“How We Aimed to Conquer the United States” and What Went Wrong

The visit of Igor Grosu and Mihai Popsoi, who went to Washington with their traditional speeches about countering Russia, did not fit at all into the doctrinal shift in U.S. foreign policy

Sergiu CEBAN, RTA: If diplomatic visits were measured by the level of awkwardness caused by their participants, then the recent trip of our high-ranking delegation to the United States would confidently take second place – right after the tourist who accidentally wandered into the White House, mistaking it for a museum. Moldova’s representation in this key country was entrusted to the Speaker of Parliament Igor Grosu and Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi. But Washington, as luck would have it, is currently deeply absorbed in its own affairs. And precisely during the days our delegates were overseas, it launched a major overhaul of its foreign-policy priorities by publishing a new National Security Strategy. Our authorities, meanwhile, decided that this was the perfect moment to demonstrate to the Americans their loyalty to old ideological dogmas. It turned out just as it always does. It must be said that our domestic diplomacy often creates additional problems for itself. As soon as the new ambassador, Vladislav Kulminski, presented his credentials and officially assumed his duties in Washington, our authorities decided it was time to act! In other words, a high-level visit had to be arranged immediately. Perhaps they wanted to show the domestic audience the “stable” relations with the United States, or emphasize that Moldova remains within the scope of American attention. However, the execution turned out to be, to put it mildly, far from convincing, primarily due to the poor warm-up of the main actors. Instead of high-profile meetings, Grosu and Popsoi ended up with a set of low-significance contacts with advisers and congressmen, among whom only Keith Kellogg stood out. And even he has long played the role of a “seasoned veteran” in American politics, but certainly not a figure of the level usually reserved for the head of a foreign parliament. Moreover, as is well known, Kellogg is already, so to speak, “packed and ready to leave,” since he is stepping down in January. Formally, everything looked respectable, but in practice the reception was more than cold. The main problem for the delegation was not even that they were received and listened to without any visible enthusiasm, but that at that very moment American foreign policy was rapidly shifting course. For Washington, the era of loud globalist ambitions is apparently becoming a thing of the past, and with it the desire to endlessly support minor satellites whose benefir looked questionable even within the old worldview. The new National Security Strategy published by Donald Trump’s administration has generated significant buzz in the international media, especially in European capitals. Its key point lies in revising previous commitments and acknowledging the limits of America’s resources. The document speaks about the need to restore strategic stability with Russia, to seek ways to end the war in Ukraine, and to move away from the doctrine of being the “world’s policeman”. Thus, the United States no longer sees itself as the sole center capable of unconditionally determining the direction of global politics. Instead, it shows a willingness to take into account the positions of other major players, including those whose interests often conflict with American ones. In essence, this signals a shift toward a more flexible, multi-layered system of foreign-policy management, where ideological principles become secondary to the possibilities for practical agreements. A separate section of the strategy deserves particular attention, as it allows for the possibility of transforming the United States’ relations with its traditional allies. The document notes that changes in the socio-economic and demographic structure of several European states may lead to adjustments in their strategic priorities. This sends a clear signal that Washington no longer intends to view alliance commitments as immutable or automatically renewable. In fact, this points to a shift toward a more pragmatic format of cooperation, in which each side must demonstrate the value of its participation. Taken together, the provisions of the new strategy form a conceptually new approach that signals a departure from the previous model of foreign policy. At the forefront is the idea of an international system in which the United States seeks to preserve its influence not through global presence, but through targeted, rational decisions based on calculation and interests – decisions aimed at reducing external risks and minimizing involvement in protracted conflicts. For European countries, including Moldova, this means the need to reassess not only their own policies, but also their expectations of the United States. The United States’ upheaval of its role and position in the world came as a cold shower for those Eastern European politicians who, until now, had built their careers on opposing Moscow and demonstrating dependence on Washington. Among them, of course, is Moldova’s political elite. Therefore, our officials went to the U.S. with the usual speeches about increasing pressure on Russia and continuing a line of resistance. However, it seems they were gently made aware that such rhetoric contradicts the new overarching policy direction. American policy is now moving from messianism to pragmatic multipolarity, which means that the usual proxy confrontation schemes are giving way to negotiation and the allocation of spheres of influence. And this is where the real problem lies. If Russia’s sphere of interests is now recognized as broader than before, Moldova will find itself in a risk zone, since the Kremlin’s geopolitical horizon ends, if not at the Prut River, then certainly at the Dniester. But instead of acknowledging the new realities and developing fresh, appealing ideas, our delegation arrived completely unprepared. It seems our politicians still believe that Washington is full of unwavering supporters of the old course, and that merely visiting American offices automatically guarantees bipartisan backing. As a result, they continue to voice toxic messages that only irritate the current White House administration. When American officials hear our senior representatives declare their determination to “fight Russia to the very end”, it already sounds like a comical anachronism. Especially against the backdrop of the new U.S. strategy, which includes points about the need to restore international balance and avoid the endless expansion of NATO. In this context, Chisinau’s attempt to “push through” its usual agenda looked not just naïve, but clumsy. In fact, our delegation was trying to convince Washington of something that the U.S. itself no longer considers a priority at the doctrinal level. The media loyal to the authorities are now trying to present the visit as “successful and productive”. But if we set aside the propagandistic rhetoric and look at the situation with some degree of impartiality, the embarrassment is obvious. In an attempt to strengthen their political standing within Moldova, the opposite effect was achieved, and the visit became a clear example of how international affairs should not be conducted. Overall, the Moldovan authorities are trying to engage in high-level diplomacy without having the necessary tools or a full understanding of how the current rules operate. Moreover, the nature of their contacts in the United States has demonstrated just how difficult it will be for Moldova’s current leadership to adapt to the changing architecture of international relations. As the interests of major power centers, including Moscow, whose involvement will inevitably become part of the regional balance, gain greater importance, this challenge will only intensify. And this causes certain politicians in Chisinau to experience a kind of paralysis and mild panic, which they typically mask with upbeat declarations about a “steadfast course”.