Moldova-Ukraine Tandem: A Dead End or a Path to the EU?

Maia Sandu continues her international tour, having offloaded the day-to-day governance of the country onto her appointees in the government and parliament. Two weeks before the New Year, the 2026 budget remains unsigned by the head of state, in contrast to the questionable decrees appointing Dorin Recean and Nicu Popescu as special envoys endowed with no clearly defined powers and an opaque mandate. Scandals involving a financial pyramid allegedly overseen or even organized by members of the president’s personal security detail, the purchase of fraudulent medical diplomas, and the smuggling of weapons from Ukraine do not appear to occupy Maia Sandu’s day-to-day attention. The task of containing high-profile incidents is delegated to a press corps strictly barred from criticizing the authorities and to the government of Alexandru Munteanu, which in a year or a year and a half will be expected to shoulder the main burden of the authorities’ future unpopular and anti-social decisions. The termination of electricity bill compensation for the population or plans to tax overseas parcels likewise seem to fall outside the scope of issues touching upon Sandu’s professional interests, as she positions herself in a leading role on the strategic questions shaping the continent. After Cyprus, the president arrived in The Hague, where she participated in the signing of the Council of Europe convention establishing an international commission to review claims for Ukraine. This is a kind of “anti-Russian tribunal”, which, an unusual case in history, was decided to be launched even before the conflict concludes. On the sidelines of the summit, Maia Sandu held a meeting with her Ukrainian counterpart, during which they discussed not only the situation on the frontlines but also potential peace initiatives. Notably, despite Volodymyr Zelensky’s calls to “continue pressuring Russia and countering all possible manifestations of Russian threats”, the final statements no longer mentioned Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, or even a “just settlement”. Instead, the standard demands were replaced with the phrase “a dignified and lasting peace”. Much was said about the plans of both countries to join the European Union, which Sandu frames in terms of “a space of peace and stability”. Zelensky clearly articulated the key points. For instance, he insists that the EU integration process for Kyiv and Chisinau “must proceed synchronously”, “be simultaneous and closely coordinated”. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha was even more specific in a conversation with Mihai Popsoi, voicing the demand to open the first negotiation clusters “as soon as possible” and “together”. This narrative has been regularly emphasized by Ukrainian representatives across various platforms in recent weeks. Last week, Ambassador Paun Rohovei in Chisinau also highlighted it. This heightened attention from the neighboring country is likely linked to the recognition of the current reality, in which our authorities could have long ago secured this bonus from Brussels, had the application review not been politically coordinated. Ukraine, being in a state of armed conflict, one element of which is a dispute over the country’s territorial borders, constitutes, by European standards, a relatively large state and also lacks political support from several EU members. Moldova does not face such problems. In particular, neither Hungary nor any other country has ever raised objections regarding Chisinau’s accession to the union. We do have critical issues in areas such as anticorruption, judicial reform, and an internal territorial conflict. However, with a certain level of tolerance and goodwill, these difficulties do not appear decisive. Therefore, in Chisinau, Bucharest, and among EU expert circles, half-implied opinions circulate about the possible separation of Chisinau’s and Kyiv’s applications, periodically denied by EU officials. In this regard, Maia Sandu takes an evasive stance, advocating for “a peaceful, secure, and European future for Moldova, Ukraine, and the entire region”, in other words, fundamentally “in favor”, but without specifics. The president acts cautiously not only because of Moldova’s traditionally loyal attitude toward Kyiv. Behind this may lie a rational interest, reflecting some understanding of the decision-making processes of the modern EU bureaucracy, which in no way correspond to the EU’s original values. Thus, unlike many commentators, Maia Sandu cannot rule out scenarios of accelerated decisions justified solely by political expediency, similar to how, in 2022, Moldova obtained candidate status “piggybacking” on Ukraine after the outbreak of hostilities. Today, one of the points in the security guarantees agreement for Ukraine, being discussed with representatives of European countries and the United States, is its expedited membership in the European Union, effectively regardless of the full set of obligations and reforms normally required. Media reports even mentioned an approximate date – 2027, which is faster than even the most optimistic forecasts for Moldova’s accession agreement (2028). In such a scenario, Kyiv again acts as the “locomotive” of EU integration, while Chisinau becomes the beneficiary of political arrangements surrounding the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. Recognizing that, having worked once, history could repeat itself, Maia Sandu does not “close the door” to such scenarios. Even under such membership scenarios (and especially in those cases), territorial issues will sharply arise for both Ukraine and Moldova. After all, the matter concerns the external borders of the European Union, resolving which may require, to put it mildly, a compromise on maximalist demands. In this case, Kyiv’s experience and approach may either prove unsatisfactory for Chisinau or, conversely, provide a carte blanche for unexpected moves, such as excluding the left bank from the process.