How the Regime Is Breaking Down Gagauz Autonomy

The ruling party appears to believe that the fastest way to neutralize the opposition mood in Gagauzia is to strip the autonomy of its powers and special status

The confrontation with Comrat over the local draft law on mandatory study of the Gagauz language has become a highly symptomatic manifestation of the deepening crisis in relations between the central government and the autonomy. Education Minister Dan Perciun insists that the law explicitly prohibits imposing the inclusion of a minority language in the curricula of schools where instruction is conducted in Romanian. At the same time, mandatory study of the state language, including in Gagauzia, is, in his view, out of the question. Although the country’s cultural wealth is in many ways sustained by the population’s multilingualism, the Gagauz language is not only part of the national heritage but also an element of modern potential – being related to and extremely close to Turkish, a language spoken natively by more than 70 million people worldwide (while over 250 million speak Russian). By contrast, Romanian is spoken only in Romania and Moldova (and not by all citizens of these countries), amounting to roughly 25 million speakers. This is a classic example of how the authorities’ nationalism collides with common sense and ends up constraining the republic’s broader global opportunities. In general, the Gagauz issue remains central to PAS’ efforts to homogenize Moldovan society and eliminate political debate and any form of dissent, even when the corresponding mechanisms are explicitly guaranteed by the constitution as well as by national and autonomous legislation. The parliamentary elections revealed the central government’s lack of control over the region’s authorities. If the regime managed to effectively manipulate the voting results of residents of Transnistria or, for example, Orhei, then in Gagauzia it did not even attempt such measures. As a result, PAS received a number of votes amounting to a mere statistical margin of error (only 1,001 people, while the opposition patriotic bloc received 30 times more). The PAS regime remains in constant conflict with the autonomous region for both domestic political reasons and because of its foreign-policy orientation. Comrat is seen simultaneously as a threat to the party’s political dominance and as an obstacle to Moldova’s integration into the European Union. It is worth recalling that in 2014 Gagauzia held a consultative referendum in which, with a 70% turnout, 98.5% of voters supported joining the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (membership in the EU was supported by only 2.5% of participants). At the time, Chisinau tried to obstruct Comrat’s actions (members of the People’s Assembly were regularly summoned for questioning by the prosecutor’s office) and even temporarily froze budgetary funding, yet it failed to disrupt the plebiscite, choosing simply not to recognize its results. At the same time, a legislative referendum was held in which nearly 99% of voters supported the adoption by the People’s Assembly of a local law “On the Deferred Status of Gagauzia”, which regulates the region’s external self-determination, that is, de facto secession from Moldova, in the event that the latter loses its status as an independent state. Thus, Gagauzia has, in formal legal terms, established a framework for secession, which PAS views as a risk that prompts the use of repressive methods of control instead of dialogue and inclusive conflict resolution. Although the authorities consider the earlier referendums illegitimate, the actual sentiments and preferences of the Gagauz population can be validated by last year’s plebiscite, which was organized by the Central Electoral Commission. Nearly 95% of residents of the autonomy voted against the constitutional amendments that the government presented as steps toward European Union accession. These figures became one of the triggers that intensified the attacks on Gagauzia. Evghenia Gutul was sentenced to seven years in prison in August (after being detained in March), and so far, the appellate courts are in no hurry to review the case. Apparently, the dialogue between the presidency and the bashkan regarding the surrender of her mandate is not progressing. In this regard, Dmitri Constantinov, the former speaker of the Gagauz People’s Assembly who resigned in mid-November, proved to be more accommodating. Now the autonomous region must organize new elections. Under the law, this responsibility lies with the regional authorities, and the vote must take place by the end of this year (the previous convocation of the local parliament was formed in 2021). However, the relevant institutions, including the Comrat Court of Appeal, have been dissolved by a decision of the central authorities. As a result, even the election date has not yet been set. Realizing that campaigning among the population is pointless and avoiding dialogue with most of the local elite, Chisinau is seeking to intervene in the electoral process primarily through the involvement of the security services. The head of the Security and Intelligence Service has already paid an unannounced visit to Comrat. The regime is trying to devise mechanisms that would allow it to tighten control over political processes in the autonomous region, as it is clear that PAS members or their appointees cannot win the elections honestly. In any political configuration, both the bashkan and the majority in the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia will remain in opposition to the current government. Therefore, various scenarios are being explored from stripping the autonomy of the powers granted to it by law to subsequently manipulating the electoral process. To launch this scheme, local personnel will in any case be required – people who can claim elected and administrative positions and who can serve as a support base for establishing external governance. The parliamentary majority would then be able to eliminate certain political elements of the region’s special status. However, Chisinau will not succeed in quickly reshaping the identity and views of the local population. In any scenario, Comrat will sooner or later have to be approached through dialogue and cooperation but it is unlikely that the current ruling party is capable of this.