The End of Illusions in Moldova-Russia Relations?

The outcome of the parliamentary elections in Moldova has cemented a decisive geopolitical shift that will inevitably entail a rethinking of its ties with Russia placing them on an entirely new trajectory

The results of the parliamentary elections, among other things, have marked the boundaries of a new era in which Moldova is decisively betting on European integration. The citizens’ vote has reaffirmed this strategic course of the state while simultaneously recording a major shift in the political history of our country – namely, its departure from Russia’s sphere of influence. Pro-European forces now make up three-quarters of the future parliament. As a result, Moldova, which has endured decades of ambiguous compromises between East and West, has decided to clearly define its direction. However, this brings new challenges and risks: integrating into this new path does not make further political maneuvering any less complex. For three decades following the collapse of the USSR, Moldova remained a liminal zone and a buffer between the European Union and Russia. Moscow viewed the country as part of its existential sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, where Russian culture, language, and economic ties were meant to guarantee the retention of influence. However, in the fall of 2025, this mechanism finally failed. Such political figures as Igor Dodon, Vladimir Voronin, Vasile Tarlev, and others, who used to define Moldova’s pro-Russian course for many years, have faded into the shadow of history. On September 28, the inevitable became clear: slogans about “neutrality,” “traditional ties with Russia,” and “shared history,” while evoking a mild sense of nostalgia for some, can no longer mobilize broad layers of voters. This indicates that the electoral landscape of the republic has changed significantly over the past few years. Even in Moldovan regions traditionally loyal to Russia, particularly in the north of the country, there is a pronounced drift toward pro-European sentiments. Yes, Gagauzia still remains the last major stronghold of Moscow’s influence, where Ilan Shor’s structures and affiliated groups continue to maintain support for Russia. However, the longevity of the current situation is increasingly in doubt. For many years, Russia maintained influence over Moldova through two main instruments: energy and the market. Gas, electricity, and agricultural exports formed the architecture of “dependencies” through which political leverage over Chisinau was exercised. However, this model ceased to work once Chisinau diversified its energy supply, integrating into European networks and gaining access to alternative routes. Exports to Russia fell below 5% of the total volume. Moldovan producers reoriented toward the EU and Romanian markets, depriving the Kremlin of economic levers of influence – and with them, the ability to impose its conditions. The situation in the media sphere is almost identical. Since 2022, Moldova’s information space has undergone a large-scale “derussification.” TV channels funded by Russian entities, as well as media outlets operating within the broader Russian agenda, were shut down, and part of the journalistic community simply shifted to local and European grants. As a result, Russia has lost even a symbolic presence in the republic’s socio-political landscape. This could not fail to affect bilateral relations, which today are at their lowest point in the entire post-Soviet period. The activities of interdepartmental and intersectoral mechanisms have been suspended, and diplomatic dialogue is effectively frozen, given that the Russian ambassador has still not received official accreditation. All mutual contacts are now largely limited to reciprocal accusations. Under the current circumstances, it appears that Moscow lacks both a strategy and an understanding of how to build relations with a state that no longer considers it a priority partner. For a long time, the Kremlin operated under the mistaken assumption that Moldova’s pro-European course and the openly anti-Russian regime in Chisinau were merely temporary deviations. However, the electoral cycles of recent years, and ultimately the September elections, have clearly shown that the Russian capital’s perception of Moldovan reality is far from accurate. It has become evident that, one way or another, the overwhelming majority of Moldovan citizens share the pro-European orientation of the elites and, more broadly, the country’s current political course. Apparently, a process of acknowledging its own misconceptions has begun in the Kremlin. This is also indicated by the recent resignation of an official from the Russian presidential administration who had overseen Moldova-related affairs for many years. At the very least, this signals a recognition of the failure of previous policies and preparations for their revision. Despite the political euphoria following the election victory, Moldovan authorities should still exercise caution. Objectively speaking, it is not yet possible to fully exit Russia’s sphere of influence. Geography, energy dependence, and the presence of Russian troops on the left bank of the Dniester – all of this continues to make Moldova vulnerable and perceived as part of the “gray zone” in the East-West confrontation. As a result, in the coming years, the country will continue to balance carefully, being forced to seek a new formula for interaction with Moscow, even if at a minimal level, to avoid uncontrolled escalation. In this sense, the prospects for Moldova-Russia relations in the coming years can be described as a “controlled cooling.” On one hand, no one is interested in a complete rupture, but on the other, a return to the previous format of cooperation seems practically impossible. Therefore, Chisinau will continue its course of strategic distancing from Moscow, focusing on integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. The issue of Russia’s military presence in the Transnistrian region remains a key point. For Moldova, it is not only a matter of territorial integrity, but also of the pace of European integration and the degree of its completion. For Russia, the left bank is both its last instrument of influence and a dilemma. Under the current circumstances, Russia is unlikely to be ready to use the region as a means of exerting pressure on Chisinau, but it is also unlikely to make any significant concessions. Everyone understands that the Transnistrian issue is a “dangerous tangle of uncertainties,” where the dynamics of the settlement are closely linked to the configuration of a broader system of coordinates, including the architecture of European security. Moscow will likely seek to hedge its losses by maintaining a minimal communication channel for potential dialogue in a pragmatic and rational manner. This model will, in essence, represent an acknowledgment of a new reality – one in which Moldova is no longer part of the “Russian world,” but rather a completely new political phenomenon requiring different approaches. In all likelihood, at least initially, Moscow will operate in a “careful observation” mode, avoiding any abrupt moves while assessing how the political process in the country unfolds amid high social pressure and external instability. At this stage in history, the main outcome for both Chisinau and Moscow should be a shared understanding that new political generations have emerged in both countries – generations that no longer live by old illusions and are no longer bound by nostalgia. For modern Moldovans, Russia is not a “big brother,” but one of the foreign policy actors with whom mutually beneficial and equal cooperation can be built. Likewise, in the perception of Russians, Moldova is gradually losing the image of the “sunny Soviet Moldavia” and is increasingly seen as a post-Soviet state clearly oriented toward integration into the European Union.