Opinion: “Moldova Risks Falling into the EU Integration Slow Lane”

Recent statements by the country’s leadership indicate that the unirea scenario is still being considered as a real alternative to independent accession to the EU

Semyon ALBU, RTA: For the time being, global passions over Greenland have subsided, and the war in Ukraine has once again moved to the forefront of international affairs. As is well known, the past several months have seen a difficult search for compromise solutions based on the so-called “28 points of Trump”. At this stage, most positions appear to have been agreed upon, with the only remaining contentious issue being the status of the part of Donbas currently held by Kyiv, which Moscow is demanding be transferred to its control as part of a peace agreement. Despite the fact that this issue appears insurmountable, there are still chances for an agreement to be reached. Yesterday, Donald Trump discussed a peaceful settlement with Volodymyr Zelensky, and shortly afterward representatives of the U.S. president met with Vladimir Putin. This evening in Abu Dhabi, the first meeting of a trilateral security group comprising Russia, Ukraine, and the United States will take place. This, too, is a kind of breakthrough and another small step toward the long-awaited peace. Of course, it would be imprudent to place absolute confidence in the notion that the conflict will end anytime soon – the degree of antagonism between Moscow and Kyiv is simply too high, and at any moment events could spiral out of control, driving the war into a new phase of escalation. And yet, a faint light has begun to glimmer at the end of the tunnel, something that should give cause for cautious optimism among all reasonable observers. At the same time, it seems our authorities are awaiting such an outcome with barely concealed anxiety, since for them the end of the war promises nothing good. Far too much, both ideologically and in practical terms, has been built around the narrative of “Russian aggression”. Its cessation would shatter the black-and-white worldview within which the ruling regime has conducted its policies. The justification would disappear not only for the systematic failures of an economy that has shown no growth for four years, but also for a range of anti-democratic practices: the tightening of censorship, the erosion of electoral institutions through bans and pressure on political opponents, and discrimination against Moldovan citizens based on their place of residence. It would also become difficult to explain why relations and economic ties with Russia continue to be dismantled, why air links are not being restored, and so on. But most importantly, there is a high likelihood that the EU integration process, which is already effectively on hold, will come to a complete standstill. We can see how enthusiasm among certain EU member states for admitting new members, especially countries like Moldova and Ukraine, is rapidly fading. Yes, some engaged European officials and lawmakers continue to paint rosy pictures of accession almost tomorrow. In reality, however, increasingly frequent and quite official voices are arguing that countries should be admitted strictly in the order of their applications and assessed on their merits. Skepticism is further fueled by the EU’s well-known internal problems related to migration, Trump’s trade wars, militarization, and economic stagnation. In addition, there are factors such as Hungary’s firm blockade of Ukraine’s accession, which would be difficult to overcome without reforming the EU’s governing principles and institutions. The EU bureaucracy, which has been the main driver behind the idea of enlargement, is trying to get creative by floating concepts of “second-class membership” – without voting rights, without representation in European institutions, and with a strict probationary period. Yet even such a curtailed arrangement is by no means guaranteed at this stage. In fact, it was clear from the outset that Moldova’s “remarkable progress” in recent years was a purely political construct, with little connection to the country’s actual achievements. That is precisely why, until 2022, EU accession seemed light-years away, even obtaining candidate status was little more than a dream. The war made it possible to leap over several rungs of the bureaucratic ladder at once. Yet this has largely been window dressing: in reality, Moldova remains very far from meeting the criteria required for admission to the EU on virtually all key parameters. Are those in power aware of this? Almost certainly. Do they understand that in the next elections they may find themselves in a situation where new milestones in European integration have not been reached, while no other tangible successes have materialized either? Of course. Perhaps this is why the authorities now appear to be once again turning toward the idea of EU membership via unirea. It is now perfectly clear that the offhand remark about a referendum dropped in an interview was anything but accidental. It was the opening salvo, marking the launch of a major information campaign that has allowed all prominent leaders and officials to swear allegiance to the ideas of unionism. Naturally, the topic is being handled with care so as not to “spook” the public: officials insist that an independent path toward EU accession remains the priority and acknowledge the limited public support for unirea. Even so, the flames of public debate have been ignited. Experts are already painting a rosy picture of how beneficial a united state would be for Moldovan business, how citizens would enjoy higher social standards and greater labor mobility, and how the republic would automatically fall under the NATO and EU umbrella, implying virtually ironclad security guarantees. The latter point is especially significant, since, by the authorities’ own admission, the unirea is viewed as a priority precisely in the event of heightened security risks. It is not hard to guess who is expected to serve as the source of those risks. All the more so as official Chisinau is doing everything it can to antagonize Moscow: staging diplomatic demarches, stoking hysteria over drones, persecuting pro-Russian politicians, banning Russian citizens from entering the country, refusing negotiations on Transnistria, all while accelerating rearmament. Could it be that all these steps are, in fact, part of a plan to provoke a major security crisis and then, under that pretext, rush into unification with Romania in the name of “protection”? Be that as it may, the situation shows that the unirea agenda, seemingly forgotten in recent years amid talk of an “independent path” toward the EU, was never truly taken off the table. While high-level summits were being held and important guests were visiting with encouraging words about imminent membership, the practical process of building a “common Romanian space” continued unabated. The Moldovan language was effectively abolished, and symbolic initiatives such as “joint government and parliamentary sessions” were relaunched. Strategic infrastructure began passing into Bucharest’s hands: electricity grids, gas pipelines, and now even the country’s only international port. Notably, the latter was transferred to Romania despite the existence of a far more advantageous Turkish offer. But, of course, we all understand that it has very little to do with economics… All that remains is to bring public support for unification to the desired level that has already grown noticeably stronger over the past few years. This is likely what Maia Sandu and PAS will be quietly focusing on throughout the remainder of their current mandate.