Moldova’s Accession to the European Union: Expected Specifics

The issue of Moldova’s accession to the European Union is not purely a matter of law. It remains a question shaped by geopolitical scenarios and dependent on mutual concessions between Chisinau and Brussels

By the end of the year, an institutional environment has taken shape that favors Moldova’s prospects for accession to the European Union and does not entail any major electoral upheavals. The current European Parliament’s mandate runs until the summer of 2029. Accordingly, the European Commission – the EU’s principal bureaucratic body and the main driver of Moldova’s membership bid – will retain its powers for the next four years. Attempts to advance a vote of no confidence against Ursula von der Leyen have failed, confirming the stability of the EU’s governing institutions and their ability to conduct negotiations with candidate countries without disruption. The PAS regime has also firmly taken root and for the long haul. The parliamentary elections have just concluded. The 2028 presidential campaign, even if the vote is shifted to parliament and Maia Sandu decides not to run for another term, promises a smooth transition without radical changes or dramatic turns. If current geopolitical trends persist, by 2029 the question of Moldova’s EU membership may already be settled in principle. At this stage, not a single EU country has voiced objections (unlike in Ukraine’s case) to Moldova’s accession to the Union. However, the process itself will require from everyone an exceptional degree of flexibility and a lowering of mutual demands and expectations. From a legal standpoint, we are simply incapable of fulfilling the full range of obligations imposed on potential member states. Let us recall that the last EU enlargement took place back in 2013 with the accession of Croatia – a relatively wealthy, developed, and democratic country. And even then, for Zagreb, which had to adapt roughly half as many EU directives as we are now expected to, certain exceptions and concessions were applied. It is evident that, for political reasons, Brussels will be unable to grant Moldova (as well as the Balkan states) membership with the same set of prerogatives currently enjoyed by existing EU members. In particular, this concerns the principle of consensus in key EU decision-making, under which every member state holds the right of veto. No one will be willing to extend such a privilege to us, not least because of Moldova’s specific geopolitical position, where, under certain circumstances (for instance, in the event of a peaceful reintegration of Transnistria), a resurgence of pro-Russian parties could occur. On the contrary, the persistent dissent demonstrated by Hungary and Slovakia is already prompting European bureaucrats to explore mechanisms for limiting the veto power altogether. Moldova will not, at the initial stage, become part of the eurozone, which is a perfectly natural state of affairs. Neither Romania nor Bulgaria, nor even Poland, a member of the Union for over twenty years, have yet adopted the euro as their national currency or obtained the right of issuance. Likewise, there will be no immediate accession to the Schengen area. Bucharest and Sofia, for instance, had to pursue this goal for nearly two decades. Meanwhile, the European Union’s migration regulations are gradually tightening, including for countries with visa-free travel. Among the latest innovations are systems for recording and storing biometric data, requirements for proof of financial solvency, and the need to submit advance electronic travel declarations. Chisinau should likewise refrain from seriously counting on obtaining a national portfolio within the European Commission, since any further expansion of the Commission’s staff would provoke bureaucratic overload and additional expenses. Such measures would not only fail to gain support among European taxpayers, but would also strengthen Eurosceptic and right-wing tendencies ahead of the 2029 elections. Overall, it is clear that even if Moldova joins the European Union within the next five years, it will by no means receive the full set of rights and privileges associated with full membership. The likely justification will be the need to complete institutional reforms and achieve clear compliance with the legislative framework and core values of the European Union. These factors, which point to a special political approach by Brussels that to some extent limits Chisinau’s status, at the same time open opportunities for our government to bargain for reciprocal concessions from the European Commission. Such an arrangement would be, at the very least, fair and would help mitigate the shock effects on the economy and society. The Moldovan electorate and political parties, especially those represented in the newly elected parliament, are simply obliged to raise this issue with Maia Sandu, Alexandru Munteanu, and the PAS leadership. The government may also request temporary exemptions from the EU’s fiscal rules and a restructuring of its debts. Moldova continues to live on credit, with a budget deficit exceeding the EU’s established threshold of 3% of GDP. Meanwhile, the national debt is approaching 60% of GDP, although the Ministry of Finance promises to reduce it to 40% by the end of the year. It may also be possible to preserve certain elements of sovereignty in trade and economic policy, including the issue of sanctions regimes, since an abrupt withdrawal from CIS, Chinese, and Indian markets could lead to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Chisinau may also be interested in seeking exemptions from the EU’s requirement to host migrants on its territory. The issue of refugee camps provokes an unmistakably negative public reaction. The logic is simple: if Moldova cannot count on the full range of rights within the EU, including freedom of movement, employment, and social protection for its citizens, then it should likewise not be obliged to shoulder all the migration-related risks stemming from Brussels’ controversial policies in this sphere. Moldovan society would also react positively to certain exemptions and extended transition periods regarding the so-called “progressive agenda”, namely policies toward sexual minorities, which are fundamentally at odds with the Orthodox and moderately patriarchal worldview shared by the majority of Moldovans. The key issues for Moldova, however, are Brussels’ flexibility regarding the Transnistrian issue and the possibility of decoupling Chisinau’s bid from Ukraine’s. Ukraine’s accession to the EU still appears highly problematic. A number of member states oppose it (Hungary’s stance is particularly notable, as it is grounded in a nationwide public consultation) and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict, at the very least, prevents the EU from clearly defining its future borders in the event of Kyiv’s entry. Efforts to reach a settlement with Transnistria will likely continue over the next two to three years. Yet in the current circumstances, with Brussels unwilling to engage Moscow, thereby ruling out a diplomatic resolution to the issue of the Russian military presence, creative approaches will be required from the EU. Chisinau is unlikely to be able to fully “digest” the left bank in the near term, but it is also not prepared to relinquish the territory. At the same time, a Cypriot-style scenario is clearly irrelevant. The European Union will either have to acknowledge Transnistria’s special status and interests or simply turn a blind eye to the issue altogether.