From Illusions to Reality: Moldova Facing 2026

One should not pin inflated expectations on the coming year: it is clearly going to be a time not of major achievements, but rather of survival and a test of resilience

The intense, conflict-ridden and in many ways pivotal year of 2025, marked by parliamentary elections, has finally receded into the past. Moldova has entered a new political cycle with a renewed government, a formally stable parliamentary majority, and familiar objectives: continuing reforms and advancing European integration. However, upon closer examination, these illusions quickly dissipate. It becomes clear that 2026 will not deliver a rapid breakthrough. Rather, the next twelve months are likely to turn into a period of painful sobering-up for society, for the authorities, and for the political class as a whole. The harsh reality ahead, compounded by a global crisis, will expose all the system’s vulnerabilities and reveal the true “talents” of the ruling party’s managers. The very first days of the new year, given what is unfolding across the American continents, have clearly confirmed that the world has definitively entered a phase of turbulence. The old rules are fading into the past, while interstate conflicts involving the abduction of presidents are becoming a new “normal". Consequently, amid intensifying confrontation between major powers, a crisis of trust in international institutions, and growing militarization, an extremely unfavorable backdrop is taking shape for states such as Moldova. For our country, situated on a geopolitical fault line and possessing limited economic and resource potential, such an epoch-defining turn of events, regrettably, offers little that is encouraging. We remain excessively dependent on external factors: financial assistance, energy routes, and the decisions of major players. Any storm, whether global or regional, raises not so much the question of the pace of our development as of our very ability to stay afloat at all. Therefore, in the period ahead, the decisive factor will be the quality of our elites and their readiness to act thoughtfully and responsibly, guided by long-term national interests rather than short-term political or electoral gain. Already in the final months of 2025, the first steps taken by the new government laid bare the scale of accumulated problems that had been swept under the “bright pre-election carpet” by Dorin Recean’s cabinet. The budget for this year is, in essence, a document of forced austerity, offering virtually no room for development, let alone the resources for another round of generous social handouts. An enormous deficit, compounded by unfulfilled commitments to the International Monetary Fund and the loss of a $170 million tranche, has become the first alarm bell for the new executive led by Alexandru Munteanu. Most likely, over the course of the year the prime minister will proceed by inertia, avoiding sharp moves and confining himself to patching budgetary holes. At the same time, the window for unpopular but necessary decisions is limited to the next twelve months. By the end of the year, this very government must articulate a conceptual vision for the 2027 budget, already under the pressure of the upcoming local elections. Another negative factor is the shrinking of external support resources, which in election years flowed in relatively steadily but are now visibly drying up. The Moldovan voter has made their choice, and the need to “feed” the electorate to secure the desired voting outcome has disappeared. As a result, 2026 will become a kind of reckoning for populism and for the accumulated problems that for years were masked by generous direct inflows of external assistance. This year, one of the key factors shaping domestic politics will continue to be the deep societal split that had become clearly visible during the presidential election and the referendum, and was subsequently consolidated in the parliamentary vote. This divide is far from abstract: it has distinct territorial, socio-economic, cultural, and ethno-linguistic dimensions. A kind of interim test will be the election campaigns for the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, as well as local races in Orhei and Taraclia, regions that had previously been under the strong influence of Ilan Sor. Despite the local nature of these elections, their outcome will nonetheless indicate how far the central authorities have managed to turn the tide in their favor and eliminate the country’s internal (geo)political fragmentation. Economic indicators and expert forecasts offer little reason for optimism. One of the main signals is a new wave of increases in energy tariffs. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, through whose territory key gas and electricity supply routes pass, renders Moldova’s energy security extremely fragile. As a result, any disruption or political decision beyond the country’s borders, such as the cessation of compensation payments, immediately affects citizens’ bills. Unfortunately, for a significant portion of the population, 2026 is likely to become a year of economic and utility survival, rather than income growth or lower tariffs. It is quite possible that, in an attempt to divert public attention from the worsening socio-economic situation, the ruling regime will likely focus on high-profile court cases, the main one being the protracted “Plahotniuc trial saga”. Yet the very first episodes suggest that, rather than serving as a symbol of justice prevailing, this process risks turning into a political boomerang, discrediting the judicial system itself and, along with it, the current government. On the foreign policy front, the coming year also offers little reason for optimism. The conflict in Ukraine is likely to continue, maintaining a high level of security risks for our country. This involves not only a hypothetical direct military threat but also rising cross-border crime, illegal arms trafficking, and smuggling. Thus, as before, domestic stability will remain tightly linked to the dynamics of the confrontation between Kyiv and Moscow. On the EU integration front, we are most likely entering a phase of “harsh reality”, demanding accelerated political maturation, since no one intends to pull Moldova into the EU any further. The period of unconditional political support from Brussels, driven by geopolitical considerations, is gradually giving way to a more pragmatic approach. The European Union, fatigued by its own crises and expansion, will inevitably tighten requirements for all candidate countries. Accordingly, failure to meet the Copenhagen criteria could slow down or even freeze the accession process. For Moldova, this scenario would be disastrous. Our political managers will finally have to emerge from their lethargy and realize that the six clusters and 33 chapters of negotiations are not mere formalities that can be rushed through in a year or a year and a half, as PAS and Sandu promised. Since the Transnistrian issue has become a factor not only in security but also in EU integration, it would be wrong to ignore it in forecasts. At the same time, no breakthroughs should be expected in this area. Arguably, the main task for the central authorities is to maintain the existing status quo and prevent sharp escalation. The concentration of Kremlin influence exclusively on the left bank of the Dniester makes the region even more vulnerable and potentially explosive from the standpoint of Kyiv’s military interests. This means that Chisinau must exercise maximum caution and diplomatic restraint. Of course, now, as the world plunges into prolonged uncertainty, long-term forecasts lose their meaning. Accordingly, one should not attach excessive expectations to 2026. It is clearly set to be a period not of major achievements, but rather of survival and testing resilience. Under such circumstances, it is wiser to hope at least that things do not become critically worse, and that the state and society can withstand the mounting pressures from both outside and within. Therefore, in order not to “amuse God with tales of grandiose plans”, focus should be placed on the essentials and, importantly, on avoiding the illusions accumulated over a prolonged period of electoral populism and the reckless promises of recent years.