What Lies Ahead for Moldova: The Country’s New Military Strategy

With the adoption of the updated military strategy, Moldova has settled its military-political course to the current geopolitical realities. Its implementation will take place under the supervision of European partners

One of the first high-profile post-election decisions of the authorities was the approval of Moldova’s new military strategy. Against this backdrop, bold and controversial headlines immediately appeared: “Moldova Prepares for War”, “Russia Named the Main Military Threat”, “Chisinau Adopts Western-Style Military”. It is clear that such an event could not fail to generate media attention, especially since it coincided with the announcement of the start of a four-year Bundeswehr mission to “assist in the modernization of the National Army”. As a result, alongside their French colleagues, the Germans will also be reforming and strengthening Moldova’s armed forces. In Germany itself, intense debates are currently underway regarding militarization at the expense of social spending. Therefore, the announced increase in Moldova’s defense budget immediately raises certain concerns. If the EU’s main economic engine is shifting its economy toward the military at the expense of citizens’ welfare, what hope can we have for a bright future? In fact, the draft of the new military strategy was presented as early as spring. Its development was linked to the adoption in previous years of a new national security strategy (in December 2023) and a national defense strategy (in July of last year). Incidentally, the previous versions of all three documents were approved back in 2018, during Plahotniuc’s period of unchecked power and under President Dodon, and already contained all the now well-worn anti-Russian narratives, as well as the course toward NATO integration and cooperation. The motivational section of the new military strategy contains references to assessments of the current state of the national defense sector from the updated national security strategy: that it was “poorly managed”, “underfunded”, “chronically underdeveloped”, and so on. Consequently, the authors arrive at the grim conclusion that Moldova has “the smallest army in Europe relative to its population”, while the “unpredictable and unstable international security context, coupled with the intensification of conventional and hybrid threats”, requires urgent action. Among the main challenges is listed the “aggressive war of Russia against Ukraine”. According to the drafters, the frvity of military threats and risks to Moldova is confirmed by repeated violations of the country’s airspace. The document explicitly states that the expansion of Russian-occupied territories toward Moldova’s borders poses a direct threat to the country’s security and statehood. The militarized formations of the unconstitutional regime in Tiraspol, as they could allegedly be used to support objectives and actions hostile to national interests, also pose a threat. Russia is accused of illegally sustaining and consolidating the potential of these structures through its Operational Group of Forces, whose presence on Moldovan territory constitutes a “violation of the constitutional provisions on the country’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and permanent neutrality, international law norms”, as well as the 1992 peace agreement. Among the main objectives of the strategy is integration into the European Union’s security and defense architecture. This includes increasing representation in its military structures, participating in EU military operations, and joint arms procurement. The strategy envisions a gradual expansion of cooperation with NATO structures and partnerships with neighboring countries, namely Ukraine and Romania. How all of this aligns with the principle of neutrality remains unclear. Regarding defense spending and the size of the armed forces: the goals set are to reach a threshold of at least 1% of GDP for defense and to increase personnel to 8,500 military personnel and 2,000 civilian staff by 2030. The document could have been adopted as early as the summer, but at that time the ruling party’s pre-election strategy did not include any decisions related to the military component. The hysteria over an alleged external threat was whipped up in the final stretch of the electoral campaign, when the government did not even possess the necessary powers. Now that it does, Prime Minister Dorin Recean can calmly close this chapter, considering his mission accomplished. Even from a strictly academic standpoint, a military strategy implies preparing the armed forces for war. It is shaped by the political elite of the state, which sets specific goals and tasks for the military. There is, however, one missing element in this equation: the military strategy must correspond to the requirements of the military doctrine. Yet the latter remains outdated – not merely from the times of Plahotniuc or even Voronin, but dating back to Lucinschi’s presidency. If one looks closely, it contains rather peaceful messages: the peaceful resolution of disputes between states; the prevention of military confrontation through collective efforts; the exclusion of any infringement upon the sovereignty and independence of the state; the strengthening of confidence-building measures; and the expansion of cooperation on the principles of respect for sovereignty, independence, and non-interference in internal affairs. Finally, its cornerstone principle is the constitutional proclamation of permanent neutrality. If we look at the situation purely from a military standpoint, without tying it to regional processes or geopolitical rhetoric, the bottom line is that since then Russia’s military presence in the eastern regions of the country has been reduced several times over, and the agency of the left-bank administration has diminished. It is quite reasonable to assert that all this was achieved thanks to a balanced and non-confrontational doctrinal course. From this conclusion, only one question remains: has that course exhausted its relevance, or not? The example of relations between Russia and Ukraine, where no such heavy legacy of an armed conflict at the outset was observed, has shown that the path of confrontation led to a large-scale tragedy and irreparable damage to the relations between the two countries. In this context, the adopted strategy notably assesses the risks of the aforementioned threats. For instance, the level of risk to Moldova’s security conditions due to Russia’s actions against Ukraine and the ongoing frozen conflict in Transnistria is assessed as moderate. However, the likelihood of increased socio-political instability in the country as a result of the authorities’ planned military initiatives is considered high. Potential consequences include polarization of public opinion and societal antagonism, disputes over the essence of the country’s neutral status, and distortion of the role and significance of the armed forces. High risks also include the perennial problem of insufficient funding and the possibility of failure in military modernization because Moldova may lag behind new trends. There is a significant risk of purchasing outdated or unsuitable equipment with the last available funds, only to later be uncertain how to use it. In other words, the military risks that the authorities constantly trumpet are not as acute or pressing as portrayed. There is a much higher likelihood of dividing society over the issue of neutrality or failing financially and organizationally to carry out these plans. The government stirs up all this turmoil under the pretext of high security threats, but the greatest danger is the potential failure of their own initiatives. The population itself does not feel a significant threat, does not support the idea of redirecting funds toward the military, and the authorities perceive this lack of public backing as the main potential problem. To overcome this public skepticism, a constant media hysteria about an external enemy will be needed. German specialists will likely help with that too. They haven’t had much success at home so far, so they’ll practice on us.