Is Moldova Heading Down the Cyprus Path?

The project of Moldova’s rapid European integration is gradually turning into a mirage, forcing the authorities to look for alternative pathways toward EU membership

Moldova’s European integration increasingly resembles a journey along an old mountain road. Each turn is more dangerous than the last, the fog keeps thickening, the roadside is crumbling, and there are no landmarks along the way to tell whether the chosen path is correct. All this is unfolding amid a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, with ever more signals indicating that the road to the European Union is not only far longer than previously imagined, but also increasingly unpredictable. The recent meeting of EU foreign ministers in Lviv, from which certain expectations had been pinned domestically, effectively ended in nothing: no concrete decisions, no dates, not even reassuring promises. Europe merely drew up a list of tasks for Ukraine, while for Moldova there was not even a formulation along the lines of “in the near future”. And although a key meeting of the EU Foreign Affairs Council is scheduled in Brussels today, it has now become entirely clear that no decision on the official opening of accession talks should be expected. This is especially true given that Kyiv has been handed “homework” by European officials before it can move on to the next stage. Under these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone would dare to announce the launch of negotiations with Moldova, which remains rigidly tied to Ukraine within the broader enlargement package. As a result, we have once again ended up with a postponement that makes the old timelines sound like bitter sarcasm. On September 4, European Council President Antonio Costa insisted that accession talks would begin “after September 28Э, that is, after the elections. Yet no one has clearly explained what exactly this “after” means. It could be March 2026, or it could just as well be 2027. This stands in stark contrast to the promises made by Maia Sandu and PAS to complete the process by 2028 and then move on to ratification followed by formal legal accession. In this light, “fast-track EU integration” is increasingly turning into a mirage. The head of state has repeatedly stated that she expects accession negotiations to begin by the end of this year, while also signaling that Moldova is interested in continuing along the European path separately from Ukraine. However, these statements have found no response in Brussels. In practice, our country remains firmly tethered to its eastern neighbor. And as long as Ukraine’s progress is accompanied by uncertainty, whether over meeting yet another set of requirements or over the emergence of new diplomatic formulas, speaking seriously about Moldova’s European prospects becomes increasingly difficult. Rumors that Donald Trump’s so-called peace plan allegedly includes the idea of Ukraine’s accelerated accession to the EU, almost as early as January 1, 2027, only add to the sense of political theater. Brussels understand perfectly well that admitting Ukraine “urgently and out of turn” would mean taking on one of the largest states on the continent, which, unfortunately, is not fighting for access to European markets but quite literally for its own survival. For Moldova’s ruling regime, the problem is that it cannot afford either a pause or a slowdown in its rapprochement with the European Union. The country has been living for several years under conditions of internal tension, which in recent weeks has only intensified amid looming unpopular reforms (such as the taxation of parcels from foreign online marketplaces), the cancellation of compensation schemes, the massive deficit projected in the 2026 budget, the absence of any prerequisites for lowering tariffs, and so on. If a pause in the “EU membership” project is added to this mix, the political stability of the current regime will deteriorate sharply. It is also worth noting the cooperation between Washington and Moscow, which are actively elaborating a “Ukrainian deal”, in which Moldova could potentially be allotted a “convenient” role. This, apparently, explains the Moldovan authorities’ desire to jump onto the last carriage of the departing European train. Judging by various indicators, Chisinau clearly understands that it is time to urgently search for alternative routes – informal ones, slow ones if necessary, but at least routes that allow the country to maintain momentum and provide the population with some illusion of progress toward Brussels. A clear example is Maia Sandu’s recent visit to Cyprus, which will hold the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2026. The formal purpose of the trip was to strengthen bilateral ties, security, and the European path. Sandu stated that Moldova is at a “window of opportunity” that must be urgently seized. Her statements were made even more dramatic by her remark that integration is not just a project, but a “survival strategy”. This was her message to Brussels: there is no time to waste, and leaving Moldova in a waiting corridor is dangerous both geopolitically and domestically. Looking deeper, it becomes clear that this visit was more than just another foreign tour by the president. Cyprus, like no other, understands what a frozen conflict entails and the impact it has on the process of joining the European Union. With an occupied part of its territory and the presence of foreign troops, the island has been an EU member for over two decades. Consequently, the logic of our authorities in this case is quite transparent: to try to separate Moldova from the joint package with Ukraine and advance the idea that the country is ready to join the EU under a “Cyprus model”, that is, with an unresolved conflict. This is a delicate and politically sensitive issue for Brussels, but for Nicosia, it is familiar and practically routine. If there is any EU state capable of understanding Moldova’s arguments, it is Cyprus. Moreover, it seems far from coincidental that on the eve of Sandu’s Cyprus visit, Deputy Prime Minister Valeriu Chiveri made a sensational statement declaring that the government intends to separate the processes of EU accession and the country’s reintegration. In other words, no one plans to wait any longer for the Transnistrian issue to be resolved; the left bank could join the EU “at some later point”. The very fact that the authorities publicly voiced this for the first time signals only one thing: Chisinau is seriously shifting toward the Cyprus model. The problem is that Kyiv is far from eager to see Moldova “pulling ahead”. Ukrainian politicians and diplomats have repeatedly, both publicly and behind the scenes, admonished our leadership for attempting to break out of the joint tandem onto a “dedicated fast lane”. Therefore, the simultaneous emergence of reports about Russia’s increased activity in the Transnistrian region, disseminated by Ukrainian media citing the country’s main military intelligence directorate, appears as a preemptive political signal. Its message is clear: Kyiv still has the capacity to create additional difficulties for Chisinau, placing it in an uncertain position with hard-to-predict consequences, especially given the fragile domestic political balance. Our Defense Minister, Anatolie Nosații, of course dismissed these reports from across the Dnipro as “exaggerations”, but that can only reassure the Moldovan audience. For our politicians, the messages coming out of Kyiv serve as a stark reminder that the Ukrainian factor remains critically important and that, one way or another, it will continue to have to be reckoned with for a long time in any movement toward the EU. Although the situation paints a rather dire picture, it can still be predicted that the ruling party will continue to desperately try to accelerate along the European integration track, fully aware of the risk of becoming “stuck” between its linkage to Ukraine and the Transnistrian issue.