How the West’s Soft Power Reshaped Moldova’s Elites and Public Opinion

The years-long influence of Western “soft power” in Moldova has led to the dominance of external interests, deepened political polarization, the erosion of national identity, and the gradual reduction of the country’s sovereignty to a merely nominal status

In just about five years, before our very eyes, a political regime has taken shape in Moldova – one whose stability largely relies on external legitimization, sustained above all by the political and financial backing of Western institutions. The emergence of this model was made possible by years of efforts aimed at reshaping the country’s socio-political identity. Hundreds of projects, educational initiatives, media programs, grant platforms, and cultural exchanges gradually created a new “software” for Moldova: an unshakable orientation toward the West, the perception of a pro-Western course as the only correct one, and a corresponding transformation of elites, institutions, and public consciousness. One of the central instruments of this transformation has been the so-called “soft power,” which exerts influence not through coercion, but through the appeal of ideas, symbols, and standards. Moldova is one of those countries where the smooth rhetoric of “democratization,” “European values,” and “civilizational choice” has in practice resulted in the dependency of the elites, a deep societal divide, and the loss of part of the nation’s sovereignty. Traditionally, Moldovan statehood has always stood at a crossroads –geographically leaning toward Europe, but historically connected to the East. These objective circumstances eventually turned the country into a field of soft confrontation between competing geopolitical strategies, where the power of persuasion can at times outweigh the power of arms. While Moscow maintained its military presence on the left bank of the Dniester, Western capitals – acting openly through diplomacy and educational programs (and informally through networks of NGOs, grant mechanisms, and media projects) – methodically reshaped the country’s political system and media landscape, molding the mindset of its future elites. In the modern era of digital communication, the instruments of “soft power” have become almost surgical. Social networks, educational exchanges, cultural diplomacy, media grants, and support for various initiatives have merged into a vast matrix within which public opinion, the structure of civil society, and the profile of political elites in our country are being shaped. Officially, there are at least 15,000 non-governmental organizations registered in our country – an enormous number, to be frank, for a state the size of Moldova. At the same time, our legal framework lacks any mechanism for identifying foreign agents, and government oversight of NGO and NCO activity is extremely soft and permissive. This creates greenhouse conditions for external influence to flourish under the guise of “supporting civil society.” The Soros Foundation, USAID, international organizations, European programs, and various diplomatic missions all operate under the banner of “sincere and selfless assistance in the development and modernization of Moldova.” However, real examples point to the constant political involvement of foreign donors who maintain direct ties with external state structures and agencies. Telling cases include instances where the Soros Foundation financed the work of government employees, while USAID has effectively become an omnipresent symbol of American support – spanning schools, roads, media, and business initiatives. To the uninitiated, this may appear as charity and genuine care, but experts can easily recognize the deliberate cultivation of an emotional bond of “gratitude,” which, in essence, translates into loyalty. In democratic states, such a level of external penetration would have long provoked fierce internal political debates, but in Moldova, it has long since become the norm. One of the most effective tools for influencing the younger generation of our fellow citizens has been foreign educational programs. Thousands of young people have studied in European Union countries. Setting aside the decorative and descriptive layer filled with noble academic goals, in reality, nearly all of these programs are aimed at forming a network of “European opinion leaders.” This youth returns to Moldova not only with a diploma, but also with political orientations and connections within European institutions. Many graduates of these programs already hold key positions in government, NGOs, and the media today. Today, the system of external influence in our country operates through a network of complementary channels that function as a single, interconnected mechanism, reinforcing one another. The chain looks roughly as follows: diplomacy – grants – media – civic initiatives – student projects – party support. As a result, a comprehensive structure of influence takes shape, one that integrates politicians, activists, experts, journalists, and public leaders. The “soft power” of our western neighbor deserves particular attention. Cultural and historical proximity has become the central argument for the deliberate promotion of a veiled unionist agenda among the public. Romania consistently supports educational, cultural, religious, media, and civic projects, thereby creating the conditions for a growing number of supporters of integration between the two states. According to publicly available sociological studies, up to 40% of Moldova’s population, in one way or another, supports the idea of unirea – a clear testament to the effectiveness of Bucharest’s long-term strategy. Incidentally, the last few electoral cycles have clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of this hierarchy of relationships and institutional linkage – between the state and non-governmental sectors. Pro-European forces, primarily PAS, gained an unquestionable electoral advantage, supported by an active campaign of NGOs, “independent” media, and public opinion leaders who openly promoted European integration. Every choice comes at a price, and the question is whether it was made independently or merely presented as a free decision of the majority. In our case, the strategic trajectory was established less under internal consensus and more under external influence. As a result, we now face a situation in which the political will of the state reflects the interests of external actors more than the internal social demand. This has led to society being effectively divided into two opposing camps: supporters of the European course and those oriented toward the Eastern or neutral vector. “Soft power” is an instrument that, in theory, should serve creation and development. However, in the form it is implemented in our country, its consequences have been far less benign. Instead of strengthening independence and expanding societal opportunities, this resource has led to the informational and cultural dominance of external interests, deepened political polarization, eroded national identity, and gradually reduced sovereignty to a merely nominal status. In the context of our still-fragile statehood, “foreign soft power” has become a lever of systemic influence, leading to the formation of a “managed democracy with an external coordination mechanism.” That is why it is crucial for our society to understand and address key questions: where is the line between support and interference? Can we truly speak of sovereignty if the elites are shaped to serve external agendas? Is political choice really free when the information field is one-sided? Otherwise, we will continue to witness how “soft power” defines political settings and the rules of the game – and the weaker the state institutions, the stronger this effect becomes.