Moldova’s Road to Europe: A Half-Membership and Ukraine’s Hand on the Brake

Although Brussels formally expresses support for the idea of completing Moldova’s EU accession negotiations in the coming years, in practice the coveted membership may occur much later than our authorities anticipate and even then, in a reduced or limited form

Semyon ALBU, RTA: The ruling party, which spent the entire election campaign riding on promises of a brilliant future in the European Union, continues to heavily exploit this now rather faded topic, disguising the coming era of “difficult and unpopular decisions”. To keep the momentum of EU integration from fading, the president traveled to Brussels this week, where she held a series of meetings with high-ranking officials. There, as usual, she was patted on the shoulder, showered with the standard set of polite compliments, and told how wonderfully Moldova is progressing toward the European Union. There were return visits as well: the President of the European Parliament has already arrived in Chisinau to deliver a speech in front of the newly elected deputies. This week also saw the publication of the European Commission’s enlargement report assessing our progress. As always, it radiates optimism, although, in the documents (unlike the bureaucratic rhetoric) there are occasional acknowledgments that, in practice, things are far from smooth. For example, it notes that we have met the conditions to open only three out of ten negotiation clusters, though the Commission hopes we will manage the remaining ones by the end of 2025. As for the PAS party’s stated goal of completing accession talks by 2028, the report describes it as “ambitious, but achievable if the current pace of reforms is maintained”. Overall, it is clear that official Brussels is determined, despite everything, to add new members, including Moldova, within the next five to seven years. Another matter is that the EU’s national governments are not exactly eager to share this optimistic vibe. In order to make the idea of expanding the Union at the expense of countries that are clearly “not of the first tier” more palatable, EU officials have begun to come up with various clever supposedly “compromise” arrangements. Thus, the well-known to us European Commissioner, Marta Kos, unexpectedly told the public in an interview with the Financial Times that the European Union may introduce a kind of “probationary period” for new members in order, so to speak, to test their commitment to the policies pursued by Brussels. In this arrangement, newly admitted states would join the community on a provisional basis: without voting rights or representation, and under the constant threat of expulsion from the bloc for any “deviation from democratic principles”. It must be said that even before this, our “EU contract” already contained plenty of rather unpleasant provisions, politely disguised in fine print: the sale of Moldovan land, which the former head of the EU Delegation, Mazeiks, let slip about; participation in solving Europe’s migration problems; and militarization. But now, without even a slight hesitation, the Europeans are proposing that we settle for some kind of incomplete membership. Yes, supposedly only for a short time, but we all know perfectly well that there is nothing permanent except change. The unfairness of this approach has already been pointed out by many, including former Prime Minister Vlad Filat, who rightly noted that this would mean assuming all obligations to comply with EU legislation and policies, but without having any ability to influence the decision-making process. It must be noted that the reactions to such a proposal have been quite negative. Volodymyr Zelensky, in his characteristic manner, stated that “you cannot be half a member of the EU”. Our authorities also let themselves a bit of criticism. However, it is obvious that while Kyiv may still push back to some extent, no one is going to take our expressions of dissatisfaction seriously. When you are fully dependent on external support, you don’t really get to raise your voice. In general, this whole situation, of course, arose precisely because of our eastern neighbor, whom several EU countries, some openly, some less so, do not want to see in the Union. Hungary is the main opponent of Kyiv in this matter, having even held an advisory referendum on the issue with obvious results. In fact, this week, the head of Hungary’s Foreign Ministry once again reiterated that under the current political regime in Budapest, Ukraine will not be admitted to the EU. In this regard, Brussels would like to replace the obstinate Hungarian leadership. But the problem is that the anti-Ukraine bloc is gradually growing with new members. Since 2023, Slovakia’s leadership, headed by Prime Minister Robert Fico, has also been opposed to supporting Kyiv. And quite recently, in the Czech Republic, which since 2022 had been an important link in supplying Ukraine and implemented a key initiative to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with ammunition, a new ruling coalition emerged after the elections, aiming to halt all military assistance. Against this backdrop, the news that Budapest intends to form an anti-Ukraine alliance including Bratislava and Prague seems hardly surprising. In fact, Brussels is not entirely satisfied with Zelensky’s regime either. Take, for instance, the European Commission report: at first glance, it also contains the usual mantras about “impressive progress”. Yet it simultaneously highlights growing pressure from state structures on anticorruption bodies and problems with judicial reform. The main issue is Zelensky’s clear intent to dismantle the anticorruption vertical built by the West to oversee Ukrainian elites, that did not end with the failed summer attempt against it. Ironically, the Ukrainian locomotive, which we so successfully hitched ourselves to in 2022 and rode toward the European Union at unprecedented speed, has begun to noticeably slow down. Increasingly, EU countries are attempting to pull the emergency brake, unwilling to let this train reach its final destination. In this situation, we find ourselves in a passive role, having lost the status of masters of our own fate. Therefore, if Brussels does decide to apply a regime of “incomplete accession with a probationary period” to new members, I don’t see much chance for us to avoid it. As the saying goes, “take it or leave it”. Given that PAS has left the country no other geopolitical alternatives, there really is no choice – so if necessary, we will agree to both truncated membership, the acceptance of migrants, and God knows what else. The “Ukrainian problem” seems even more serious. There was, in fact, a potential window of opportunity to slip out of the overall package with Ukraine. But as long as Kyiv actively crushed this initiative at its root, mobilizing its circle of supporters within the EU, we simply agreed that without our eastern neighbor, we ourselves would get nowhere. Now, with the anti-Ukrainian front gaining momentum, we risk finding ourselves in a “hostage” situation, where others in principle will be ready to take us under their wing, but not Kyiv. And when it comes to the question of how to deal with this, hardly any of our ruling bigwigs seem to have an answer.