What Threatens the Moldova-Ukraine Tandem?

The Ukrainian ambassador in Chisinau described the political relations between the two countries as a “tandem”, while simultaneously confirming a list of concrete demands that Kyiv has put forward to the Moldovan authorities. But is this duo truly strategically beneficial and sustainable in the long term?

In 2022, Moldova became a candidate country for European Union membership as a result of an unpredictable turn of geopolitical events. In essence, we acted as a kind of “attachment” to Ukraine, which found itself on the front line of armed confrontation with Russia on the side of the Western community. Even the launch of accession negotiations, largely a symbolic act, was easily synchronized between Brussels, Kyiv, and Chisinau. However, within the republic, there are ongoing political debates aimed at ensuring that the partnership with Ukraine and other artificial ideological constructs do not constrain national capabilities and interests or impede development and trade. These rhetorical exchanges concern not only the issue of separating our EU accession bids, although, in any case, this topic is purely theoretical at the moment. Neither country will sign the relevant agreement before 2028, the point at which some clarity may emerge regarding the trajectory of a settlement to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. What is at stake is, in fact, a much broader set of foreign-policy planning questions. For example, the Socialist Party has initiated the creation of an informal parliamentary friendship group with Russia (the PAS majority officially rejected this idea as yet another demonstration of support for Kyiv), arguing that it is necessary to preserve trade and cultural relations with Moscow. Ukrainian Ambassador Paun Rohovei, being thoroughly familiar with the specifics of the region and, both ethnically and mentally, well attuned to the Moldovan political establishment, formulated Kyiv’s position in a manner that was as diplomatic as it was firm and unequivocal. Reflecting on the so-called “tandem”, he reminded everyone whom exactly Chisinau owes for its security and for the clarification of its European integration prospects: “Based on this, we decided to move forward as a tandem. Therefore, I am confident that this path will continue, regardless of the external factors that may seek to exert influence. Today there may be negative pressure on Ukraine; tomorrow negative pressure may appear on Moldova.” According to him, Kyiv will insist firmly on continuing the European path as a single package alongside our country. Kyiv views the current PAS administration, and particularly the new cabinet, as comprehensible and sufficiently acceptable, insofar as this is possible given the inevitable competition between specific economic interests and existing cultural differences. The prime minister and his deputy, who oversees the Transnistrian issue, worked in Ukraine for many years, interacting with various representatives of the establishment. Presidents Maia Sandu and Volodymyr Zelensky have also met repeatedly and trust one another. Paun Rogovei is pressuring Moldova’s partners regarding the continuation of Chisinau’s highly anti-Russian stance. The ambassador demands that Moscow be excluded from the framework for resolving the Transnistrian issue and that Brussels’ role be strengthened, fully aware that neither Transnistria nor Russia will agree, which puts Chisinau in a deadlock and effectively blocks negotiations. He also calls for the removal of the peacekeeping operation on the Dniester: “The first element is the withdrawal of Russian troops. The second element is the transformation of the so-called peacekeeping mission, which is effectively controlled by the Russian Federation, from a military into a civilian operation, with broader participation of the international community under the aegis of an international organization, or, for example, a European one…” In fact, even at this stage, contradictions could arise between Ukraine and Moldova, since rational solutions for Chisinau in the areas of security and political settlement (as well as migration, transport, energy, trade, and agriculture) would require a pragmatic dialogue with Moscow. However, ideologically, this approach is more convenient and comprehensible for Maia Sandu and her team. Especially since at the level of the European Union bureaucracy and many EU member states, a similar line prevails, demonizing Moscow and intensifying confrontation with Russia. Therefore, neither the issue of separating the applications (which is de facto unnecessary, since Moldova can enter the EU on full and equal terms only if it exerts pressure on Brussels jointly with Ukraine, provided that Ukraine preserves its statehood and its strategic orientation after the war with Russia) nor the Transnistrian question will become triggers for a deterioration in Moldovan-Ukrainian relations. Chisinau itself is not seeking to accelerate these processes, instead using the “Transnistrian threat”, the “Russian threat”, and the “banner of European integration” as instruments for preserving the political regime, eliminating opposition voices, and attracting international financial support. Controversies within the “tandem” may emerge in the sphere of energy cooperation. Ukraine’s infrastructure has been subjected to extremely painful and regular attacks, which has long turned the country, even despite a catastrophic decline in industrial output and population, into a net importer of electricity, dependent, among other things, on the transmission services provided by Moldova. These strikes could have been limited if Kyiv ceased its attempts to undermine Russia’s oil production, transit, and refining sector, and if there were even minimal diplomatic developments in Istanbul. But Ukraine is not yet ready for such difficult compromises. Maintaining balance in the system will require increasing effort and restrictions with each passing week not only within Ukraine itself, but also from its key partners, including Moldova. A significant share of Moldova’s natural gas reserves is stored in Ukraine, and for certain reasons Chisinau may find itself unable to use these reserves promptly, including during the winter period. All these factors, together with the EU’s irrational environmental agenda, will continue to put upward pressure on prices in Moldova. Against the backdrop of U.S. sanctions against Lukoil, which also require immediate intervention and costly measures from the government, and the need to provide compensation to the population, Chisinau will predictably face a resource deficit. Romania will remain a partner in this regard, but Bucharest’s potential, both financial and energy-related, is also limited. If Brussels once again agrees to shoulder all the costs, by providing a credit line and political guarantees, Maia Sandu and her team will be able to continue playing at political “Ukrainism”. However, if the financing begins to stall (and Brussels is already, to put it mildly, struggling to cover the war in Ukraine, its own rearmament, and social spending), cohesion within the “Kyiv-Chisinau tandem” may suffer and quite soon, specifically for energy-related reasons. In such a scenario, the president’s office may unexpectedly turn to Hungary’s example (by negotiating exemptions from sanction regimes with Washington), especially since there have never been any real contradictions between Chisinau and Budapest.