Moldova Mirrors Romania’s Energy Policy Failure

The active promotion of renewable energy while neglecting the development of traditional power generation sources, a model implemented for over a decade across the Prut, threatens Moldova with constant shortages, external dependence, and persistent uncertainty for the economy

The January cold snap of 2026 forced many Romanian citizens to confront the dead-end trajectory taken by such a strategic sector as electricity generation. Over two decades of integration into the European Union, despite massive investments and external assistance, Romania has lost its former agency and turned into a territory chronically dependent on imports. State interests were pushed into the background, granting certain business groups unprecedented opportunities for profit extraction while leaving the population to face ever-rising tariffs. In January, tariffs for households rose once again by 0.1-0.4 lei (to 1.42-1.57 lei per kWh) due to higher electricity transmission and distribution rates charged by different companies. This, unsurprisingly, triggered yet another wave of public discontent. By July 2025, the price of electricity in the neighboring country, adjusted for purchasing power, was already the highest in the EU at €0.47 per kWh. The limited tariff “cap” for a broad range of consumers is no longer in place: it has been preserved only for natural gas bills, where the situation is somewhat better. A number of subsidies remain, but solely for socially vulnerable categories of citizens. The constant generation shortfall during peak hours became even more pronounced during the freezing days of January. Romania is forced to import around 20-30% of the electricity it needs at extremely inflated prices. In cloudy and windless weather, deficits are observed even during daytime hours, clearly illustrating a simple truth: relying exclusively on the rapid expansion of so-called “green” energy does not ensure stability or predictability at the national level. In 2025, the number of photovoltaic installations across the Prut grew at a rapid pace, pushing total installed capacity beyond the 7,000 MW threshold. According to industry estimates, an additional 2,500 MW could be brought online this year. Our leadership also attributes similar successes in the development of renewable energy to itself. In fact, Moldova is simply copying the market trends of its neighboring country. The reasons are obvious: companies close to the government receive significant subsidies for the installation of solar panels and the development of wind power generation as part of the EU policy, and then profit from it. What happens to the national energy system during periods when renewable sources are idle is of little concern to private actors, it falls outside their area of responsibility. The missing volumes of electricity can, of course, be purchased on the regional market, even given limited transmission capacity. The only question is the price. A few days ago, Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu assured that there are no risks of destabilization or “blackouts” for the country. According to his estimates, consumption on the right bank in January of the current year did not exceed 850 MW during peak hours (760-780 MW on weekends). Of this volume, about 40% is covered by domestic generation: 30% (on average around 200 MW) is provided by the combined heat and power plants in Chisinau and Balti, while another 10% comes from wind installations, solar panels, and the Costesti hydropower plant. The remaining 60% is imported from Romania. The structure of these imports is as follows: 2% comes from bilateral contracts at relatively acceptable prices, 24-27% from wind, solar, and hydropower, and all the rest from purchases on the exchange. The situation in the Romanian energy system in the morning and evening hours is well known. Romania has no spare renewable generation capacity for export to Moldova during these periods, despite widely circulated reports of allegedly unprofitable electricity supplies to our country. Some “independent” Romanian media outlets even have to conduct investigations in the genre of exposing fake news. However, in their search for the truth, journalists are faced with a less convenient reality: in some cases, supplies to Moldova under bilateral contracts were indeed made at lower prices by excluding the intermediation of Romanian distribution companies. At the same time, local distribution companies still receive their margin, and there is no discrimination involved. There is another, far more serious problem – the absence of a coherent state approach, in which the interests of private actors and the demands of European officials take precedence over energy security. During cold spells, many Romanian consumers look with envy and bewilderment at Poland, which is ramping up electricity production not only to fully meet domestic demand but also to export power to neighboring countries, pushing output to a record 30.5 GW. And the point is not that Poland has built more wind or solar power plants. It has simply preserved traditional coal-fired generation: around 60% of current demand is covered by coal-fired power plants, another 14% by gas-turbine units, while the entire “green” energy sector remains within the 20% range. Romania could have had similar situation: roughly 60% of total electricity generation could have come from coal and gas, rather than half that level, as is the case today. However, thermal power plants with a combined capacity of around 3,000 MW were taken out of operation at the insistence of Brussels officials and “green energy” lobbyists. The coal-fired capacity that the Romanian authorities have so far managed to defend now amounts to only about 1,000 MW. Romanian citizens themselves are increasingly asking why Warsaw has managed to protect its national interests, while Bucharest has not. Meanwhile, Moldova is actively following in the footsteps of its Ukrainian colleagues, rushing to implement Brussels’ recommendations on the “green transition” and “decarbonization”, while opening up opportunities for those close to power to make money. Real state interests are preferred to be left unspoken, replaced instead with cheap geopolitical propaganda. The topic of a possible resumption of electricity supplies from the locally well-known Cuciurgan power station is effectively taboo. The main argument against it is alleged economic infeasibility: electricity generation from gas at current prices is declared commercially unprofitable, while purchases from across the Prut on the exchange are said to be more advantageous. Such statements are better suited to private entrepreneurs than to state managers, and we leave them on the conscience of PAS officials. The current ministers prefer to avoid talking about the need for generation reserves to balance the power system. They also remain silent about the current cost of electricity generation at the combined heat and power plants in Chisinau and Balti, built in the 1950s-1970s. Meanwhile, it is well known that the cost of electricity production at the same TPP-2 in Chisinau, which today bears the main load, is significantly higher than at the MGRES, especially when it is operating optimally on both banks of the Dniester. Consumers and many journalists continue to insistently ask the same question: when will utility tariffs finally become more affordable and stop topping the anti-ratings? In December, Moldova could have become the most expensive country in Europe for household electricity prices if it had been included in the European ranking of prices adjusted for purchasing power (PPS), based on comparative calculations using the HEPI methodology (Household Electricity Price Index). Yet officials treat such questions as a sign of stupidity and “nostalgia for the Soviet past”, urging people to forget both the tariffs that existed before 2022 and the very reasons for their rapid rise.