats to the security of Transnistria. At least in the immediate future. For the Kremlin, such a conflict is objectively disadvantageous right now. The defensive potential of Transnistria is limited and controlled primarily by the local authorities. The two Russian peacekeeping battalions, largely staffed by residents of the region, serve as a significant factor only in peacetime, under conditions of the normal functioning of the Joint Control Commission and peacekeeping institutions. Effectively protecting its citizens without devastating Moldova with missile strikes would be extremely difficult for Moscow. An inevitable and harsh Russian response to aggression from Chisinau, whether independent or externally provoked, would serve as a “black mark” for relations with the US administration, ties that Vladimir Putin, judging by appearances, values highly under Donald Trump. This dialogue is already faltering against the backdrop of stalled attempts to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Therefore, on the Moldovan front, the Kremlin prefers to operate through informational, political, and psychological methods. Such a conflict would also become an excessive headache for the international community, which is watching the catastrophes in the Middle East and Ukraine with concern and bewilderment. Even Washington, under the current administration, is not eager to engage in yet another security crisis, since Israel’s actions have put it in a difficult political position, jeopardizing its alliances with the Gulf monarchies and consuming a vast amount of military and diplomatic resources. Our society is even less interested in a deterioration of the situation between the banks of the Dniester or in deeper involvement in the Ukrainian tragedy. The memory of the 1992 war remains vivid for the majority of citizens. Even a significant portion of the PAS electorate would not support such a scenario. However, the ruling party, dependent both financially and politically on the European Union’s bureaucracy, lacks autonomy in its own decisions. The price for securing legitimacy and conditional budgetary stability is unconditional loyalty and a readiness to carry out any directives. The EU provides PAS with generous support – visits by heads of state and government, legally dubious sanctions against the regime’s opponents, promises of EU membership, including the expedited completion of the legislative screening process. Brussels is making every possible effort to preserve the current authoritarian rule in Moldova. Such investments, both financial and political, that seemed extraordinary just a few years ago cannot remain without return indefinitely. Here, the question of the European Union’s role in international affairs becomes crucial, as it has, for the first time in history, become not only destructive (which, subjectively, may suit Brussels) but also purely decorative and peripheral. The European Union has managed to lose in all the wars of recent years, especially in those that Donald Trump “successfully” claimed to have resolved. The costs of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation have fallen squarely on the EU. Donald Trump officially shifted all the losses onto Brussels as part of a trade deal, subordinating his ally to American interests, and continues to demand additional measures from the EU that lead to recession, a decline in industrial production, job losses, and socio-economic degradation. It is fortunate that the territorial claims of Donald Trump over Greenland were temporarily avoided, the implementation of which would have been a definitive confirmation of the contemporary EU’s weakness in international affairs. France and the OSCE (predominantly a European organization) have been pushed out of the South Caucasus – the OSCE Minsk Group has been disbanded, and relations with Georgia have been seriously and long-term damaged. Attempts to interfere in Middle Eastern affairs (such as demanding sanctions against Iran or criticizing Israel while simultaneously recognizing Palestine) appear downright pathetic, as they not only fail to influence the situation on the ground but merely exacerbate already severe conflicts. Periodic escalations between Serbia and Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina are a direct consequence of Brussels’ unbalanced and short-sighted policies. The influence of European countries beyond their region, including in their former colonial territories, is shrinking. France and Belgium have been expelled from most African countries. The United Kingdom faltered during the Indo-Pakistani crisis, requiring intervention from Donald Trump. In Afghanistan, the Taliban are now indifferent not only to London but even to Washington. In Moldova, the cover-up of PAS’ lawlessness, which violates all conceivable democratic norms and discriminates against its own population, also appears pathetic if it is not justified in terms of strategic interests in the long run. In this respect, the situation becomes extraordinary. The European Union is persistently “inviting” Russia into a direct conflict and actively preparing for it at the industrial and mobilization levels, while also attempting to involve Donald Trump on its side despite his reluctance. This includes recent militant reactions and statements from Poland, typical hysterics in the Baltic states, military preparations including counter-drone measures in the recently relatively neutral and prosperous Scandinavia, and the militaristic drift of Romania under Nicusor Dan, which had previously exercised caution in concrete actions. It is possible that Brussels (specifically Brussels, not Washington) has already chosen Moldova as the next theater for attempts to deal Russia a strategic defeat. This has not been achievable in Ukraine: Kyiv is exhausted and, without further internationalization of the conflict, risks losing not only territory but also political cohesion. Presumably, such risks underlie the statement from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. The question is whether the population and elites of Moldova perceive this signal and what path they will choose on September 28 and afterwards.