Anton ŠVEC
Several dozens of high-profile criminal cases are currently circulating within Moldova’s justice system, and their review appears chaotic and clearly politicized. The outcome of this overload will determine whether the system holds up or ends up being fully taken over under the pretext of reform
During the election campaign, the judicial system, subjected to a forceful vetting, that is, effectively “reprogrammed” in the interests of the ruling regime, was used primarily as a tool of targeted pressure against political opponents. Unlike in neighboring countries such as Romania or Ukraine, where judicial reforms resulted in clashes between modernized anticorruption bodies supported by the EU bureaucracy and the governing parliamentary majorities, in Moldova the changes simply placed most judicial and prosecutorial institutions under the control of the presidency. This authoritarian mechanism neutralized the ambitions of a number of political actors and was also used to intimidate citizens of certain age groups and viewpoints, who were mass-prosecuted for installing banking apps or for voting “the wrong way”.
Through the judiciary and methods characteristic of a police state, the authorities have achieved full control over freedom of expression and the electoral process, excluding independent media, dissenting citizens, and civic associations from political participation. As a result, we now have a parliament in which the opposition is fragmented and demoralized, competing merely for the chance to be allowed even minimal involvement in the exercise of power through any compromise with the ruling regime. Notably, one of Maia Sandu’s very first steps after the election results were announced was a demand to subject the legal profession to vetting. The goals are evident: to relieve pressure on the already controlled and “tamed” participants in judicial proceedings (judges, prosecutors, investigators), to eliminate the remaining elements of adversarial procedure and transparency, and to reduce the risks of a wave of appeals and overturned verdicts in international courts (Moldova has been systematically criticized and financially penalized for such qualifying rulings by the European Court of Human Rights).
The president’s initiative turned out to be so absurd and provocative in substance that even some PAS representatives and members of the government, including the new Minister of Justice, have so far refrained from openly supporting it. However, it is fully synchronized with and fits into Maia Sandu’s broader strategy (with the active participation of Speaker Igor Grosu and his PAS subordinates in parliament) to restrict the use of and place firm controls on online platforms and messaging services. Taken together, these actions aimed at dismantling the classical system of separation of powers and the free circulation of information will abolish the democratic foundations of statehood and will enable total control over dissent, as well as all political instruments, in the interests of Sandu and her entourage.
In the summer, the judicial system had already been brought to a standstill due to a protest by the lawyers’ community, which forced the head of state to postpone signing the law on the advocates that had been passed by parliament at its last full session. It is possible that the threat of vetting now serves as an additional means of pressure on the Advocates’ Union in order to push this unlawful measure through in the post-electoral environment, as well as on specific individuals currently involved in high-profile judicial cases.
Meanwhile, there are quite a lot of such cases, and they continue to attract significant attention. The topic of drafting absurd protocols for allegedly “buying votes” has predictably faded away, and it is unlikely that the authorities will succeed in securing the extradition of Ilan Sor, Veaceslav Platon, or Marina Tauber. However, even so, the case file of a captured judiciary remains extremely extensive and toxic. Moreover, the PAS regime should not be confident that, after the elections, Western institutions, including the European Commission and other EU bodies, will remain equally indifferent to these violations. Brussels still vividly remembers Kyiv’s recent assault on its own anticorruption bodies, as well as Bucharest’s conflict with Laura Kövesi a few years ago (it is telling that in recent years the EU’s Chief Prosecutor, who was initially supportive of Maia Sandu, has stopped visiting Moldova or publicly commenting on its legal affairs).
In particular, in an accelerated manner and in violation of a whole range of procedural norms and defendants’ rights, criminal cases are being considered against the Bashkan of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, and Svetlana Popan, as well as against the former coordinator of the ruling coalition, Vladimir Plahotniuc, and his associate, ex-deputy Constantin Tutu. The latter is being accused of illegal border crossing, although the nature of his movements clearly does not match the authorities’ earlier statements or the narrative promoted by the investigation. The 15-year prison term demanded by the prosecutors would be absolutely unprecedented in a country where dozens of Ukrainian draft dodgers and migrants from Muslim countries (often bearing no responsibility beyond administrative violations) enter illegally on a daily basis.
The appeal in the case of Evghenia Gutul is also being conducted with demonstrative mockery of the Bashkan and her lawyers, accompanied by direct threats to the autonomy from the security services. It is already clear that her release may become possible only as the result of a deal with the authorities, i.e., a pardon in exchange for admitting guilt and agreeing to resign from her position and leave Moldova.
The schedule of court hearings in the case of Vladimir Plahotniuc is striking – while the defendant himself is attempting to study dozens of volumes of the criminal case, the authorities plan to hold about 25 more hearings by the end of the year. And this is happening despite the fact that the review of the case surrounding the so-called “black kyliok”, in which several well-known politicians are also involved one way or another, has been postponed indefinitely due to an alleged shortage of judicial personnel. All this intense and often unclear activity is shaking the foundations of a judicial system that has taken decades to form and raises questions about democracy, the rule of law, and the sovereignty of the people in the country. Instead of addressing specific abuses and corruption, the total “reconfiguration” of the third branch of government in the interests of the president and the party effectively controlled by her is taking place.
And this is despite the fact that the national justice system ignores high-profile criminal cases when they historically involved representatives of the ruling party and regime, or their close relatives, ranging from the head of the General Inspectorate of Police to PAS deputies in the current parliament.
The Moldovan judicial system is entering a phase of maximum stress-testing, after which it will most likely be left without independence, without professional personnel, and without the willingness to follow the constitution and defend citizens’ rights. Who and in what way will integrate all this dubious “structure” into the European Union, especially considering that it belongs to the so-called first cluster, the “Fundamentals”, which Chisinau is eager to open as soon as possible , is a question that will require exceptional diplomatic skill and endurance from Deputy Prime Minister Cristina Gherasimov and the top partnership envoy Nicu Popescu.