2025 in Review: Moldova’s Political Landscape

The outgoing year did not become a time of achievements or breakthroughs, and, by and large, there were no real prerequisites for that. We are entering 2026 burdened with a large set of old problems and rather vague prospects, both for citizens and for the state as a whole

This year in Moldova’s history will likely be remembered as a period of prolonged and, in many ways, exhausting stress-testing of resilience. Most of it unfolded under the banner of parliamentary elections. These elections became the culmination of a three-year cycle that included the presidential race, local elections, and, finally, the formation of a new legislature. In effect, almost all public and political life was subordinated to two core questions. Is the government capable of maintaining control over processes amid internal fragility and external instability? And can the country continue along the European trajectory without a resilient economy, social consensus, and completed institutional reforms? The geopolitical context, the ongoing war in Ukraine, rising tensions in Eastern Europe, and instability in the Black Sea region, only compounded Moldova’s vulnerability, placing it seemingly on the periphery of major developments, yet inevitably drawing it into their orbit. At the same time, 2025 laid bare the limits of the existing governance model. Judicial reform, which had become the cornerstone of the European agenda and the main symbol of the “new Moldova”, has in effect failed, despite the high expectations of the political leadership, society, and external partners. The overall trajectory of modernization leaves much to be desired. This explains the obvious lack of coordination in the actions of state institutions, which have essentially demonstrated their inability to carry through initiated reforms to tangible results. This is an extremely alarming signal given the scope of work that lies ahead on the path toward European integration. Domestic policy The parliamentary elections and the victory of the PAS party ultimately cemented the continuity of the political course, at least in the medium term. In 2025, the social contract of recent years was reaffirmed: European integration as a strategic objective and the rejection of multi-vector nature as the foundational model of the country’s previous foreign and domestic policy. From this point on, a change in course is possible only in the event of major geopolitical upheavals or radical shifts in the regional security architecture – factors over which Chisinau has no direct control. At the same time, the very nature of political competition in Moldova has changed markedly, and the classic division into left, right, and centrist forces seems to have lost its meaning. Ultimately, everything has come to be structured around a geopolitical choice, while the previously fragmented, multi-vector system has faded into history. In this sense, Moldovan politics has become harsher and more polarized, with the key criteria now being “for” or “against” the European path, “West” or “East”. This binary approach has significantly simplified the domestic political landscape and narrowed the space for compromise between different parties and political formations. One of the key outcomes was the decline of the opposition forces, which are experiencing both a leadership crisis and a crisis of substance. Igor Dodon has definitively lost his role as the undisputed leader of the pro-Russian camp, while no new figure capable of consolidating this electorate has emerged. Younger politicians striving for power so far lack sufficient political weight and authority and, most importantly, are not prepared to offer a coherent and compelling alternative for this segment of voters. The main problem of the opposition is the absence of a coherent and constructive program that could complement its criticism of the authorities, which often remains its only tool for political struggle. Attempts by parliamentary opposition forces toward the end of the year to simulate a united front appear unconvincing, as they are incapable of presenting a consolidated nationwide project. As a result, each group continues to fight for its own interests and its narrow electoral segment. Economy and energy Against the backdrop of relative political stability, the economic picture looks far less encouraging. Despite substantial European support, Moldova’s economy remains trapped in structural inertia. GDP growth over the past five years has been only about 0.4% – a figure comparable to the stagnation of the 1990s. Employment has declined to 808,000 people, the lowest level in the country’s history of independence. Social indicators are also alarming. Absolute poverty in the south of the country has jumped from 31% to nearly 50%, while nationwide in 2025 it reached a record high of 33.6% (even higher in rural areas – 42.9%). Emigration remains one of the most acute indicators of the country’s socio-political health. This year alone, nearly 50,000 people permanently left Moldova, and over the past five years, the country has lost more than 300,000 citizens – a figure that, as one might expect, is the highest in the nation’s history of independence. As a result, 2025 has become the point at which these numbers are seen not merely as a demographic issue but as a strategic challenge undermining the state’s prospects and functionality. The energy crisis in Transnistria, which erupted in the first days of the year, became one of the most serious socio-political and economic challenges for Moldova. It effectively destroyed the configuration that had existed for decades and had been part of the reintegration framework between the banks of the Dniester. As a result of this upheaval, a new energy reality emerged, which, as events of the past months have shown, is unreliable for both the right and left banks. Dependence on imported resources, the supply routes of which pass through areas of military risk, makes energy security one of the key factors of national vulnerability both this year and in the next. Foreign policy and security On July 4, the first bilateral summit with the European Union was held in Chisinau, which the authorities described as “historic” and “epoch-making”. The public was told that such a format is applied only to Brussels’ strategic partners, implying that Moldova had supposedly reached a new level in its relations. The authorities were expecting, until the last moment, an announcement of the official start of EU accession negotiations. Moreover, European partners initially did not rule out the possibility of “decoupling” Moldova from Ukraine in this process. However, Kyiv’s principled objections changed their stance, and as a result, in the December declaration of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, Moldova was not mentioned at all. Instead of an official dialogue on accession, Brussels offered only technical consultations on three of the six clusters. This decision effectively dashed the pre-election promises of PAS and Maia Sandu to complete the negotiations by 2027. At the same time, security challenges were intensifying. By the end of the year, it became abundantly clear that the Russian-Ukrainian war once again did not fit within a diplomatic “window of opportunity” and, consequently, will continue into 2026. For our republic, the extension of the conflict is obviously far from an ideal prospect. Increasing incidents of drones entering national airspace and the discovery of munitions at Romanian customs when leaving Moldova all point to the risk of deeper entanglement in the vortex of regional instability. Regions and country’s unity 2025 marked the final shift of Chisinau from a policy of compromise to a policy of dismantling rebellious regions – Transnistria and Gagauzia. The aim of this approach is to achieve maximum centralization, as well as enhanced control and governability. Moreover, the question of the future status of the Transnistrian region is becoming increasingly pressing amid European integration. However, its resolution goes far beyond the capabilities of Chisinau alone, as this historical issue is embedded within a much broader geopolitical framework. The sentences handed down to the Governor of Gagauzia, Evghenia Gutul, and the former Speaker of the People’s Assembly, Dmitrii Constantinov, were not only exemplary but also symbolic. In essence, they definitively dismantled the myth of Gagauz autonomy as a political entity with a special status and the right to its own unique nature, including in the political sphere. In doing so, Chisinau sent a targeted message to the Gagauz elites that any future attempts at desynchronization with the central authorities would inevitably carry criminal consequences. The year 2025 was not a year of achievements or breakthroughs, and, by and large, there were no prerequisites for them. The authorities will, once again, likely present “peace and stability” to the citizens as their main accomplishments, intended to overshadow the socio-economic problems and the rapid decline in living standards. The only question is how long society will be willing to accept such a narrative. But we will find out in the coming year.